11–20 of 36 posts
I wish this was understood clearly by more security engineers, but, alas...
The one problem I have with the trusted files thing is that I have no way to trust non-file-visiting buffers. Why is *scratch* untrusted!? *scratch* should always be trusted, without me having to configure anything, ideally. Though a setting to automatically trust non-file-visiting buffers would be nice. I just ended up stopping using the scratch buffer because of that issue.
Age verification aaaaaand Trusted Computing now! \o/
(Just kidding - have to point at the question of what trust is exactly. Because I can not accept the "trusted files" claim; I don't think anyone can ever trust anything, unless there is some really objective criterium that is unchangeable. But if something is unchangeable, can it be useful for anything? Yes, you can ensure that a calculator would correctly put a given input into the correct output, or a function to do so, but in real calculation this is not the only factor to be guaranteed, not even in quantum computing. What if you manage to influence the calculation process via light/laser information or any other means? I can't accept the term "trusted" here, because it implies one could and should trust something; that is a similar problem to the term AI - I never could accept that "AI" has anything to do with real intelligence with the given hardware, it is just a simulation of intelligence; pattern matching and recognition only makes it more likely to produce useful results, but that does not imply intelligence at all. It lack true understanding - that is why it has to sniff for data, to improve the mapping of generated output. One can see this on many AI-centric videos on youtube, the AI is often hallucinating and creating videos that are not possible, e. g. suddenly a leg appearing in motion that is twisted in the opposite direction. That shows that the AI does not understand what it is doing. Any human could realise that this is physically just not possible. I see this on cheaper AI videos even more, e. g. chuck norris videos where chuck would kick everyone yet the motions are totally wrong and detached from the "real" scene.)
It's getting so very old - all I want out of a process is code autocomplete, but I have to grant it read & write permission to my entire disk and network. When do we get good permissions and sandboxing and isolation? This can't go on.
The one problem I have with the trusted files thing is that I have no way to trust non-file-visiting buffers. Why is *scratch* untrusted!? *scratch* should always be trusted, without me having to configure anything, ideally. Though a setting to automatically trust non-file-visiting buffers would be nice. I just ended up stopping using the scratch buffer because of that issue.
(add-hook 'lisp-interaction-mode-hook (lambda () (setq-local trusted-content :all)))
The one problem I have with the trusted files thing is that I have no way to trust non-file-visiting buffers. Why is *scratch* untrusted!? *scratch* should always be trusted, without me having to configure anything, ideally. Though a setting to automatically trust non-file-visiting buffers would be nice. I just ended up stopping using the scratch buffer because of that issue.
Shouldn't something like this fix the problem, at least for scratch buffers: (add-hook 'lisp-interaction-mode-hook (lambda () (setq-local trusted-content :all)))
Only the scratch buffer is to be exempted, not every buffer that gets this mode.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Shouldn't something like this fix the problem, at least for scratch buffers: (add-hook 'lisp-interaction-mode-hook (lambda () (setq-local trusted-content :all)))
Pretty sure that's unsafe, don't do that. Only the scratch buffer is to be exempted, not every buffer that gets this mode.
(with-current-buffer "*scratch*"
(setq-local trusted-content :all))Earlier quoted context omitted.
Shouldn't something like this fix the problem, at least for scratch buffers: (add-hook 'lisp-interaction-mode-hook (lambda () (setq-local trusted-content :all)))
Pretty sure that's unsafe, don't do that. Only the scratch buffer is to be exempted, not every buffer that gets this mode.
(when (equal (buffer-name) "*scratch*") ...)Earlier quoted context omitted.
Pretty sure that's unsafe, don't do that. Only the scratch buffer is to be exempted, not every buffer that gets this mode.
Agree. This is probably better: (with-current-buffer "*scratch*" (setq-local trusted-content :all))
If we are already experimenting with different ideas, this should also work (and gives a hint of how you want to fix the issue upstream):
(define-advice get-scratch-buffer-create (:filter-return (buf) trusted)
(with-current-buffer buf
(setq-local trusted-content :all))
buf)