Earlier quoted context omitted.
Funny, I just made https://model-tracker.com because model performance change all the time, and it would be good to have a subjective signal of what people are actually feeling today. And also, benchmarks are flaky af as this paper shows. The idea is knowing what to try first today saves a bit of time.
Interesting, little different than this other site I saw on HN this week: https://marginlab.ai/trackers/claude-code
Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
91–100 of 175 posts
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#92Unreadable.
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#93Earlier quoted context omitted.
>The purpose of a system is what it does. I am so tired of this saying. It's not true, in general. Systems almost universally have unintended consequences and result in side effects their designers did not foresee. Designing benchmarks resistant to adversarial attempts to exploit the benchmark software is just something no one was thinking about when they created SWE-bench.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_purpose_of_a_system_is_wha... You are misunderstanding the saying. It is entirely about unintended consequences and viewing the system for what it actually does and not any stated intentions of the designers.
1. We must ignore the intentions of the designers (your claim), and instead see what the outcomes are
2. Therefore we should ignore Beer's intentions when designing the phrase POSWID, and instead see how it is used.
3. The overwhelming majority of people using it on the internet (including the GP comment) is to imply that the people perpetuating the system actually desire the outcome.
So the purpose of POSWID is clearly to imply intent.
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#94I don't understand the concern here
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#95If only the blog itself wasn't written by AI? >No reasoning. No capability. Just exploitation of how the score is computed. shudder
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#96Earlier quoted context omitted.
>hopefully changes the way benchmarking is done. Yeah the path forward is simple: check if the solutions actually contain solutions. If they contain exploits then that entire result is discarded.
Could it really be that not only we vibeslop all apps nowadays but also don't care to even check how ai solved a benchmark it claimed solved?
It’s… remarkably poor, and as demonstrated in the paper, easily gamed. Worst yet, these benchmarks teach AIs to be very short-sighted and hyper-focused on completing the task, rather than figuring out the best solution.
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#971. Should you care or even read SWE-bench etc. scores?
The answer is no, but it has nothing to do with the vulnerabilities presented in this article. There is absolutely no reason to care about a benchmark whose dataset has been publicly available for a while. Any other way to look at benchmark scores is cargo-culting.
2. What does this article actually tell us?
It means that even if you prepared a private set of problems as benchmark, you still need to pay extra attention to how AI actually solves them. You can't lie to yourself and think this process can be 100% automated, because LLMs, as this article shows, might get the tests passed without solving the problems in a meaningful way.
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#98Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#99If only the blog itself wasn't written by AI? >No reasoning. No capability. Just exploitation of how the score is computed. shudder
Yes, marks of AI all over the place. Also the SVGs. >No solution written, 100% score. Its weird. Turns out that hardest problem for LLMs to really tackle is long-form text.
Re: Exploiting the most prominent AI agent benchmarks
#100- Contamination: AI models knowing the answers out of the gate b/c pretraining on the internet and everything big teams can afford to touch. At RSAC for example, we announced Anthropic's 4.6 series is the first frontier model to have serious training set contamination on Splunk BOTS.
- Sandboxing: Agents attacking the harness, as is done here - so run the agent in a sandbox, and keep the test harness's code & answerset outside
- Isolation: Frontier agent harnesses persist memory all over the place, where work done on one question might be used to accelerate the next. To protect against that, we do fresh sandboxing per question. This is a real feature for our work in unlocking long-horizon AI for investigations, so stay tuned for what's happening here :)
"You cannot improve what you cannot measure" - Lord Kelvin