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Remote Attestation

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Re: Remote Attestation

#21

Post by michaelmrose »

Waiting for when one can't boot Windows without running snitch software which analyzes everything you do first to ensure you aren't a pedophile then that you aren't a terrorist then that aren't disloyal or un-American.

You won't be able to send email or bank if you aren't running the snitch or any configuration where you could defeat it.

Hell in a boring dystopia run by adults this could theoretically be a good thing! Never miss the next obvious school shooter!

Then look at who actually runs our country.

Re: Remote Attestation

#22

Post by gucci-on-fleek »

greyface- wrote: post #13
mjg59 wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You say that, and also remote attestation is how Signal knows it's talking to a legitimate SGX enclave running the expected payload

> running the expected payload SGX does not cryptographically guarantee this. It cryptographically guarantees that the processor contains a legitimate provisioning key signed by Intel. Intel pinky promises that its processor will then only use this provisioning key in certain ways. This promise is essentially unauditable, and previous SGX bugs have shown that Intel isn't really in a position to make it anyway.

You are 100% correct, but this is still mostly fine: without SGX, you need to completely trust Signal, since it could trivially modify the server-side code. But with SGX, you only need to trust that Signal and Intel won't both collude.

The most likely attacks on Signal involve trusted insiders or configuration errors, and SGX mostly prevents these, since to exploit it, you'd need to bribe insiders in both Signal and Intel, or find configuration errors in both of their software stacks.

Collusion is certainly still possible, but it's much harder to pull off, since it typically requires nation-state-level resources to exploit. Signal does actually have nation-state adversaries, but the vast majority of other software projects don't.

(I personally think that remote attestation is the single biggest risk to the free software movement, but I begrudgingly accept that Signal is a very good use case for it.)

Re: Remote Attestation

#23

Post by Uptrenda »

Gigachad wrote: post #20
Uptrenda wrote: post #16

It's a nice idea, but I wouldn't design any system on the assumption that a TPM needs to stay secure for the system to be safe. There's been so many exploits. We can consider the iphone as an R & D platform for doing blackbox computations. In that nothing is allowed to run that Apple doesn't want. Protecting that is apples bread and butter and they care about it enough to value critical exploits in the millions. Yet…

The iPhone is actually working really well. There has never been a widespread malware attack on the iphone. Only highly targeted attacks on individuals. And Apple even has an answer for this as well with Lockdown mode which renders all of those previous exploits impossible. There's also Memory Integrity Enforcement on the iPhone 17 chips which makes all memory exploits detectable by the OS so it can trigger a reboot…

there are private exploits built into devices like Cellebrite that the police have access to. The system isn't as infallible as you think. Would not be surprised if the NSA and various hacking groups have stockpiles, too.

Re: Remote Attestation

#24

Post by Uptrenda »

klausa wrote: post #19
Uptrenda wrote: post #16

It's a nice idea, but I wouldn't design any system on the assumption that a TPM needs to stay secure for the system to be safe. There's been so many exploits. We can consider the iphone as an R & D platform for doing blackbox computations. In that nothing is allowed to run that Apple doesn't want. Protecting that is apples bread and butter and they care about it enough to value critical exploits in the millions. Yet…

By that metric we should just pack it all up and call it a day on computing in general; because even despite literal trillions of dollars being spent on it, we still haven't found a way to make it secure.

You can make software secure though since it can be patched. How do you patch hardware if it has design flaws? The whole claim behind these hardware cages is they can't be accessed from outside the cage, period. So IMO, seeing multiple failings of this sort kind of makes me not want to trust it.

Re: Remote Attestation

#25

Post by userbinator »

This is the dream of corporate authoritarians everywhere. The dystopian nightmare we all warned about because we saw it coming. "Security" is the "think of the children" fearmongering of the current environment.

As one of our Founding Fathers put it: "Those who give up freedom for security deserve neither."

Remote Attestation: Just Say No.

Re: Remote Attestation

#26

Post by Gigachad »

Uptrenda wrote: post #23
Gigachad wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The iPhone is actually working really well. There has never been a widespread malware attack on the iphone. Only highly targeted attacks on individuals. And Apple even has an answer for this as well with Lockdown mode which renders all of those previous exploits impossible. There's also Memory Integrity Enforcement on the iPhone 17 chips which makes all memory exploits detectable by the OS so it can trigger a reboot…

there are private exploits built into devices like Cellebrite that the police have access to. The system isn't as infallible as you think. Would not be surprised if the NSA and various hacking groups have stockpiles, too.

The iPhone has two main security systems to counter this, one being lockdown mode which disables USB data while the device is locked, and the other is the iPhone will reboot itself if it hasn't been unlocked for long enough. This puts the device in Before First Unlock state where the encryption keys are wiped from memory. This means no software bug can unlock the device because the encryption keys are derived from the users password.

The main attack left is brute forcing the lock screen password and bypassing the cooldown timer. This seems to be the method most used for getting access to phones. This is defeated by having an actual text password rather than the 6 digit password.

So yes they have advanced hacking tech, but the iphone security is remarkably effective and as a user there are a couple of simple measures that make it pretty much unbreakable.

If you believe you are at risk of having your phone taken and plugged in to a Cellebrite like device, enable Lockdown Mode, set a good password and if possible hit the power button 5 times to disable face id.

Re: Remote Attestation

#27

Post by stingraycharles »

userbinator wrote: post #25

This is the dream of corporate authoritarians everywhere. The dystopian nightmare we all warned about because we saw it coming. "Security" is the "think of the children" fearmongering of the current environment. As one of our Founding Fathers put it: "Those who give up freedom for security deserve neither." Remote Attestation: Just Say No.

Could you elaborate on why this is so evil?

Ensuring our remote employees’ machines are secure is a serious problem for us, and it’s absolutely impossible to require employees to be diligent. We require attestation upon connection to our corporate VPN that checks for basic things such as latest security patches, certain tools installed, etc.

Re: Remote Attestation

#28

Post by davidfiala »

Attestation of any type: A double edged sword, where you are guaranteed to lose freedom. Attestation entrenches, empowers, and enriches other entities that aren't you.

Ironic how this post got upvoted in parallel to polar opposite in the #1 slot: "John Deere owners will get the right to repair equipment under FTC settlement" https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48838876

Engineers may debate about what-about-isms of vulnerabilities and counterexamples of TPM failures, but that misses the point: We should be debating about where society will be when devices you paid for serve other masters.

Probably we should just write/vibe/demand better software. Otherwise we're going to end up with a law demanding TPMs that watch more than just your firmware...

Re: Remote Attestation

#29

Post by fooqux »

stingraycharles wrote: post #27
userbinator wrote: post #25

This is the dream of corporate authoritarians everywhere. The dystopian nightmare we all warned about because we saw it coming. "Security" is the "think of the children" fearmongering of the current environment. As one of our Founding Fathers put it: "Those who give up freedom for security deserve neither." Remote Attestation: Just Say No.

Could you elaborate on why this is so evil? Ensuring our remote employees’ machines are secure is a serious problem for us, and it’s absolutely impossible to require employees to be diligent. We require attestation upon connection to our corporate VPN that checks for basic things such as latest security patches, certain tools installed, etc.

It's a tool. Remote attestation isn't "evil" in the same way a knife isn't inherently evil. It's how they're used.

It's not that remote attestation can't be used for good. Obviously it can. It's that there's so many ways we can use it for evil, and given the track the world is on, it's quite obvious it will be.

Re: Remote Attestation

#30

Post by tzs »

userbinator wrote: post #25

This is the dream of corporate authoritarians everywhere. The dystopian nightmare we all warned about because we saw it coming. "Security" is the "think of the children" fearmongering of the current environment. As one of our Founding Fathers put it: "Those who give up freedom for security deserve neither." Remote Attestation: Just Say No.

And those who give up security for freedom soon have neither. You need a balance.

Ben Franklin understood that and so included qualifiers in the quote, which was "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety".

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