This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…
Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
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Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#282It means you skip supply chain attacks but may miss fresh vulnerability patches too.
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#283This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…
The proper response from them and you, should be to make sure to have some isolatin between user space and root like gvisor.
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#284This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#285Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#286Earlier quoted context omitted.
Faults are injected into the code at a constant rate per developer. Then there's the intentional injections. Auto-installing random software is the problem. It was a problem when our parents did it, why would it be a good idea for developers to do it?
This is related to a massive annoyance of mine: when I run a piece of software and the system is missing a required dependency, I want the software to *tell me* that dependency is missing so I can make a decision about proceeding or not. Instead it seems that far too often software authors will try and be “clever” by silently installing a bunch of dependencies, either in some directory path specific to the software,…
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#287Earlier quoted context omitted.
That means going back to disabling Javascript or only allowing widely used, well-maintained Javascript libraries.
> or only allowing widely used, well-maintained Javascript libraries. That isn't a guarantee either, just last month someone compromised the Axios library.
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#288This is a baffling take.. These exploits are local privilege escalations for linux systems. They'll allow an attacker with a foothold in a shared environment or with low privilege access to a system to affect the rest of the system. They aren't RCEs and won't let attackers access environments that they couldn't before other than the shared hosting scenarios. That is absolutely not how most supply chain attacks are ca…
Either my reading of your comment is wrong or you misunderstood the supply chain comment by OP I think: what they mean is that a supply chain attack that gets the exploit on a system would be great now because the reported vulns are unfixed pretty much everywhere
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#289"Wait a week to install software" does not work. Just a few months ago a massive exploit hit the web, which was a timed attack which sat for more than a month before executing. If everyone starts waiting a week, their exploits will wait 2 weeks. Cyber criminals do not need to exploit you immediately, they just need to exploit you. (It also doesn't change a large range of vuln classes like typosquatting)
It's much easier to break into an NPM/Github account and push malicious commits in the few hours a maintainer is sleeping than it is to push something out and not have it noticed for 2 weeks.
There are lists of attacks which had an exposure window which was much shorter than 2 weeks:
https://daniakash.com/posts/simplest-supply-chain-defense/ https://blog.yossarian.net/2025/11/21/We-should-all-be-using...
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#290[flagged]