Alternatively, switch to an operating system like FreeBSD which doesn't take a YOLO approach to security. Security fixes don't just get tossed into the FreeBSD kernel without coordination; they go through the FreeBSD security team and we have binary updates (via FreeBSD Update, and via pkgbase for 15.0-RELEASE) published within a couple minutes of the patches hitting the src tree. (Roughly speaking, a few seconds for…
Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
141–150 of 497 posts
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#142People lamented semver not being trustable but that ship sailed a long time ago, and supply chain attacks are going to get worse before they get better.
Our team is pretty minimal when it comes to enforced hooks (everyone has their own workflow) but no one could come up with an objection to this one.
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#143Alternatively, switch to an operating system like FreeBSD which doesn't take a YOLO approach to security. Security fixes don't just get tossed into the FreeBSD kernel without coordination; they go through the FreeBSD security team and we have binary updates (via FreeBSD Update, and via pkgbase for 15.0-RELEASE) published within a couple minutes of the patches hitting the src tree. (Roughly speaking, a few seconds for…
That being said, I'm not suggesting that anyone should judge an entire OS based off of how they handle a single minor report, since everything else that I've seen suggests that FreeBSD takes security reports quite seriously. But then you could also use this same argument for the Linux kernel bug, since it's pretty rare for a patch to be mismanaged like this there too :)
[0]: https://www.maxchernoff.ca/p/luatex-vulnerabilities#timeline
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#144Alternatively, switch to an operating system like FreeBSD which doesn't take a YOLO approach to security. Security fixes don't just get tossed into the FreeBSD kernel without coordination; they go through the FreeBSD security team and we have binary updates (via FreeBSD Update, and via pkgbase for 15.0-RELEASE) published within a couple minutes of the patches hitting the src tree. (Roughly speaking, a few seconds for…
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#145Don't install anything, use an LLM to write everything from scratch. It may have bugs, but no one will know how to exploit them, especially when closed source. Code is cheap and is becoming cheaper by the day. We need new paradigms.
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#146This was always a nightmare waiting to happen. The sheer mass of packages and the consequent vast attack surface for supply chain attacks was always a problem that was eventually going to blow up in everyone's face. But it was too convenient. Anyone warning about it or trying to limit the damage was shouted down by people who had no experience of any other way of doing things. "import antigravity" is just too easy to…
I've been wanting a capability based security model for years. Argued about it here in fact. Capabilities are kind of an object pointer with associated permissions - like a unix file descriptor. We should have: - OS level capabilities. Launched programs get passed a capability token from the shell (or wherever you launched the program from). All syscalls take a capability as the first argument. So, "open path /foo" b…
I prefer it’s model of declaring this is what I want to use, any calls to code outside that error out.
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#147> Copy Fail 2: Electric Boogaloo What are people thinking with these meme style vulnerability names? It's going to be hard to pitch "we need to push back the timeline on this new infrastructure deploy while we mitigate Copy Fail 2: Electric Boogaloo".
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#148Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've been wanting a capability based security model for years. Argued about it here in fact. Capabilities are kind of an object pointer with associated permissions - like a unix file descriptor. We should have: - OS level capabilities. Launched programs get passed a capability token from the shell (or wherever you launched the program from). All syscalls take a capability as the first argument. So, "open path /foo" b…
Have you heard of pledge in OpenBSD? I prefer it’s model of declaring this is what I want to use, any calls to code outside that error out.
- Pledge requires the program drop privileges. Process level caps move the "allowed actions" outside of an application. And they can do that without the application even knowing. This would - for example - let you sandbox an untrusted binary.
- Pledge still leaves an entire application in the same security zone. If your process needs network and disk access, every part of the process - including 3rd party libraries - gets access to the network and disk.
- You can reproduce pledge with caps very easily. Capability libraries generally let you make a child capability. So, cap A has access to resources x, y, z. Make cap B with access to only resource x. You could use this (combined with a global "root cap" in your process) to implement pledge. You can't use pledge to make caps.
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#149This was always a nightmare waiting to happen. The sheer mass of packages and the consequent vast attack surface for supply chain attacks was always a problem that was eventually going to blow up in everyone's face. But it was too convenient. Anyone warning about it or trying to limit the damage was shouted down by people who had no experience of any other way of doing things. "import antigravity" is just too easy to…
I am so happy to go through another round of kernel RPMs after the freak out today! I have one server that has shell users, and I did the "yum update" and "reboot -f" dance last week. Was that good enough? Oh no. Here we go again!
Re: Maybe you shouldn't install new software for a bit
#150This gets me to ask whether I have been hacked . For a few weeks now, both my main mbp and iPhone have been showing unexpected hangs of 1-30 seconds. I can’t find out what’s causing it - not memory pressure, not cpu load. I am worried that the sluggishness appeared about the same time on both devices
For ios, rebooting your phone is extremely effective at removing exploits. The boot chain attestation stuff can verify the system is in a known state. If you are ultra paranoid you could enable lockdown mode which preemptively disables the entrypoints for exploits. So far I don't believe there has been any exploit which works with lockdown mode enabled.