Exept PGP could run on freely available hardware. What makes Mythos vulnerable is the centralization and scale of compute required and its proprietary nature. History shows that export controls fail on knowledge, but are damn effective on commercial products.
How so? 80% of Anthropic's revenue comes from outside the United States. There's no way to justify high capex, and US-personnel only research labs and pretend to keep the lead in AI at the same time. You either compete square and fair, or you're gonna stay behind.
From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
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Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#42It's a very brief history: it consists of three examples, only one of which isn't in the title. And the middle one is arguably a success story because the government did stop a bunch of spyware vendors it particularly disliked. That they turn a blind eye to some others is not really a policy failure, it's a deliberate political choice. The obvious difference between PGP and Mythos is that Mythos is a service you buy…
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#43It's a very brief history: it consists of three examples, only one of which isn't in the title. And the middle one is arguably a success story because the government did stop a bunch of spyware vendors it particularly disliked. That they turn a blind eye to some others is not really a policy failure, it's a deliberate political choice. The obvious difference between PGP and Mythos is that Mythos is a service you buy…
I want to put this charitably, but you come out swinging by saying this is "over hyped"... You clearly don't work in a role dealing with attacks from these models. They've changed the game, and for the worse. Capabilities that used to be available only to nation-state attackers are legitimately commodified, or nearly so.
Local models will catch up and then you won’t be able to legally download them. I’m guessing DeepSeek 5 will be illegal to download even if it’s only opus 4.x level when it’s released.
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#44There's no effective way of enforcing export controls on local software like PGP etc. Whatever they say someone will leak it. It is possible to shutdown access to hosted services, as happened with Fable, but it can't really be done selectively. The US government wanted to allow it for US nationals only but Anthropic couldn't do that and so shut it down for everyone. Even if they did tie Claude accounts to nationality…
You could quite effectively set up access to Fable with know-your-customer, attested clients/workstations, and then inspection of what the session is actually used for to detect out-of-country use. It's not impossible.
Except for xAI/Grok. Government officials in charge have deep connections there and will never apply such rules to them.
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#45Brutal own goaling by the USA. I'm glad it happened, but the USA had a golden opportunity to subsidize domestic providers for 10 years and lease to China to discourage competition and side innovation. DeepSeek and Qwen would have been neat parlor tricks, never developed further because the US subsidized mega models would have been too cheap and reliable to make them necessary. Nope! USA played its hand and forced the…
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#46> Amazon CEO Andy Jassy also reportedly alerted the administration after Amazon’s own researchers, he said, found a way around Fable 5’s safeguards. Anthropic disputes the “jailbreak” label Doing god’s work there, Andy, thanks /s Wonder what Anthropic internal messages look like about his move. Does Anthropic have a meme slack channel?
And probably any company David Sachs invested in.
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#47[0]: I know it has never been excellent in terms of quality, but still...
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#48Trump's export controls to China seem to be having the exact opposite effect as intended, and are (as a less befuddled mind might have anticipated!) actually accelerating their technical advance. Huawei is a good case in point, about to have a 100% domestic replacement for NVIDIA chips (& CUDA stack), not reliant on TSMC, ASML, Samsung, SK Hynix... Initially Huawei's Ascend AI chips had used HBM memory from Samsung a…
It depends how good the US labs get at stopping distillation of their models.
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Mythos is a service you buy from a US company, not source code you can procure from anywhere and compile on your own weren't chinese labs training on US Ai outputs? a looot of ai power is in correct data to train for - that's pretty much like inviting workers to your factories, they won't take machines with them, but will see and consume all the processes
I doubt that it has ever been possible to obtain enough output tokens from OpenAI or Anthropic to be useful for training other LLMs. In any case, had that been possible in the beginning, it stopped being possible long ago, because any suspicious accounts would be banned and the cost would be prohibitive even if they were not banned. On the other hand, anyone can train new LLMs using the open weights Chinese LLMs, or…
there's also a market for chinese labs sending checkpoints to US companies to be trained on US compute and sent back
i'm surprised that so many people take chinese tech reports about how they train their models at face value tbh
Re: From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn't stop anyone
#50By choke-pointing commercial efforts to export cryptographic tech the NSA got a perfect view and control lever of expertise export and transfer.
My hunch is that while deploying An algorithm is easy, deploying a system that is actually secure as a whole end to end requires a lot know how.
Bottom line it’s a bot naive to think that NSA is simultaneously very capable at being an omnipresent spy and is so stupid to not recognize that export controls have obvious holes.