The problem with all of this is that security specialists (of which I am one, guilty as charged) have historically campaigned for more complex passwords. This worked well for conventional (non-clustered, non-accelerated) password cracking mechanisms.
Sadly, this starts to fall apart with accelerated and/or distributed cracking. On average I crack a few hundred passwords a week, and more often than not organisations have what I call seed words (e.g. the password reset word or common words used throughout the organisation) and the majority of passwords are variants of them.
My own ability to crack passwords for most algorithms (within a reasonable timeframe) tends to cap at dictionary words with number and letter substitution and somewhere around the 8-10 character mark. Using a phrase means that as an attacker you have to account for other people using more complex but shorter passwords. I'd still suggest getting capitalisation, punctuation or at least a number in your phrase but the bulk of the keyspace comes from the length rather than complexity plus the fact that the people carrying out these attacks are normally cracking more than one password at a time.
For a few years now (since around the time of Oeschlin's paper[1]) I've been advising customers to use longer passwords made of phrases and things they can remember for passwords they regularly use[2] and randomly generated passwords of some length stored in a password safe[3] for things they might forget. The goal of this advice is to make it harder for people to crack passwords and to reduce the volume of passwords people have to remember.
[1] - http://lasec.epfl.ch/pub/lasec/doc/oech03.pdf
[2] - http://xkcd.com/936/
[3] - http://keepass.info/ - one of many options available