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Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

xeiaso.net

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Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#281

This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…

Either my reading of your comment is wrong or you misunderstood the supply chain comment by OP I think: what they mean is that a supply chain attack that gets the exploit on a system would be great now because the reported vulns are unfixed pretty much everywhere

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#282
I saw a recent post about only adopting packages a certain number of days post release (say +3 days, or +7 days) after. The idea is you never bring in fresh commits, only older ones. This would need dangerous or bad commits to be marked vulnerable too.

It means you skip supply chain attacks but may miss fresh vulnerability patches too.

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#283

This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…

The supply chain attack in this case, would be injecting the exploit on a ci/cd system and escalating the local user who runs the npm code to root.

The proper response from them and you, should be to make sure to have some isolatin between user space and root like gvisor.

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#284

This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…

yeah but i mean installing an npm package in a container is giving it low privilege access

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#286
post #273

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Faults are injected into the code at a constant rate per developer. Then there's the intentional injections. Auto-installing random software is the problem. It was a problem when our parents did it, why would it be a good idea for developers to do it?

This is related to a massive annoyance of mine: when I run a piece of software and the system is missing a required dependency, I want the software to *tell me* that dependency is missing so I can make a decision about proceeding or not. Instead it seems that far too often software authors will try and be “clever” by silently installing a bunch of dependencies, either in some directory path specific to the software,…

Ruby gems and CPAN have build scripts that rebuild stuff on the user's device (and warn you if they can't find a dependency). But I believe one of the Python's tools that started the trend of downloading binaries instead of building them. Or was it NPM?

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#287
post #182

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That means going back to disabling Javascript or only allowing widely used, well-maintained Javascript libraries.

> or only allowing widely used, well-maintained Javascript libraries. That isn't a guarantee either, just last month someone compromised the Axios library.

They stole the axios's npm keys and they uploaded malicious artifacts. They did not takeover the axios's repo. The issue is with packaging and distribution, not with code.

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#288

This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…

Either my reading of your comment is wrong or you misunderstood the supply chain comment by OP I think: what they mean is that a supply chain attack that gets the exploit on a system would be great now because the reported vulns are unfixed pretty much everywhere

No, you read it right. I just misunderstood the post's message as "these exploits will enable more supply chain attacks". I'll probably delete my comment since it's debating a strawman. It is absolutely right that these exploits might enable these attacks to have a larger impact. I still don't think that I agree with the message since a malicious npm package already installed can get its payloads from a C2 server, it doesn't need an npm update.

Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit

#289

"Wait a week to install software" does not work. Just a few months ago a massive exploit hit the web, which was a timed attack which sat for more than a month before executing. If everyone starts waiting a week, their exploits will wait 2 weeks. Cyber criminals do not need to exploit you immediately, they just need to exploit you. (It also doesn't change a large range of vuln classes like typosquatting)

> If everyone starts waiting a week, their exploits will wait 2 weeks

It's much easier to break into an NPM/Github account and push malicious commits in the few hours a maintainer is sleeping than it is to push something out and not have it noticed for 2 weeks.

There are lists of attacks which had an exposure window which was much shorter than 2 weeks:

https://daniakash.com/posts/simplest-supply-chain-defense/ https://blog.yossarian.net/2025/11/21/We-should-all-be-using...

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