I can't wait for npm/github to do literally anything at all to mitigate these attacks. Literally anything. Have we considered a basic WAF-style block on some postinstall script strings? LLM-assisted code scanning on publish? Is there anyone home? No I suspect not.
Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
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Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#92it seems obvious to me the ability to push code to public repositories shluld be tied to real human identity.
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#93‘No way to prevent this’, Says Only Development Community Where This Regularly Happens — https://itnext.io/no-way-to-prevent-this-says-only-developme... >
"A well administered supply chain, being necessary to the freedom of an open internet, the right of the developers to keep and bear hundreds of uninspected transitive dependencies, shall not be infringed."
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#94Earlier quoted context omitted.
how do containers solve the problem? if they are connected to the internet (and they are) you have got the same problem, if the credentials can be read by the container, at least to my understanding
Watertight subdivision in a ship doesn't promise: "there'll never ever be water in this ship" . It says: "If there's water in this ship due to one hole, it'll stay in one compartment" . Note that I said one hole: you have the titanic, many compartment gets holes, that one ship is still going to sink. (btw that the Titanic sunk is not an excuse not to secure other ships. And it did save a great many other ships to hav…
One thing could be more clear, is that the Titanic's bulkheads didn't go all the way to the top deck. They did not seal completely and were not watertight.
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#95‘No way to prevent this’, Says Only Development Community Where This Regularly Happens — https://itnext.io/no-way-to-prevent-this-says-only-developme... >
The Node ecosystem happens to be more vulnerable for social and software design reasons, it's true. But people need to be aware that PyPI and Cargo et. al. are not in any fundamental way less vulnerable. This will happen there too.
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#96Another day, another pre/postinstall script executed that could have easily have been prevented by any sane package manager. NPM really desperately needs an 'allowBuilds' style allowlist [1] and 'approve-builds' command [2]. 1. https://pnpm.io/settings#allowbuilds 2. https://pnpm.io/cli/approve-builds
Agree. Postinstall scripts should be explicit opt-in, not ambient capability.
Most packages should not need arbitrary code execution during install. And when they do, that should be obvious during review.
The default should probably be: install files, don’t run code.
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#97> Docker Container Escape > The payload checks for the Docker socket and, if present, attempts container escape through three sequential methods: So even if you're running devcontainers / VMs, these worms are already trying to escape. Make sure you're running a rootless VM engine (e.g. podman instead of docker) !
Despite what some people will tell you (including many in the security indistry), Docker is not a strong security boundary, and it should not be treated as one. It shares a kernel with the running system. It reminds me of the good old days when people would hand out low privilege Linux accounts and rely on the kernel to prevent privilige escalation. Docker is literally the same thing, just with extra steps. Especiall…
> Despite what some people will tell you (including many in the security indistry), Docker is not a strong security boundary, and it should not be treated as one. It shares a kernel with the running system.
Solaris Zones and FreeBSD Jails (their inspiration) also share a kernel with the running system and do not seem to have as many escape vulnerabilities.
(Though partly because there may not be as much scrutiny of course.)
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#98> Docker Container Escape > The payload checks for the Docker socket and, if present, attempts container escape through three sequential methods: So even if you're running devcontainers / VMs, these worms are already trying to escape. Make sure you're running a rootless VM engine (e.g. podman instead of docker) !
Why not run a proper virtual machine?
> Why not run a proper virtual machine?
Extra 'overhead' and heaviness (perceived or real).
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#99In the fictional universe of William Gibson's Sprawl trilogy, it is legal and normal for defenders to go kinetic on cyberattackers. How long until it is simply easier for governments and big business in the countries victimised by these criminal groups, to find the path of least resistance and go after them personally?
We can’t even prevent shop lifting.
Compared to what?
Re: Mini Shai-Hulud Strikes Again: 314 npm Packages Compromised
#100Pretty wary of the entire JS/nodejs ecosystem at this stage.
Yes... The only things I use from the JS ecosystem are {Claude,gemini}-cli which I fear will be compromised. Fortunately I run in them in their own user accounts with no e.g. ssh credentials, but I dead that's not enough especially for Gemini which probably has access to my entire Google account somehow.