Live data from Hacker News

A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

blog.lopp.net

121–130 of 248 posts

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#121
post #65

Any particular reason yall can't just argue in court that by creating opportunities for your PII to be stolen your governments (state or federal or both) are actively harming you economically? Sure, not much money to be had by fighting that fight but basically any PAC should have the means to do this and by claiming money is at stake and not people's actual safety you do have a better chance at this not being dismiss…

Unless you've had fraud committed against you, that's a hard sell. What dollar figure do you use as the basis? Are you suing for years of credit monitoring? Because that's typically the solution for people who are the victims of PII leaks. One could argue that it's a failure of law enforcement or telcos or regulators to do enough to prevent fraud and maaaaybe bring a class action or something, but that's a massive st…

https://www.newsnationnow.com/business/your-money/annoyance-...

Suggest phone scams are a $26 B per year industry.

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just because a call is a spam call doesn't mean it is spoofed. STIR/SHAKEN ends spoofing but anyone can ultimately buy a phone and make calls that are spammy.

Spoofing isn’t ended at all Almost every spam call has that I get, is spoofed. Someone here explained it, once. I think the spoofed calls use a legacy transport tech that can’t be forced to validate.

Can't that legacy transport be blocked / not-be-peered with then? That's what usually happens with old insecure tech that is being phased out.

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#123

We really just need telcos to stop allowing caller id spoofing. Doesn’t even need your name, but with a real number we could actually report these scams. You can still allow people to hide it, but then by default every non-business phone should block calls with hidden numbers.

What ever happened to SHAKEN/STIR? I thought this was supposed to happen 5 years ago. Did they just chicken out on the prospect of actually shutting down telcos sending spam volume? I still get loads of spam phone calls, so clearly something went wrong (or slow enough to be indistinguishable from wrong).

I love a good tortured acronym:

> SHAKEN system, short for Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs [...]

> The name was inspired by Ian Fleming's character James Bond, who famously prefers his martinis "shaken, not stirred". STIR having existed already, the creators of SHAKEN "tortured the English language until [they] came up with an acronym."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STIR/SHAKEN

(Unrelatedly, seeing a slash used casually within the URL slug feels so wrong)

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#124
post #53

In my opinion, the real fix to scam, spam, and robocalls is to pass along the REAL(TM) Caller ID information not just the caller ID but the actual billed Caller ID information and allow the recipient easy ways to drop the calls when those two don't match. I don't know exactly the technical details of Stir/Shaken but someone somewhere is paying / getting paid for each call and this information should be transparently…

I was nodding in agreement, but I realized there must be some catch here. If this was that simple it probably could've been implemented a while ago.

My guess is that there's some requirement that if it's a working number, it must be able to dial emergency services and that's the loophole that's being exploited. So the FCC's answer is if all numbers must work, push the check directly on the subscriber.

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#125
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just because a call is a spam call doesn't mean it is spoofed. STIR/SHAKEN ends spoofing but anyone can ultimately buy a phone and make calls that are spammy.

Sure, but with phone numbers that can't be spoofed, telcos can terminate service, and filtering technologies can block calls. Spam gets expensive if you have to buy new service every five calls.

It does. But the spammers still do it. Because eventually they hit one person who gives them a thousand dollars or whatever and it pays off.

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#126
They would do well to make a better CTA for their call to action. Here's the link from the article:

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/26/2026-10...

I think that gets you most of the way to a link that somebody on HN dropped a few days ago:

https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filings/express

It requires the docket-id to complete:

Docket No: 17-59

You can double check that Docket Number here: https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-seeks-comment-enhanced-know...

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just because a call is a spam call doesn't mean it is spoofed. STIR/SHAKEN ends spoofing but anyone can ultimately buy a phone and make calls that are spammy.

Spoofing isn’t ended at all Almost every spam call has that I get, is spoofed. Someone here explained it, once. I think the spoofed calls use a legacy transport tech that can’t be forced to validate.

How do you verify it is spoofed? Have you asked your carrier to drop unverified calls from your service?

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#128

We really just need telcos to stop allowing caller id spoofing. Doesn’t even need your name, but with a real number we could actually report these scams. You can still allow people to hide it, but then by default every non-business phone should block calls with hidden numbers.

unfortunately, the grift economy is hyper-meritocratic: If you can figure out a scam and it makes money, who are we, as capitalists, to stop you? You take out the lower rungs of the grift economy, then whose to say who can fleece the tax payer with a repainting of a reflecting pool on tax payer's dime. It's a slippery slope, really.

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#129

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> the most blatant attempts at subverting due process This seems so clear to me; KYC is an end run around the constitution. But how do we stop it? If we legislate "no KYC" then what is my recourse when an imposter empties my accounts? You'd want it to be at least allowed. But if we allow industry to require KYC "we will only deposit your pay to a verified bank account" then you may end up with de facto KYC if not de…

>But how do we stop it? Use Monero as much as possible. If enough people adopted it, there's absolutely nothing they could do to stop it short of turning off the internet entirely. Even China, with the strictest internet controls in the world, hasn't managed to stop people paying for banned goods and services in crypto there.

I'm all for cryptocurrency as a way to fight both KYC and money-dilution, but it's still not user-friendly. Regular people need a way to clog the gears too.

Re: A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

#130

Let me give you an analogy: Someone keeps blaring an airhorn outside your window at 4am. It's making it difficult for you to sleep. The government, in their bountiful wisdom, decides to hold an emergency meeting, and agrees to pass a law that people need to show an ID to buy an airhorn. You're appalled. This is an invasion of privacy! You protest outside of city hall. You try to get some of your neighbors onboard, bu…

The funny thing is most of the world had already pioneered the airhorn ID long ago. Very few of them saw any decrease in 4 AM airhorn activity, yet some are already well-known to arrest and harass airhorn users to international human rights observers' condemnation.
Post reply on HN