Semi-related: has the rate of published exploits picked up as if late, or is it simply the fact that there’s hype around ai as security tool (offense or defense) so it’s simply in the news more often? Feels like there’s something new every other day - linux, windows, mobile, various commonplace tools used by everybody, the list goes on
A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
11–20 of 255 posts
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#12Semi-related: has the rate of published exploits picked up as if late, or is it simply the fact that there’s hype around ai as security tool (offense or defense) so it’s simply in the news more often? Feels like there’s something new every other day - linux, windows, mobile, various commonplace tools used by everybody, the list goes on
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#13Hmmm... I'd like someone to double check my thinking here. I posted this exact prompt for gpt 5.5 xhigh: ``` does this look right to you? don't do any searches or check memory, just think through first principles static int vpu_mmap(struct file fp, struct vm_area_struct vm) { unsigned long pfn; struct vpu_core core = container_of(fp->f_inode->i_cdev, struct vpu_core, cdev); vm_flags_set(vm, VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM…
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#14Semi-related: has the rate of published exploits picked up as if late, or is it simply the fact that there’s hype around ai as security tool (offense or defense) so it’s simply in the news more often? Feels like there’s something new every other day - linux, windows, mobile, various commonplace tools used by everybody, the list goes on
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#15Hmmm... I'd like someone to double check my thinking here. I posted this exact prompt for gpt 5.5 xhigh: ``` does this look right to you? don't do any searches or check memory, just think through first principles static int vpu_mmap(struct file fp, struct vm_area_struct vm) { unsigned long pfn; struct vpu_core core = container_of(fp->f_inode->i_cdev, struct vpu_core, cdev); vm_flags_set(vm, VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM…
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Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#16Hmmm... I'd like someone to double check my thinking here. I posted this exact prompt for gpt 5.5 xhigh: ``` does this look right to you? don't do any searches or check memory, just think through first principles static int vpu_mmap(struct file fp, struct vm_area_struct vm) { unsigned long pfn; struct vpu_core core = container_of(fp->f_inode->i_cdev, struct vpu_core, cdev); vm_flags_set(vm, VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM…
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#17"This is notably fast given that this is the first time that an Android driver bug I reported was patched within 90 days of the vendor first learning about the vulnerability." This makes me feel better about Google, but also makes me kind of frightened of the rest of Android. I wonder what Apple's response time is?
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#18I read about Pixel 9 Dolby Decoder bug, and it is based on integer overflow. It was a mistake to allow "+" operator to overflow, and this must be fixed in new languages like Rust, but it is not.
We've moved slightly closer to this, but in a world where we're still arguing over memory safety being necessary we've probably still got a ways to go before we notice that addition silently overflowing is a top-10 security issue. It's the silent top-10 security issue, I guess.
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#19Hmmm... I'd like someone to double check my thinking here. I posted this exact prompt for gpt 5.5 xhigh: ``` does this look right to you? don't do any searches or check memory, just think through first principles static int vpu_mmap(struct file fp, struct vm_area_struct vm) { unsigned long pfn; struct vpu_core core = container_of(fp->f_inode->i_cdev, struct vpu_core, cdev); vm_flags_set(vm, VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM…
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Yes, they certainly would. You wouldn't have smartphones, for instance.
I can't tell if this is satirical or not. But there are so many takes like this recently (hold the website liable for user content, hold the corporate developer liable for zero days in a project they happened to touch) that would all result in the same outcome (no more product at all) that I can't help but wonder if there's some luddite psy-op trying desperately to bring us back to a pre-Internet era in any way they can...
Re: A 0-click exploit chain for the Pixel 10
#20Hmmm... I'd like someone to double check my thinking here. I posted this exact prompt for gpt 5.5 xhigh: ``` does this look right to you? don't do any searches or check memory, just think through first principles static int vpu_mmap(struct file fp, struct vm_area_struct vm) { unsigned long pfn; struct vpu_core core = container_of(fp->f_inode->i_cdev, struct vpu_core, cdev); vm_flags_set(vm, VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM…
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