Earlier quoted context omitted.
For this application round, ICANN is running an Applicant Support Program, or ASP. The applicants seeking to apply for a TLD this round who qualify for the ASP will have a substantially reduced application fee, among other benefits. Our organization is one such org who has qualified for the ASP so we will not have to pay the full $227,000 application fee.
How much is the reduced fee then? As I understand it's somewhere between 75-85% less, which is still a lot of money. Also, who is paying for the reduced fee, administrative and infra costs? And have you actually submitted gTLD application, or are you trying to crowdfund? Unclear to me.
.self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
221–230 of 410 posts
Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#222States could grant such domains when individuals register their identity, for example, "klaus-mueller- .self". It runs on a VPS, and it is well documented how to create and run a website on that. School kids are introduced to it. Would be an excellent entry point into digital sovereignty for citizens.
Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#223Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#224The "one free domain per person" isn't the interesting part really - that will be hard to police unless domain name is a function of ID proof (avoids squatting). 0) The actual intersting part of a new TLD can be growing reputation by post-facto taking away a domain without recourse in case of squatting. Instead of adversarial takedowns (which produce false positives as noted), let anyone challenge an inactive domain…
Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#225Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is good that Microsoft Vega is popularizing zero-knowledge identity-based attestations. It's unfortunate that they're doing so in a relatively inflexible way. I wish the Vega people had oriented their work around general-purpose zkVMs instead of application-specific ZK circuits. The latter is a fleeting efficiency win; the former is a permanent flexibility advantage. ZK-based privacy advocates shouldn't over-index…
Disagree with this. RISC Zero is useful for crypto use-cases: Other people need to verify an exact program was run. The identity use case is about connecting sources of trust (document issuers) with consumers of that trust ("this is a real person") in ways that don't release more than the minimum information required ("the passport office has signed that this is a real person so we can trust that"). Single purpose ci…
> Single purpose circuits make a lot of sense for this
No, they don't. They lock your system into a single set of trade-offs without an advantage to offset it. They're premature optimization. How do you think ZK systems can be made resilient to cloning attacks without hardware locking if your ZK vocabulary is limited to stupid BBS-style selective disclosure and nothing else?
Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#226Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#227Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#228Earlier quoted context omitted.
I had a similar class where they threatened to fail us if we didn't use Dreamweaver and instead wrote our own html.
Were they paying for the Dreamweaver licenses?
Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#229Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is good that Microsoft Vega is popularizing zero-knowledge identity-based attestations. It's unfortunate that they're doing so in a relatively inflexible way. I wish the Vega people had oriented their work around general-purpose zkVMs instead of application-specific ZK circuits. The latter is a fleeting efficiency win; the former is a permanent flexibility advantage. ZK-based privacy advocates shouldn't over-index…
Can you talk more about RISC Zero? Does it require a TEE of some sort? I had trouble finding a quality mid-detail spec of how it works; lots of marketing materials basically.
For example, age verification: I can run a program that takes a signed time-stamp and an officially-signed birth certificate and produces a yes/no "over 18" boolean, then prove to you I actually ran this program, not just "return true", but WITHOUT revealing the birth certificate.
It's a really neat facility that too few people are thinking about. We've had zero knowledge systems for a few decades now, but until now, each one has been a special bespoke mathematical object that would take years to develop. Over the past year or two, we've 1) made the things 1000x faster, and 2) made it possible to write arbitrary code under zero knowledge instead of having to make each ZK system a PHD thesis.
Others say that zkVMs are pointless because they're less efficient than these bespoke mathematical objects. Yes, they are. So what? The flexibility is worth it. Others say that zkVMs came out of Etherium, so they're only good for "crypto" stuff. False. Sure, it's the Etherium people who did a lot of foundational research into efficient zkVMs. We owe them a debt of gratitude, because they made a new kind of CS object that's going to be useful for tons of things not tied to Etherium or web3 in any way.
Anyway, if you want to get a feel for fully programmable ZK systems, check out https://noir-lang.org/, a programming language for ZK programs (not a zkVM, but same UX). Or https://github.com/a16z/jolt, which lets you run normal Rust under zero knowledge.
Today, you can write normal-looking code and have it execute under zero knowledge, and, importantly, efficiently. You literally couldn't do this two years ago, and it changes everything.
Re: .self: A new top-level domain designed to support self-hosting
#230The "one free domain per person" isn't the interesting part really - that will be hard to police unless domain name is a function of ID proof (avoids squatting). 0) The actual intersting part of a new TLD can be growing reputation by post-facto taking away a domain without recourse in case of squatting. Instead of adversarial takedowns (which produce false positives as noted), let anyone challenge an inactive domain…
I am probably missing something, but how DNS TXT updates can be made difficult to automate?
Many ways of adding friction to obtaining the updatable value - which a human owning a domain would be happy to do, but a squatter would not want to.