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No thanks. I'll accept it in my browser when they fix the security implications this raises, and when the Spec is no longer in draft.
The security implications of not having WebUSB are having to install untrustworthy native drivers every time you want to interface with a USB device.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Comments like this scare me. Sorry to hear that. I thought this was a safe space for hackers to express enthusiasm about pushing their own hardware and software further (and in this case even in a comparatively safe way). > I just have no faith in humanity, and do not understand why we think this is a good idea to give a browser this much access to local system resources. The browser already has all that access, it…
> I thought this was a safe space for hackers to express enthusiasm about pushing their own hardware and software further (and in this case even in a comparatively safe way). Nothing is preventing said experimentation nor discussion of it. I am merely offering my more conservative views of the situation as a contrast to the echo chamber gungho nature of the experimentation. Just because we can doesn't mean we should…
If native platforms removed USB or Bluetooth, the "control over my own hardware" crowd would flip a table. I just wish they also understood the benefits of the web compared to native. The Chrome/Project Fugu team's dream of making the web platform as powerful as native platforms is the correct one from a user freedom standpoint, or at bare minimum a "user choice" standpoint.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
What if we implement them but hide them deep in the settings or as experimental feature inside the hidden developer menu, behind multiple warning messages and password prompts? Only the very determined developers and advanced users would be able to unlock them. Then it's safe enough?
Users will unfortunately click on absolutely anything that a trusted (deservedly or otherwise) source tells them to, and you won’t be able to reliable convince them otherwise with UX alone. This includes all “developers only”, “click 5 times” etc. UX interventions. You have to decide whether the feature warrants the remaining risk after all mitigations, or at least exceeds other, simpler attack vectors. I think in th…
No thanks. I'll accept it in my browser when they fix the security implications this raises, and when the Spec is no longer in draft.
It has nothing to do with security, as WebUSB has no ability to interact with any device unless the user explicitly allows each and every website that requests access to do so. It's the same security as any other browser API that requests access.
Will this work on Firefox Android? I recently wanted to try the printervention.app website to print from my phone over an OTG cable.
‡: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/Web...
No thanks. I'll accept it in my browser when they fix the security implications this raises, and when the Spec is no longer in draft.
The spec is still in draft because Apple refuses to let it move forward - because WebUSB, WebBluetooth and other APIs would compete with their app store, where they can make money from purchases made through apps. They prioritize profits over progress. It has nothing to do with security, as WebUSB has no ability to interact with any device unless the user explicitly allows each and every website that requests access…
This is untrue. Web standards need two independent implementations. Google can’t convince any other rendering engine besides their own to implement it.
It doesn't take a single no from Apple to veto it; it takes a single yes from anybody outside of Blink to move it forward. Nobody is doing that.
Here is what Mozilla have to say about WebUSB:
> Because many USB devices are not designed to handle potentially-malicious interactions over the USB protocols and because those devices can have significant effects on the computer they're connected to, we believe that the security risks of exposing USB devices to the Web are too broad to risk exposing users to them or to explain properly to end users to obtain meaningful informed consent. It also poses risks that sites could use USB device identity or data stored on USB devices as tracking identifiers.
— https://mozilla.github.io/standards-positions/#webusb
Until Google can convince anybody outside of Blink to implement it, it is not a standard it’s a Blink-only API.
People are starting to ship even local apps only in the form of some html & js that only works on Chrome because only Chrome has webusb. Whether we like the idea of the browser having access to usb or not, I at least like even less the idea of being forced to install and use Chrome for the same reasons as the bad old days of being forced to use IE.
WebUSB is so great. I can ship a cross-platform application that accesses a hardware device without having to deal with all the platform specifics, and with decent sandboxing of my driver. I think one way to make it more "secure" against unwitting users would be to only support WebUSB for devices that have a WebUSB descriptor - would allow "origin" checking.
Yep. FlipperZero, Android, now some random chinese handheld radio - just some of the things I didn't have to install some crap unsandboxed app to flash in the last 3 months. Absolutely revolutionary.
And Web Serial reached mainline Firefox last week. I hope Mozilla can eventually stop playing their silly role in the security theater of “but what if our users are dumb” and actually deliver those "power-user" features that would allow me to uninstall Chrome for good. Oh, and also, --app= flag please.
That's good news. I wish FF wasn't so conservative... they're missing a lot of cool APIs. Sometimes I wonder who they think their audience is. I suppose they would know better than I would.