Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

projectzero.google

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

151–160 of 255 posts

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#151

Post by Gigachad »

nekitamo wrote: post #82
greesil wrote: post #4

"This is notably fast given that this is the first time that an Android driver bug I reported was patched within 90 days of the vendor first learning about the vulnerability." This makes me feel better about Google, but also makes me kind of frightened of the rest of Android. I wonder what Apple's response time is?

Given that 42% of Android devices are unpatched as of now [1] it's an interesting decision on their part to release their research and make them all vulnerable [1] https://gs.statcounter.com/android-version-market-share [2] https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/survey-reveals-over-1...

The old way of keeping security bugs private is just completely broken now. If you aren't on a device that gets security updates you are in significant danger, regardless of what Google decides to publish. No name hackers are sitting on stacks of exploits these days and are actively using them.

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#152

Post by Gigachad »

ftqalj wrote: post #52
revolvingthrow wrote: post #6

Semi-related: has the rate of published exploits picked up as if late, or is it simply the fact that there’s hype around ai as security tool (offense or defense) so it’s simply in the news more often? Feels like there’s something new every other day - linux, windows, mobile, various commonplace tools used by everybody, the list goes on

If one reads between the lines in part 1, the code in question was introduced due to AI features and the exploit was found by humans : https://projectzero.google/2026/01/pixel-0-click-part-1.html So AI usage increases bugs and humans have to weed them out!

These days I'd expect much of Android is vibe coded with minimal review.

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#153

Post by lupire »

thrownthatway wrote: post #142
thewebguyd wrote: post #127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That should be the default behavior, not a special lock down option that also disables other features. Why can't they just make it like most email clients? No preview by default, give a banner with an option to explicitly allow a preview for that specific message or conversation?

I tend to agree. But how does that prevent one from receiving and opening a malicious message?

Because many people know not trust unknown senders.

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#154

Post by Gigachad »

sharpshadow wrote: post #144

Where are the iPhone jailbreaks didn’t see anything since a long time.. what’s happening? Did I miss them or isn’t anything available? I mean props to Apple however they do it but is it a matter of time in regard to the current timeline or what is actually going on?

Exploits that can survive reboots are almost impossible these days. And a jailbreak enabling exploit now requires a whole chain of exploits which are worth significant money and also get patched as soon as they become public.

So something like the old iphone jailbreaking scene is just impossible now.

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#155

Post by khimaros »

Gigachad wrote: post #149
microtonal wrote: post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think Android UI customization is the main issue. Many vendors are not even able to keep device firmware and Linux kernels in sync. Qualcomm and others are doing monthly bulletins: https://docs.qualcomm.com/securitybulletin/may-2026-bulletin... Since a lot of vendors are months or even years behind, their phones are full of known holes. When it comes to security, basically: GrapheneOS > iOS > PixelOS >> Samsu…

How is GrapheneOS able to get around the issue of SoC firmware blobs being slow to roll out?

they aren't, but they often push kernel/system patches faster than Google. they also have more kernel hardening in place, which makes some classes of exploits ineffective.

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#156

Post by michaelt »

jiggawatts wrote: post #140
GeekyBear wrote: post #115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One of the things Apple's Lockdown mode does is disable previews of images or links that are sent to you. It seems like the lesson is that you shouldn't be processing data sent to the device by random strangers without the user explicitly choosing to open the file or follow the link.

Sorry, but that is an insanely defeatist attitude blended with a hint of blaming users for wanting features. Image decoders are pure functions and all should have been rewritten as 100% safe Rust years ago. Users need functionality. It’s up to us to figure out how to provide that safely. Saying to users they shouldn’t have those features isn’t sage advice, it’s admitting failure.

The thing is, nobody's happy just previewing jpegs and pngs.

Before you know it, people want to preview SVGs, PDFs, video, HTML and so on.

And to do that properly means you've got to support obscure formats like JBIG2 and CCITT Fax. Malicious vector images with a billion elements to render. XML that lets one file embed another.

And good luck getting the budget to re-implement them all from scratch in a better language, when the only business value the feature delivers is a postage-stamp-sized preview image.

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#157

Post by throawayonthe »

Gigachad wrote: post #149
microtonal wrote: post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think Android UI customization is the main issue. Many vendors are not even able to keep device firmware and Linux kernels in sync. Qualcomm and others are doing monthly bulletins: https://docs.qualcomm.com/securitybulletin/may-2026-bulletin... Since a lot of vendors are months or even years behind, their phones are full of known holes. When it comes to security, basically: GrapheneOS > iOS > PixelOS >> Samsu…

How is GrapheneOS able to get around the issue of SoC firmware blobs being slow to roll out?

mainly by only supporting devices with consistent fast fw updates (which is how pixelos is also on the list)(samsung is also mostly on top of their shit but multiple security features are unavailable to third party operating systems so unviable)

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#158

Post by StilesCrisis »

mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #121
StilesCrisis wrote: post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They're quite open about it. https://grapheneos.org/features#attack-surface-reduction

You said removing features. This link is talking about making certain feautures optional and disabled by default, not removing them.

Did you happen to notice the phrase "stripping out code" in the first sentence?

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#159

Post by thrownthatway »

lupire wrote: post #153
thrownthatway wrote: post #142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I tend to agree. But how does that prevent one from receiving and opening a malicious message?

Because many people know not trust unknown senders.

I should have said “a well crafted malicious email” or SMS etc.

Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10

#160

Post by Onavo »

JumpCrisscross wrote: post #100
krupan wrote: post #66

I followed the link to the Pixel 9 bug/exploit and saw this: "Over the past few years, several AI-powered features have been added to mobile phones that allow users to better search and understand their messages. One effect of this change is increased 0-click attack surface, as efficient analysis often requires message media to be decoded before the message is opened by the user" Haven't we learned our lesson on this…

> Haven't we learned our lesson on this? What is the purported lesson we should have learned? Users choose phones with rich messaging features. This was a major selling point for iPhone, first, with iMessage, and later with Android until iOS caught up with RCS.

Didn't Android switch their codec stack to rust?
Post reply on HN