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Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

theregister.com

21–30 of 103 posts

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#21
I've been working with Microsoft products since about 1989. It has been mostly miserable, like living with a schizophrenic gorilla. You wake up in the morning and don't know how fucked your day is going to be. Dealing with them has been absolutely impossible even when you were one of their "gold" tier partners back in the day.

I hope the promise of a July 14th threat goes as planned. They need to hurt. And everyone needs to see the risks they are taking by using their products.

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#22
I read a little about BitLocker. It seems to store the encryption key in TPM and acquire it automatically after boot. I wonder, can encryption key be extracted by inserting a rogue PCIe card and reading it from memory, or by inserting a rogue DDR memory card with a backdoor to read the key from it, or by sniffing CPU - TPM bus?

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#23
post #19

The best interests of the customers of Microsoft is an immediate apology, a payment of at least $100,000, and a signed agreement pledging that no (further) legal action will be taken. The denial of Microsoft is just as harmful as the exploits of these flaws.

or everyone just dump all their exploits on Saturday morning 2AM, then buy puts.

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#24

I read a little about BitLocker. It seems to store the encryption key in TPM and acquire it automatically after boot. I wonder, can encryption key be extracted by inserting a rogue PCIe card and reading it from memory, or by inserting a rogue DDR memory card with a backdoor to read the key from it, or by sniffing CPU - TPM bus?

Sniffing the TPM's been available for quite some time, actually - and quite cheap!

https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing

The best way would be to arguably keep the key completely off the TPM and use remote attestation. There's some preboot products out there like WinMagic SecureDoc* that use a little Linux partition, spin up just enough to get a network connection up to a remote server, provide authentication services, and then send the Bitlocker key down, unlock the partition, and chainload onwards to Windows.

* I acquired an enterprise device on eBay and was VERY surprised to find this product on it as the preboot protector. Zero way to crack in from my end, so I applaud it. There's even some MFA solutions they offer around this! https://winmagic.com/en/solutions/mfa-windows-login/

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#26
post #24

I read a little about BitLocker. It seems to store the encryption key in TPM and acquire it automatically after boot. I wonder, can encryption key be extracted by inserting a rogue PCIe card and reading it from memory, or by inserting a rogue DDR memory card with a backdoor to read the key from it, or by sniffing CPU - TPM bus?

Sniffing the TPM's been available for quite some time, actually - and quite cheap! https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing The best way would be to arguably keep the key completely off the TPM and use remote attestation. There's some preboot products out there like WinMagic SecureDoc* that use a little Linux partition, spin up just enough to get a network connection up to a remote server, provide authentica…

Something I've never understood about TPM attestation, is what happens if you plug the TPM into a microcontroller and give it all the same measurements that it would normally receive during a normal boot? Would that let you spoof attestations?

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#27

I read a little about BitLocker. It seems to store the encryption key in TPM and acquire it automatically after boot. I wonder, can encryption key be extracted by inserting a rogue PCIe card and reading it from memory, or by inserting a rogue DDR memory card with a backdoor to read the key from it, or by sniffing CPU - TPM bus?

yes sniffing is possible, for now im waiting for some pluton variant to start making its way into the chip and die stream.

the concept is to shield the TPM its bus, and any keys whith the CPU chip.

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#28

I read a little about BitLocker. It seems to store the encryption key in TPM and acquire it automatically after boot. I wonder, can encryption key be extracted by inserting a rogue PCIe card and reading it from memory, or by inserting a rogue DDR memory card with a backdoor to read the key from it, or by sniffing CPU - TPM bus?

[deleted]

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#29
post #19

The best interests of the customers of Microsoft is an immediate apology, a payment of at least $100,000, and a signed agreement pledging that no (further) legal action will be taken. The denial of Microsoft is just as harmful as the exploits of these flaws.

or everyone just dump all their exploits on Saturday morning 2AM, then buy puts.

> or everyone just dump all their exploits on Saturday morning 2AM, then buy puts.

But nobody can buy PUTs at 2am on a saturday morning? You should buy PUTs on a friday before close then dump the exploits no?

Re: Microsoft 0-day feud escalates as researcher threatens another exploit dump

#30
post #26
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sniffing the TPM's been available for quite some time, actually - and quite cheap! https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/articles/TPM-sniffing The best way would be to arguably keep the key completely off the TPM and use remote attestation. There's some preboot products out there like WinMagic SecureDoc* that use a little Linux partition, spin up just enough to get a network connection up to a remote server, provide authentica…

Something I've never understood about TPM attestation, is what happens if you plug the TPM into a microcontroller and give it all the same measurements that it would normally receive during a normal boot? Would that let you spoof attestations?

TPM-only saves you against someone pulling your drive. Probably more than enough for a USB drive. Enable startup PIN if you’re worried about someone grabbing the whole laptop.
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