Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

tanstack.com

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

61–70 of 501 posts

Re: Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

#61

Post by j-bos »

> it installs that commit's declared dependencies (which include bun) and then runs its prepare lifecycle script

Again? How have lifecycle scripts not instantly been defaulted off? Yes breaking things is bad, but come on, this keeps happening, the fix is easy, and if an *javascript* build relies of dependendlcy of dependency's pulled build time script, then it's worth paying in braincells or tokens to digure it out and fix the biold process, or lately uncover an exploit chain. This isn't even a compiled language.

Re: Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

#62

Post by captn3m0 »

jonchurch_ wrote: post #48
captn3m0 wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/deploy/configure-... is the feature they use. > We impose tag protection rules that prevent release tags from being created until a release deployment succeeds, with the release deployment itself being gated on a manual approval by at least one other team member. We also prevent the updating or deletion of tags, making them effectively immutable once created. On top of that…

I tested approving a deployment via API last week w/ my gh cli token (well, had claude do it while I watched). Again, I really want to be wrong about this, but my testing showed that it is indeed trivial to use the default token from my gh cli to approve via API. (repo admin scope, which I have bc I am admin on said repo) Nothing in this link [1] proves what I said, but it is the test repo I was just conducting this…

You're right. Found the relevant docs+API calls:

https://docs.github.com/en/rest/actions/workflow-runs?apiVer...

Also for a Pending Deployment: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/actions/workflow-runs#review...

Both of these need `repo` scope, which you can avoid giving on org-level repos. For fine-grained tokens: "Deployments" repository permissions (write) is needed, which I wouldn't usually give to a token.

Re: Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

#65

Post by embedding-shape »

bpavuk wrote: post #55
cube00 wrote: post #41

Please be careful when revoking tokens. It looks like the payload installs a dead-man's switch at ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh as a systemd user service (Linux) / LaunchAgent com.user.gh-token-monitor(macOS). It polls api.github.com/user with the stolen token every 60s, and if the token is revoked (HTTP 40x), it runs rm -rf ~/. https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383#issuecomment-...

if so, then this is actual terrorism of the software world!!

Only if the goal is to actually spread fear in a civilian population. It's not clear what the motivation is here besides "the worm spreads itself lol".

Re: Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

#66

Post by [deleted] »

meander_water wrote: post #60
cube00 wrote: post #41

Please be careful when revoking tokens. It looks like the payload installs a dead-man's switch at ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh as a systemd user service (Linux) / LaunchAgent com.user.gh-token-monitor(macOS). It polls api.github.com/user with the stolen token every 60s, and if the token is revoked (HTTP 40x), it runs rm -rf ~/. https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383#issuecomment-...

I don't understand why people were voting this comment down in the issue page

[deleted]

Re: Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

#67

Post by bpavuk »

embedding-shape wrote: post #65
bpavuk wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

if so, then this is actual terrorism of the software world!!

Only if the goal is to actually spread fear in a civilian population. It's not clear what the motivation is here besides "the worm spreads itself lol".

that dead man's switch surely smells like that tbh

Re: Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

#68

Post by bpavuk »

meander_water wrote: post #60
cube00 wrote: post #41

Please be careful when revoking tokens. It looks like the payload installs a dead-man's switch at ~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh as a systemd user service (Linux) / LaunchAgent com.user.gh-token-monitor(macOS). It polls api.github.com/user with the stolen token every 60s, and if the token is revoked (HTTP 40x), it runs rm -rf ~/. https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383#issuecomment-...

I don't understand why people were voting this comment down in the issue page

bots.

the GitHub bot law: the GitHub bot situation is way worse than you imagine even if you are aware of the GitHub bot law.

yes, a cheap parody on Hofstadter's law, but that's how bad it is

Re: Postmortem: TanStack NPM supply-chain compromise

#70

Post by einpoklum »

getcrunk wrote: post #63

I think we are at the point where everyone really needs to run each project in its own vm. Given the recent lpe vulns docker 100% won’t cut it. And containers were never meant primarily as a security boundary anyways

Luckily, projects using more secure language ecosystems like C and C++ are spared this kind of problems :-)
Post reply on HN