Live data from Hacker News

It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

noemamag.com

301–310 of 822 posts

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#301
post #263

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A true monist would realize that any experience of the uploaded being that received a copy of the brain is not felt by the original brain that has been copied. This is a fact and it is elementary to see it as true, as well as supporting the view that the copy is not the same being at all. If your description of computation functionalists is accurate, then they simply are dualists and would do good in admitting this t…

Imagine you are destroyed in your sleep by aliens and replaced by an atomically identical duplicate. Would you call this "you"? If not, what if the aliens recycled the atoms from your original body to make the new body, putting each original atom into the same original spot with the same position and momentum (ignoring quantum and uncertainty principle). What if they recycled 99% of the atoms from your original body,…

None of these scenarios would result in "me" from a monist perspective. The destruction is a discontinuity point, I died there and then, and then the next planck moment a new being was created with all my memories. But "I" died.

The functionalist answer, as you understand it, is dualist. It says "something" survived the utter complete destruction of the physical body and was "put back in it" once it was reassembled. If "it" survived the complete physical destruction of the body, it must be somewhere else, detached from the body.

And, you know, there's really nothing wrong being dualist. I do not mean to denigrate that specific worldview. What is problematic is claiming to be a staunch monist while holding dualist positions.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#302

> During the Middle Ages, Western civilization described humans as composed of two distinct entities: body and soul. This is absolutely, completely, demonstrably false. Soul-body dualism was largely a 17th-century innovation, although Plato somewhat anticipated it. Most medieval Catholic thought rejected it (and continues to do so), being quite clear that the soul/mind and the body are one entity. How can people in g…

"Augustine of Hippo was perhaps the greatest Christian philosopher of Antiquity and certainly the one who exerted the deepest and most lasting influence. He is a saint of the Catholic Church, and his authority in theological matters was universally accepted in the Latin Middle Ages and remained, in the Western Christian tradition, virtually uncontested till the nineteenth century."

.....

"...he nevertheless remained convinced that soul is an incorporeal and immortal substance that can, in principle, exist independently of a body"

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/augustine/#AnthGodSoulSou...

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#303
post #238

FTA: > Then he declared that there is another distinct problem — why the brain’s behavior is accompanied by experience at all — which he christened the “hard” problem of consciousness. The hard problem isn't about "why", it's about "what it's like". Try to explain what it's like to hear a major and a chord to a deaf person, or what it's like to see magenta to someone who's blind. None of the things you say, sign or w…

> Try to explain what it's like to hear a major and a chord to a deaf person, or what it's like to see magenta to someone who's blind. I know this isn't what you wanted, but the dualism struck me: A major chord is like a blend of two base colors that give rise to a pleasant composite color. Mix the wrong bases and the result is sensibly wrong. Magenta is like when you play a D and an F# together. When you see it at s…

> A major chord is like a blend of two base colors that give rise to a pleasant composite color. Mix the wrong bases and the result is sensibly wrong.

why does a major chord sounds pleasant? and why does a minor chord sounds "sad"? Why does the locrian mode sound so unsettling? is it due to our anatomy or purely cultural?

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#304
post #252

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is brain power by the ton all over the place. The answer cannot be based on what a thing can do, but on what a thing chooses to do.

The verb "chooses" here does a lot of the heavy lifting, and implies a consciusness that chooses. It's making the answer circular and it means that we are just pre-filtering the possible answers for our preconceptions. My cat is not "less conscious" because he's choosing to sleep all day.

If I may equivocate for a moment: your cat is unconscious, which is less conscious than wakefulness.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#305

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Isn't what makes the experience of love special the experience of love? a robot can hold hands and kiss and bring flowers home far more efficiently than i can. is that what love is? A robot CAN write a poem about how the redness of a flower reminds them of their mother’s funeral. But the outward signal of grief is not evidence of an internal experience of it.

I’ll bite the bullet: if a robot has a complicated enough internal representation of the world, it may very well develop a concept of love (or “care”, or “noticing”, or “intention”. Love is such a slippery word…) that we would have to trust. Imagine a cat-sitting robot. The robot can differentiate between individual cats. It learns how to play with the cats and feed them in in their preferred way. The cats grow to tr…

This - as usual - confuses behaviour with consciousness.

Humans bonded with ELIZA, but that didn't mean ELIZA was conscious. ELIZA was an automaton that mimicked certain behaviours that triggered certain emotional responses.

If you scale that up you get an LLM and/or a social media bot farm, both of which are much better at triggering responses than ELIZA was.

It's now trivial to create an automaton that play acts various moods, and if you give it a memory it will mimic relationship-related conversations.

But it doesn't need to be conscious to do that, and the parsimonious Occam's razor explanation of its behaviours is that it's more economic and credible to assume it's still an automaton with no self-awareness.

Otherwise you have to argue that much simpler systems, like PID thermostats, and pretty much every computer system, are conscious because they "experience" qualia that represent a varying state of the world, with memory.

The sneakiness in your example is choosing an example which mimics emotional bonding. Rhetorically that makes it look like a hypothetical robot is acting emotionally, which is one of the covert signals us mammals tend to associate with consciousness.

But the criticism stands. Feigning emotions well enough to fool other mammals isn't at all the same as experiencing them.

To really experience emotions you need a self-image quale which includes an emotional component. And since subjective experiences have no objective element that can be measured, we can never say for sure whether anything or anyone else actually is conscious.

We assume we are, because we experience it, and we assume others are by implication.

But there's a point where that assumption stops being reasonable, and that's where your cat robot exists.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#306
Seems like void of any substance if one takes whatever flavor of monism for granted. Just because everything is supposed to be build on the same fundamental building blocks/fluxes/whatever doesn’t mean every phenomenon is caused by constructions of equal complexities.

That is, life referring to something inherently far more complex than inert assemblies remains perfectly valid in many monist perspectives.

[edit: took life rather than consciousness as an example, but the stated argument in the article seems to be equally applicable relevant for both concept, or any concept that suppose that emergent complexity is possible]

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#307
post #301

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Imagine you are destroyed in your sleep by aliens and replaced by an atomically identical duplicate. Would you call this "you"? If not, what if the aliens recycled the atoms from your original body to make the new body, putting each original atom into the same original spot with the same position and momentum (ignoring quantum and uncertainty principle). What if they recycled 99% of the atoms from your original body,…

None of these scenarios would result in "me" from a monist perspective. The destruction is a discontinuity point, I died there and then, and then the next planck moment a new being was created with all my memories. But "I" died. The functionalist answer, as you understand it, is dualist. It says "something" survived the utter complete destruction of the physical body and was "put back in it" once it was reassembled.…

What if they destroyed and reassembled only 0.5% of your brain? What's your dividing line? 0.36%? 0.0188%?

> The functionalist answer, as you understand it, is dualist.

I think you're misunderstanding that words are social constructs which can point to abstract categories rather than necessarily single concrete objects at a particular moment in time (although words can also do that).

Like if you have multiple tennis balls, each ball is still a tennis ball, despite each ball being different, because "tennis ball" is a social construct and an abstraction that's an indirection to a certain concept. In the worldview I am talking about, the word "you" is an indirection to a mind that is indistinguishable in content and experience from the one you have right now, with the property of fungibility across modalities, time and space.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#308

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is brain power by the ton all over the place. The answer cannot be based on what a thing can do, but on what a thing chooses to do.

I'm not sure I'm following you, what do you mean? That other animals as well have enough brain power for consciousness?

I said brain power isn't interesting because it doesn't prove anything. There are things that we absolutely know are not conscious yet have a lot of brain power, ie countless pieces of simple deterministic software that we can explain all the way down to the atoms like a sewing machine.

Yes other animals have demonstrated brain power that exceeds some humans, or even all humans while they are young enough, if you just go by some sort of puzzle-solving abilities. The fact that you can figure out how to unscrew a jar lid, and so can an octopus, doesn't imply anything about the octopus being the same as a human in an octopus body.

Similarly observing something simpler exhibit some of the same outward behaviors you and every other human does also doesn't mean anything. Humans do a lot of very simple things. A human seeks food and comfort and avoids pain and damage. And so does a plant. Electric motors turn shafts, and so do humans. So you have to discount anything that's merely a commonality like that, including other things that seem more complex, and so seem like they are what makes us different. We do also have more simple brain power than most animals, and so it is like a correlation with consciousness, but it is not consciousness itself or automatic proof of it and doesn't automatically or necessarily produce it. It's probably a required ingredient though. IE all beef is meat but not all meat is beef, all consciousness may have brain power but not all brain power has consciousness.

But, repeating an example I used in another comment, if you had no other interface with the world except a remote controlled roomba, you would be able to make yourself known. Not by anything as plain as writing out words on the floor, but by actions. There are an infinite number of ways that you a conscious being could disclose your existense to me who can only see the roomba. You could be anything from caring to menacing by simple actions. Because it's not the capacity to roll across the floor, it's where & when you choose to roll across the floor that ends up speaking and disclosing intent, which discloses the "you" in there.

Watch any horror movie about the robots going wrong, or like twighlight zone episodes where you don't actually see much action but the person wakes up and there is a knife sitting next to them, and the presumption is the creepy doll placed it there while they slept. It's a message that they could have killed them any time they wanted to, and they want you to fear.

No other animal has ever done anything like that, that can only be explained by "I want you to know that I know." or more generally "I want you to have a particular thought.", only things that can be explained much more simply and directly. Some things seem to come close like animals caring for other animals, bringing another animal food etc, but that is really just anthropomorphizing, because we also have all those same animal condition components to our own existense. We also feel hunger, feel a desire to relieve someone else's hunger, protect our young, etc. And animals do have some ability to model what they see. They can observe another animal and model what it wants or fears etc, because the ability to predict other things behavior is very beneficial to survival. And we see that and think it proves more than it does.

If you're a roomba that pushes a cookie across the floor to me, that doesn't prove anything all by itself, but it could be part of it. It's like how a word isn't a novel or a philosophical concept, but the philosophical concept is communicated with words.

The idea is to try to recognize how llms are like a misdirection tricking us into thinking certain things simply because they use text as the thing they manipulate. That makes them seem way more human than they really are, simply because they are slicing and dicing prior recorded human communication, which up until now has been something unique to humans. You don't need any words at all to make yourself known to me as being not just a roomba.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#309

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The really hard problem is that your gut, having a neural network as complex as your brain, is also probably conscious. And all it's ever known and will ever know is the feeling of pushing food through it and tasting different types of food. Now that's a horror story.

It’s only your labels in language that are splitting this system into separate parts.

Conversely, it may be that it's only labels in language that are unifying disparate parts into a single "neural system" concept. Ultimately the world is either individual particles and fields, or it is all Oneness, Brahman, and anything else is just arbitrary unification/division; but we can't know which is which.

Re: It is time to give up the dualism introduced by the debate on consciousness

#310
post #300

Rovelli is arguing (I think) that we need to fundamentally view consciousness as a natural phenomenon - albeit one that is extremely complex and poorly understood. So we ditch the philosophical puzzle and focus on the reality we can perceive and reason on. The problem is that consciousness is a philosophical invention (and a slippery one at that). We're in the wrong frame. If you accept consciousness is a thing you e…

Consciousness the the fundamental reality; it is the only thing we know for sure. I know for sure what I am perceiving. Forget about if it is a simulation or not: it is still what I am perceiving. There is nothing else I can be sure of. So you are correct that it is, in some sense, un-explorable. However, if the above is the reason, then nothing else is explorable also; you cannot prove that we are not in a simulatio…

Why does whether we're in a simulation or not matter for whether anything is explorable?

You can explore how the simulation works, there's just some other layer you can't explore. Or maybe you can somehow.

When you look at the stars, are they real or a simulation in your brain? Does that mean you can't explore them?

Post reply on HN