Exif Smuggling (2025)
21–30 of 32 posts
Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#22Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#23It isn't necessary to use Exif to embed arbitrary data inside an image. Could as well use PNG extra chunk, JFIF app marker, or simply append data to the end of the file. It would be more interesting to devise a method that survives all extra data stripping and re-encoding, perhaps taking advantage of deterministic encoders, assuming they don't randomize pixel data on purpose. In other words: turning the image data st…
Do you mean steganography?
Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#24Oh, that's clever. It's not just hiding the payload in the Exif, it's hiding the fact that the payload came from the network at all, by reading it from the browser cache (presumably after embedding the image into a page the user visited). So you have a package that doesn't include (directly) malicious code or make network calls, yet it can still run malicious code from the network. This is much better than simple obf…
I suppose image sanitizers come soon to browsers. Only sanitized images will be cached; anything the browser can't make sense of will be thrown away.
Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
Isnt this the principle behind synthid?
Maybe if you look at it from far away enough. Watermarking tries to resist image data manipulation. Smuggling data is concerned with preservation of bytes. Though if we're executing arbitrary code on the target anyway, ways of embedding data in an image are vast, including watermarking/steganography.
Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#26Oh, that's clever. It's not just hiding the payload in the Exif, it's hiding the fact that the payload came from the network at all, by reading it from the browser cache (presumably after embedding the image into a page the user visited). So you have a package that doesn't include (directly) malicious code or make network calls, yet it can still run malicious code from the network. This is much better than simple obf…
More than that; the trigger code can sit passively and just check the cache for whatever payloads may come its way. I suppose image sanitizers come soon to browsers. Only sanitized images will be cached; anything the browser can't make sense of will be thrown away.
Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#27Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#28Why is this a link to a random fork that has no commits, rather than the original?
Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#29Oh, that's clever. It's not just hiding the payload in the Exif, it's hiding the fact that the payload came from the network at all, by reading it from the browser cache (presumably after embedding the image into a page the user visited). So you have a package that doesn't include (directly) malicious code or make network calls, yet it can still run malicious code from the network. This is much better than simple obf…
More than that; the trigger code can sit passively and just check the cache for whatever payloads may come its way. I suppose image sanitizers come soon to browsers. Only sanitized images will be cached; anything the browser can't make sense of will be thrown away.
Re: Exif Smuggling (2025)
#30Many many years ago I saw someone using an image hoster which only checked mime type, and not filename. That's the important bit after all right? Uploading an image as image.php worked, and if the exif comment contained php code, it ran.
The passwords were both "internet".