171–180 of 261 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I suppose you meant GPT-2, but for years? Did they say the same about subsequent models?
They did it for 2 and 3, however it looks like they didn't for 4 and 5. GPT-2: https://slate.com/technology/2019/02/openai-gpt2-text-genera... GPT-3: https://www.itpro.com/technology/artificial-intelligence-ai/...
It’s clear that Anthropic has run out of the compute capacity needed to serve Mythos publicly. They’re using security concerns to mask their inability to deliver the model at scale, while still trying to maintain their lead over OpenAI. As a result, they’ve chosen to release it privately under the banner of an “ethical” rollout.
In case the topic of memory safety is interesting to anyone I've been experimenting with using AI agents to port common web infra projects to safe/ performant Rust. Somewhat inspired by the Bun port - was thinking that at some point memory safety might be such a big deal that people just need drop in replacements. - Valkey/ Redis port here https://github.com/ianm199/valdr (passes ~99% of single node test suite, real…
I find this kind of rewrite both disrespectful and completely useless. Useless because the difficulty isn't getting to a working state but maintaining it. You now have to build a community around it to make any of this worthwhile. What would this software be worth if security issues weren't patched and bugs weren't fixed? You can't do this alone. And I find it disrespectful because people have spent decades building…
But this is more about memory safety - you can have immense respect for the giants who built these tools but also be worried that memory safety might become an even bigger deal. If someone found a memory zero day in nginx or openSSL for example that is a very big deal!
I think this is one strategy we should look into, hopefully people in the C community look into other options like project Glasswing/ next generation fuzzers etc. When the world of security is changing so fast it is good to get a lot of shots on net.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
A lot of social engineering attacks die the second you have domain bound 2FA. Not everything, but a lot. But the idea that we'll squash all of the critical vulns is simply nonsense, despite the weird Firefox blog posts that indicate otherwise.
We don't need to squash all of them, we need to squash all of them that are practically findable by current and very near term frontier models.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's someone who is confident enough to have an evidently successful enough career to be able to access Mythos in its currently-limited rollout and yet not take themselves terribly seriously online. Realistically their opinion deserves to hold more weight than the median HN comment.
I dunno, I trust the engineers working on Firefox or the Linux kernel more than some random pseudo-anonymous Mastodon account - https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/05/mozil... https://www.theregister.com/software/2026/03/26/linux-kernel...
That said: I already was aware of Mozilla's account and despite what you are thinking, it essentially confirms everything.
> The biggest differentiating factor was the use of an agent harness, a piece of code that wraps around an LLM to guide it through a series of specific tasks. For such a harness to be useful, it requires significant resources to customize it to the project-specific semantics, tooling, and processes it will be used for.
Yep. Sounds exactly right. So the question is do we really need Mythos for this or can almost any reasonably close to frontier AI model accomplish similar results with a sufficiently advanced harness?
Jury's out but my vote is "probably most of the way". After all, alongside all of the splashy zero days dropped by eager AI companies, Greg Kroah-Hartman has been posting many useful, if minor patches to the Linux kernel produced by nothing more than a single 128 GiB Framework Desktop. So apparently, even small models can be very useful if you can find a way to get the noise out.
Mythos could still be very useful and effective and still be mostly a marketing ploy, and that's because until very recently investment in trying to make LLMs work for security auditing has been underserved. Without more substantial information, it's difficult to tell how much better at security research Mythos is vs say, Opus or DeepSeek 4 coupled with a good agent harness would be.
And in that sense, it's the same sort of crap as the GPT-2 and GPT-3 releases. A lot of hooplah about how dangerous it is to humanity. Then it turns out it's only dangerous enough that it needs to be gated behind an additional monthly subscription.
I don't get how this is event front page of HN.
In case the topic of memory safety is interesting to anyone I've been experimenting with using AI agents to port common web infra projects to safe/ performant Rust. Somewhat inspired by the Bun port - was thinking that at some point memory safety might be such a big deal that people just need drop in replacements. - Valkey/ Redis port here https://github.com/ianm199/valdr (passes ~99% of single node test suite, real…
Are you preserving the original software licenses, or AI-laundering the code in the manner[1] of https://malus.sh 1. AI-rewrites are not clean room implementations.
In the meantime, not everyone with actual access to the model are all that impressed. https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/116679693992983945
It’s clear that Anthropic has run out of the compute capacity needed to serve Mythos publicly. They’re using security concerns to mask their inability to deliver the model at scale, while still trying to maintain their lead over OpenAI. As a result, they’ve chosen to release it privately under the banner of an “ethical” rollout.
Jack Clark, co-founder of Anthropic said the following at an Oxford lecture last week ([0], at around 10 and 12 mins): "It's a technology that we do not fully understand because it's more grown than made. And it is a technology that you can concoct plausible scenarios where it could kill every single person on the planet. So to think building this technology is without risk would be an act of hubris or insanity. [...…
(The ambiguity of sarcasm is intentional here.)
I'll share the first-hand account I recently got from someone else. > We've used it at work > it is... not as hype as everyone is concerned about > I'd argue the framework around it for security scanning is the arguably more useful side of the tool, definitely doesnt take a huge model to get all the issues it flagged on our systems > For us, it absolutely flooded us with noise > I mean hundreds if not thousands of fa…