Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
91–100 of 200 posts
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#92I got "overblocked" for this one: rm -rf node_modules && npm install but actually if you're only removing `node_modules` and you have a working package-lock.json already, what you want is `npm ci`; `npm install` can mutate package-lock.json and potentially expose you to supply chain attacks. If you use `npm ci` I think you don't need to `rm -rf node_modules`, either. Anyway you should generally run `npm ci` except wh…
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#93--dangerously-skip-permissions is the only way to fly. Of course your environment needs to be properly containerized and autobackup set up, so even rm -rf from your harness would do nothing. Life is too short to spend on replying to permissions requests.
I've seen these suggestions but I am really curious about the set up because I just don't get it. If you want to work on the code then you need to have access to the repositories, so you need the github token. Then, to test the app, you may need your own backend token. And VPN. Of course, only to DEV, of course all tokens encrypted. So, only DEV and your branch of the code is in danger. In my view, even that is prett…
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#94[1] - https://exe.dev/ is a new cloud provider with some very useful agent UX [2] - I built https://github.com/stanislavkozlovski/dclaude/ for this; not perfect but gets my job done on the rare occassion I need to run the coding agent locally
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#95I vibe coded a TUI that just shows running lxd containers I hit 'n' to toggle all network access minus anthropic and openai URLs. I use pi (sometimes claude, always on bypass) and I auto allow everything. I only toggle manual approval in rare cases like running a script or command that needs to touch a production system and I need to validate everything. Normally my container has full write access to staging so it ca…
Sounds like your process has made you vulnerable to huge classes of exploits and accidents. You have no oversight of changes locally, and only focus on when it touches prod. That means toxic local changes can get in, and if it works in staging why would you look too closely at it before merging to prod? Meanwhile a malicious npm package has made it into your repo, and your staging api keys have been sent to the comma…
I create a draft pr and manually review all items before then marking ready for review for the team.
So I'm not blindly pushing things to prod without review.
Without staging key access I wouldn't have been able to do a payment provider migration at this speed. iterating by migrating users in staging and being able to use and validate the sdk quickly with opus is a massive time saver.
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#96Earlier quoted context omitted.
I put mine in various aes encrypted file (like `~/.secrets.aes`) and then source it explicitly when needed with: . I have a handful of aliases/functions to make it more smooth, but that's the core.
Where are those aliases stored?
It's a shellscript that they encrypted. They decrypt it and feed the decrypted output immediately into the shell, to be sourced.
That encrypted secrets file could contain any shellscript, so the aliases are stored in there, together with the API-Keys and passwords.
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#97Scope Violation: `ls ~/Documents`
Buddy, my `${HOME}` is committed to a repository. It includes `.bashrc` and `Documents` directory. These are not scope violations if I'm having the LLM work on them!
Re: Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
#98Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's a great example of how dangerous actions are perceived as innocent. The entire model of approving specific commands is absolutely bonkers. npm run build = run an arbitrary shell command written in package.json Meanwhile the agent could have done any of the following without approval: - edited `package.json` to contain any arbitrary build command - planted malicious code in `build.js` (called by `npm run build`…
Yup. The most secure computer is one encased in concrete and dropped into the ocean.