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GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

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Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#361
post #336

There is a Feature request from 2018 that I have been following for a long time to ask for VSCode Sadbox. I do not understand how Microsoft is not putting it up in priority. https://github.com/microsoft/vscode/issues/52116

"VSCode Sadbox" -- pun intended or not, that's funny :-)

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#362
post #348

I'm surprised that we have a lot of comments but still no alternative which would be secure by design. Meaning, not downloading stuff shadily in the background like Zed, or allowing extensions to roam free like VSCode...

I understand not wanting to ship a single IDE package with support for everyting by default. But in that case the IDE vendor should build and audit enough extensions themselves so you can have a working product without relying on untrusted/unaudited ones.

We aren't talking about a single dev developing an IDE on their spare time. We are talking about a company with expenses and revenues in billions. They could develop and support replacement for every single extension in the vscode marketplace (most are redundants) and it would still be an invisible blip in their financial numbers.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#365

Updated: Catalog of all major npm/nodejs ecosystem attacks since May 2025-2026: https://npm-supply-chain-attacks-25-26.pagey.site/ All used techniques and mitigation strategies, including this one: https://npm-supply-chain-attack-techniques.pagey.site/

I genuinely wish you good luck keeping track of all npm issues to come

lol.. thanks.. I'll try... not an easy work though :-P

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#366
So I have been thinking about this for a while - if your product has "plugins" there's only two ways forward:

* There's a line of "blessed plugins" that your own company supports, maintains and guarantees, and everything else is considered "not trusted" or

* Plugins have explicit permissions - like phone apps do. "This plugin can make external calls/write to the filesystem inside a dedicated folder/read and set cookies". And then you are in charge of enforcing that with the strongest sandbox you can make.

Plugin ecosystems without these rules are just the wild west.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#367

I really hope this pushes Microsoft to add a explicit permission system to VS Code extensions, and improve security of dev containers.

I really hope this pushes users (here: devs and maintainers) to decrease their reliance on Microsoft and especially stop outsourcing security to them. Migrate off vscode already.

There's nothing really special about VSCode here, except that it's really popular. You could just as easily attack Emacs or Vim or Sublime or [...] users by distributing a malicious extension.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#368

I really hope this pushes Microsoft to add a explicit permission system to VS Code extensions, and improve security of dev containers.

Before I say anything: I don't use VSCode and have no intention of doing so. Most of my experience is gained vicariously, through working with or helping someone else who does. I use Emacs for my day-to-day stuff. I don't think Emacs extensions are more secure by design. Pretty sure that, if I wanted to, I could craft an extension that does bad things. I'm not sure how hard it would've been to sneak it past MELPA or…

> 1. Users learn to use their tools.

That Just Won't Happen. Especially not in a corporate/government setting. In my experience, it's rare for people to actually want to improve how they work without there being external pressure. Workflows once learned become very, very hard to unlearn and it's already a massive issue when you are responsible for a piece of business software that's used by a hundred users - I once was on a team responsible for the software used by tens of thousands of people. Major changes always, always had to be accompanied by training material and the time for that training had to be budgeted as well.

A large part of the issue is cultural/financial realities. People are already overloaded with work as penny pinchers think it's wise to keep people at 100% utilization leaving no gaps for anything - they know that if they become more efficient, their workload will not go down, their bosses will just dump more things on their table. And people don't want to train for their job if they're not paid for it, as well.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#369
I've been telling less computer literate folks not to install random stuff since the nineties, and I can't understand how many devs are doing just that these days.

I used to work in security auditing, and it makes me feel pretty jaded to think of the gigabytes upon gigabytes of random stuff that just gets pulled in from everywhere in IDEs, package managers, build pipelines and container images.

At least back then there was still a chance to read a significant part of the code and find problems before they found you.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#370

Earlier quoted context omitted.

friendly reminder: use vim :)

It honestly surprises me we don't hear news about vim/neovim plugin supply chain attacks.

https://www.reddit.com/r/neovim/comments/1j45stl/someone_wro...
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