211–220 of 255 posts
> This is rendered even easier by the fact that the kernel is always at the same physical address on Pixel OpenBSD fixed this back in 2017.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux....
Where are the iPhone jailbreaks didn’t see anything since a long time.. what’s happening? Did I miss them or isn’t anything available? I mean props to Apple however they do it but is it a matter of time in regard to the current timeline or what is actually going on?
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They're quite open about it. https://grapheneos.org/features#attack-surface-reduction
You said removing features. This link is talking about making certain feautures optional and disabled by default, not removing them.
Removed from operation
I followed the link to the Pixel 9 bug/exploit and saw this: "Over the past few years, several AI-powered features have been added to mobile phones that allow users to better search and understand their messages. One effect of this change is increased 0-click attack surface, as efficient analysis often requires message media to be decoded before the message is opened by the user" Haven't we learned our lesson on this…
I was at an "AI Security" talk recently, that centred around "While we blindly will injest inputs to and from AI, and that's a security issue. There's nothing we can do, so just deal with the aftermath". Including saying "If a threat actor updates your internal documentation, they can use that to influence the AI". If a THREAT ACTOR IS UPDATING DOCUMENTATION, YOU'RE COMPROMISE! We're not talking about "Wikipedia Vand…
I think it's reasonable for a security conference to talk about how if you put the internal documentation in the LLM context, that means you're elevating the permissions of anyone who can edit the documentation by transitively giving them the ability to instruct the LLM in its "actions" (outputs).
While it should be obvious that's what you're doing, I would say most people I talk to about LLMs do not understand that all parts of the context window together shape LLM output, and there is no such thing as "only obey instructions from the system prompt".
I followed the link to the Pixel 9 bug/exploit and saw this: "Over the past few years, several AI-powered features have been added to mobile phones that allow users to better search and understand their messages. One effect of this change is increased 0-click attack surface, as efficient analysis often requires message media to be decoded before the message is opened by the user" Haven't we learned our lesson on this…
I was at an "AI Security" talk recently, that centred around "While we blindly will injest inputs to and from AI, and that's a security issue. There's nothing we can do, so just deal with the aftermath". Including saying "If a threat actor updates your internal documentation, they can use that to influence the AI". If a THREAT ACTOR IS UPDATING DOCUMENTATION, YOU'RE COMPROMISE! We're not talking about "Wikipedia Vand…
My second thought was “perhaps they’re just very forward-thinking”, and now I’m sad about the future again.
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It isn't because no ISA implements add like that, so there's always performance on the table if you check every time, and people would probably endlessly moan about how Rust is 20% slower than C on this add-heavy microbenchmark. That said you can enable overflow checks in Rust's release mode. It's literally two lines: [profile.release] overflow-checks = true I wonder if it would make sense for ISAs to have trapping v…
> It isn't because no ISA implements add like that MIPS does (did?). And VAX, IBM/360, ....
fascinating how GrapheneOS achieves high security level on the same hardware where Google failed to even randomize android's kernel location
Is Graphene vulnerable to these exploits?
This published exploit sounds to be highly specialized to the specific build options.
I followed the link to the Pixel 9 bug/exploit and saw this: "Over the past few years, several AI-powered features have been added to mobile phones that allow users to better search and understand their messages. One effect of this change is increased 0-click attack surface, as efficient analysis often requires message media to be decoded before the message is opened by the user" Haven't we learned our lesson on this…
I like seeing thumbnail previews of images in messages
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Did you happen to notice the phrase "stripping out code" in the first sentence?
And which features have been removed, as you claim? Removing code is not necessarily removing features. I use GOS and I honestly can't think of a missing feature compared to the stock OS, other than stuff not in AOSP in the first place, like gemini.
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I strongly disagree that there is no evidence that Lockdown mode is effective; there have been numerous exposed, active iOS exploitation campaigns of which none have worked against Lockdown mode. When we're trying to prove a negative, that's actually some of the strongest evidence we can get. The economics of the device exploitation industry are completely orthogonal from bug bounty payouts; the markets only overlap…
I don't necessarily disagree but a lot of chains will bail out if they find like the Norton Antivirus app on your phone so
(as an aside): I'm not trying to say Lockdown Mode is infallible; I am sure phones in Lockdown Mode are or will be compromised. But it's clearly a very powerful tool, and to try to argue that it is some kind of marketing-driven conspiracy, against the body of evidence of its success, using bug bounty payout numbers (???), as the grandparent post did, is ridiculous.