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It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

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Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#381

I once read a comment on here that I found interesting but haven't been able to find it again. Basically it flipped the problem on its head. We're arguing how you start at the physical substrate and get to consciousness. They argued that you could start with consciousness and argue how you get to the physical side (experimentation via your conscious experience, etc). It was from a religious individual who called the…

Yes, it's called idealism. And the whole field of it is a pile of fallacies of ambiguity that can take years to see and treat with caution.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#382

I once read a comment on here that I found interesting but haven't been able to find it again. Basically it flipped the problem on its head. We're arguing how you start at the physical substrate and get to consciousness. They argued that you could start with consciousness and argue how you get to the physical side (experimentation via your conscious experience, etc). It was from a religious individual who called the…

I don't think I've shared my thoughts on here, but this sounds a lot like my thought process: what if you start with nothing but consciousness, then find a path to a physical universe?

Consciousness is inherently about awareness, so at some point the consciousness would be aware of itself. Now it has the concepts of before/after, and from that opposites, incrementing, subtracting, 1 dimensional space etc. Eventually through this process you could "spawn up" other consciousnesses each expanding their individual bubbles of experience and understanding, eventually getting complex enough to create an entire universe with physical matter that can be experienced by other consciousnesses.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#383

I'm not sure where all this discussion about the hard problem is coming from suddenly, or why people continue to struggle to understand it. It's really very simple. The hard problem identifies the in principle difficulty in explaining phenomenal consciousness, something not definable in terms of structure and function, given only the explanatory resources of structure and function. It's like saying you can't explain…

Do you have a verdict for whether science can ever explain the origin of the universe? I can only doubt it could answer the actual hard problem of consciousness. I find most people, especially on here, to be blindly "science-optimistic"

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#385

I once read a comment on here that I found interesting but haven't been able to find it again. Basically it flipped the problem on its head. We're arguing how you start at the physical substrate and get to consciousness. They argued that you could start with consciousness and argue how you get to the physical side (experimentation via your conscious experience, etc). It was from a religious individual who called the…

One thing is certain: we are talking about consciousness. This means that the world does not work like this: there is physics, and above it there is consciousness which is merely monitoring the physics. This cannot be true (or is unlikely), since we are discussing consciousness and therefore the physical act of talking is driven by something that knows that consciousness exists. There must be a link back from consciousness to physics. A simpler way is to assume that physics IS consciousness. Physics as a science is a kind of introspective activity.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#386

I'm not sure where all this discussion about the hard problem is coming from suddenly, or why people continue to struggle to understand it. It's really very simple. The hard problem identifies the in principle difficulty in explaining phenomenal consciousness, something not definable in terms of structure and function, given only the explanatory resources of structure and function. It's like saying you can't explain…

> The hard problem identifies the in principle difficulty in explaining phenomenal consciousness, something not definable in terms of structure and function Great, I'm a physicalist so uhhhh I reject this lol. I think you can define cognitive capabilities and phenomenal experience by reducing to structure and function. You're right that it's simple though.

I'm a physicalist as well. A commitment to physicalism doesn't force you to reject the hard problem. The hard problem doesn't entail that phenomenal consciousness is not grounded in physical structure and function. The hard problem is about what is needed to explain consciousness. Science typically involves defining some phenomena precisely in terms of structure and function, then giving a precise story about how some observed behavior captures the structure and function that defines the phenomena under question. For example, we define temperature by the height of mercury in a thermometer, then we mathematically derive the height of mercury given the average speed of molecules in the environment. Thus we successfully reduce temperature to average kinetic energy of molecules.

But the process of reduction starts by precisely defining the phenomena in terms of structure and function. If we are unable to give a precise definition that uncontroversially captures the target phenomena, then we cannot in principle give a scientific explanation of said phenomena. This is where we stand with consciousness. There is an in principle barrier to a transparent structural description of phenomenal consciousness. But this is an explanatory limit only. It doesn't necessitate some non-physical phenomena is involved. What we need are new concepts that can connect the phenomenal to the physical. But conceptual innovation is not something you get from more measurements and more data. This is what makes consciousness a philosophical problem.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#387

Neal Stephenson touches on this topic in several of his novels. Probably the most concrete of this is "Fall; or Dodge in Hell" which involves a simulation of people's scanned brains rediscovering qualia and constructing their own simulated world from scratch. In the book, two of the deceased digital "souls" eventually mate and produce digital offspring and the whole simulation starts consuming more and more resources…

> Probably the most concrete of this is "Fall; or Dodge in Hell" which involves a simulation of people's scanned brains rediscovering qualia and constructing their own simulated world from scratch.

This is a great example for a discussion about The Hard Problem. Here is the description from the book of the inner experience of this scanned brain as it gets booted up:

> What came next could not, of course, be described without using words. But that was deceptive in a way since he no longer had words. Nor did he have memories, or coherent thoughts, or any other way to describe or think about the qualia he was experiencing. And those qualia were of miserably low quality. To the extent he was seeing, he was seeing incoherent patterns of fluctuating light. For people of a certain age, the closest descriptor for this was “static”: the sheets, waves, and bands of noise that had covered the screens of malfunctioning television sets. Static, in a sense, wasn’t real. It was simply what you got out of a system when it was unable to lock on to any strong signal—“Strong” meaning actually conveying useful, or at least understandable, information. Modern computer screens were smart enough to just shut down, or put up an error message, when the signal was lost. Old analog sets had no choice but to display something. The electron beam was forever scanning, a mindless beacon, and if you fed it nothing else it would produce a visual map of whatever was contingently banging around in its circuitry: some garbled mix of electrical noise from Mom’s vacuum cleaner, Dad’s shaver, solar flares, stray transmissions caroming off the ionosphere, and whatever happened when little feedback loops on the circuit board got out of hand. Likewise, to the extent he was hearing anything, it was just an inchoate hiss.

The Hard Problem asks: who is experiencing this qualia and why is there an experiencer at all? Stephenson writes how this simulated brain is experiencing static as it condenses into meaningful patterns, but he implicitly starts with someone experiencing this static qualia. If this is the very beginning of the simulated brain booting up, where did this experiencer come from?

> At some point, we'll have AGI that pass any test we can think of and we'll still have people arguing that these cannot be conscious.

Because you're conflating intelligence with consciousness. There is no test for consciousness. In fact, you can't even prove that other human beings are conscious, you only know that you yourself are because it's self evident to you (cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am). The whole point of the hard problem is that you can imagine something exactly like a human being that passes every test of being a human being (e.g. an AI) but still not be sure that it has any inner experience.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#388
post #336

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What if they destroyed and reassembled only 0.5% of your brain? What's your dividing line? 0.36%? 0.0188%? > The functionalist answer, as you understand it, is dualist. I think you're misunderstanding that words are social constructs which can point to abstract categories rather than necessarily single concrete objects at a particular moment in time (although words can also do that). Like if you have multiple tennis…

> What if they destroyed and reassembled only 0.5% of your brain? What's your dividing line? 0.36%? 0.0188%? Apologies, I read too quickly and skipped over this. See one of my sibling comments. I concede this is problematic for my position and I need to think harder on how to solve it, but I don't think it's unsolvable. The placeholder answer is that there must be a certain level of damage -- the precise % probably d…

There's nothing you need to solve because definitions of words are subjective social constructs that are neither correct or incorrect. Definitions are axioms.

You have chosen to define the word "you" to require continuity, under some rubric. By that definition, a copy of you isn't really you. That's correct under your axiom, but it is incorrect under other axioms.

The functionalists I am trying to channel in this conversation have a different subjectively chosen definition of that same word, that is internally coherent assuming functionalism is a true description of the world.

You may wish to argue that their definition/axiom lacks utility, but that's subjective and cannot breach the boundary into a claim about objective correctness (logical deductions) under the axiom.

> You can have a tennis match with different balls which is functionally identical to have it with the same ball, because the ball in the game is an abstraction that lives _outside_ the ball itself.

This sounds like solipsism not dualism vs. monism. In non-solipsistic monism, social constructs can exist outside of a collection of minds, because other minds also exist.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#389
post #204

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I never quite understood what we mean by "consciousness" but I find fascinating that most modern philosophers who describe themselves as materialists / non religious can argue in the same sentence that there is something special and extra-natural about the human experience. It's one or the other: either nature is all there is, and therefore, consciousness is a purely natural phenomenon, that we can investigate, and p…

I don't know anyone who supports both ideas at the same time. Are you saying that philosophers do? Most philosophers are materialists or computational functionalists, while being monists. This means they aren't dualists, and it means they do not adopt the supernatural explanation. But they are careful not to rule out dualism. There's this pattern I've observed in discussions about philosophy. First there's a rejectio…

I think a lot of people interpret philosophers' arguments differently and it isn't always clear what a philosopher themselves truly believes.

For example Searle's Chinese room thought experiment... On the one hand you can easily construe it to imply that he believes there's something fundamentally special about human consciousness that cannot be reproduced by a machine. On the other hand you could interpret his perspective, which I think is more in line with his real perspective, as implyimg that replicating the human mind machine requires truly replicating it physically rather than approximating it and that it's misleading to imply that you can get there with an approximation ... Still I can see how this confuses dualists or could appear in line with their point of view even though it is arguably a nuanced take on the materiallist view

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#390

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> At some point, we'll have AGI that pass any test we can think of and we'll still have people arguing that these cannot be conscious. You've already drawn your line in the sand (i.e. they are conscious). In that case, you can't also claim that we should continue producing them by the millions at the flick of a switch. The AI-is-conscious crowd will have to choose - either they are conscious, in which case they shoul…

I think you mean morally consistent. though even then humans don't have any real qualms about that. Dogs and livestock are conscious, we use those as tools.

> Dogs and livestock are conscious, we use those as tools.

Sure, but we don't create as many as we can, then kill them at the end of the day when the work is done.

If you want to call AIs conscious, you can't also campaign for willy-nilly creation, even if they do get a status of a working tool (dogs, etc).

If you think they are conscious, which implies laws protecting them, then the "owner" of them gets an obligation (you can't do whatever you want to a dog, for example).

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