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Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

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Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#181
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Tunnel vision? If your model can handle big context, why divide into lesser problems to conquer - even if such splitting might be quite trivial and obvious? It's the difference of "achieve the goal", and "achieve the goal in this one particular way" (leverage large context).

I meant, if the claim here is that small models can accomplish the same things with good scaffolding, why didn’t they demonstrate finding those problem with good scaffolding rather than directly pointing them at the problem?

They don't have to.

Lot of people in this thread don't seem to be getting that.

If another model can find the vulnerability if you point it at the right place, it would also find the vulnerability if you scanned each place individually.

People are talking about false positives, but that also doesn't matter. Again, they're not thinking it through.

False positives don't matter, as you can just automatically try and exploit the "exploit" and if it doesn't work, it's a false positive.

Worse, we have no idea how Mythos actually worked, it could have done the process I've outlined above, "found" 1,000s of false positives and just got rid of them by checking them.

The fundamental point is it doesn't matter how the cheap models identified the exploit, it's that they can identify the exploit.

When it turns out the harness is just acting as a glorified for-each brute force, it's not the model being intelligent, it's simply the harness covering more ground. It's millions of monkeys bashing type-writers, not Shakespeare at one.

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#182
post #15

The Anthropic writeup addresses this explicitly: > This was the most critical vulnerability we discovered in OpenBSD with Mythos Preview after a thousand runs through our scaffold. Across a thousand runs through our scaffold, the total cost was under $20,000 and found several dozen more findings. While the specific run that found the bug above cost under $50, that number only makes sense with full hindsight. Like any…

Spending $20000 (and whatever other resources this thing consumes) on a denial of service vulnerability in OpenBSD seems very off balance to me. Given the tone with which the project communicates discussing other operating systems approaches to security, I understand that it can be seen as some kind of trophy for Mythos. But really, searching the number of erratas on the releases page that include "could crash the ke…

You don’t see the value of vulnerabilities as on the order of 20k USD?

When it’s a security researcher, HN says that’s a squalid amount. But when its a model, it’s exorbitant.

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#183
post #82

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That was my thought exactly. If small models can find these same vulnerabilities, and your company is trying to find vulnerabilities, why didn’t you find them?

Who is spending millions of dollars on small models to find vulns? Nobody else is selling here or has the budget to sell quite like this. Anthropic spends millions - maybe significantly more. Then when they know where they are, they spend $20k to show how effective it is in a patch of land. They engineered this "discovery". What the small teams are doing is fair - it's just a scaled down version of what Anthropic alr…

> What the small teams are doing is fair - it's just a scaled down version of what Anthropic already did.

Do they find novel items? Or do they copy the areas already found by others?

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#184
post #15

The Anthropic writeup addresses this explicitly: > This was the most critical vulnerability we discovered in OpenBSD with Mythos Preview after a thousand runs through our scaffold. Across a thousand runs through our scaffold, the total cost was under $20,000 and found several dozen more findings. While the specific run that found the bug above cost under $50, that number only makes sense with full hindsight. Like any…

Wasn't the scaffolding for the Mythos run basically a line of bash that loops through every file of the codebase and prompts the model to find vulnerabilities in it? That sounds pretty close to "any gold there?" to me, only automated. Have Anthropic actually said anything about the amount of false positives Mythos turned up? FWIW, I saw some talk on Xitter (so grain of salt) about people replicating their result with…

Signal to noise

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#185
post #15

The Anthropic writeup addresses this explicitly: > This was the most critical vulnerability we discovered in OpenBSD with Mythos Preview after a thousand runs through our scaffold. Across a thousand runs through our scaffold, the total cost was under $20,000 and found several dozen more findings. While the specific run that found the bug above cost under $50, that number only makes sense with full hindsight. Like any…

[dead]

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#186

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But the entire value is that it can be automated. If you try to automate a small model to look for vulnerabilities over 10,000 files, it's going to say there are 9,500 vulns. Or none. 'Or none' is ruled out since it found the same vulnerability - I agree that there is a question on precision on the smaller model, but barring further analysis it just feels like '9500' is pure vibes from yourself? Also (out of intere…

> 'Or none' is ruled out since it found the same vulnerability It's not, though. It wasn't asked to find vulnerabilities over 10,000 files - it was asked to find a vulnerability in the one particular place in which the researchers knew there was a vulnerability. That's not proof that it would have found the vulnerability if it had been given a much larger surface area to search.

I don't think the LLM was asked to check 10,000 files given these models' context windows. I suspect they went file by file too.

That's kind of the point - I think there's three scenarios here

a) this just the first time an LLM has done such a thorough minesweeping b) previous versions of Claude did not detect this bug (seems the least likely) c) Anthropic have done this several times, but the false positive rate was so high that they never checked it properly

Between a) and c) I don't have a high confidence either way to be honest.

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#187

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Spending $20000 (and whatever other resources this thing consumes) on a denial of service vulnerability in OpenBSD seems very off balance to me. Given the tone with which the project communicates discussing other operating systems approaches to security, I understand that it can be seen as some kind of trophy for Mythos. But really, searching the number of erratas on the releases page that include "could crash the ke…

You don’t see the value of vulnerabilities as on the order of 20k USD? When it’s a security researcher, HN says that’s a squalid amount. But when its a model, it’s exorbitant.

If I understand you correctly, you're asking me if I would class this as a 20k USD (plus environmental and societal impact) bug? nope, I don't.

I've not said anything else than that I think this specific bug isn't worth the attention it's getting, and that 20k USD would benefit the OpenBSD project (much) more through the foundation.

> When it’s a security researcher, HN says that’s a squalid amount. But when its a model, it’s exorbitant.

Not sure why you're projecting this onto me, for the project in question $20k is _a_lot_. The target fundraising goal for 2025 was $400k, 5% of that goes a very long way (and yes, this includes OpenSSH).

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#188

All of this discourse seems very bizarre. If smaller models can find these things, that doesn’t mean mythos is worse than we thought. It means all models are more capable. Also if pointing models at files and giving them hints is all it takes to make them find all kinds of stuff, well, we can also spray and pray that pretty well with llms can’t we. It just points to us finding a lot more stuff with only a little bit…

> If smaller models can find these things, that doesn’t mean mythos is worse than we thought. It means all models are more capable. It means "it's so dangerous we can't release it" was a blatant lie since anthropic would have already known this.

Sure, I think it’s reasonable to tell Anthropic the barn door is already open.

Though, like, I guess I expect that when this comes out, all the opus traffics will move over. It does appear to be much more capable, just jury is out about how much more capable

Re: Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

#190
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Wasn't the scaffolding for the Mythos run basically a line of bash that loops through every file of the codebase and prompts the model to find vulnerabilities in it? That sounds pretty close to "any gold there?" to me, only automated. Have Anthropic actually said anything about the amount of false positives Mythos turned up? FWIW, I saw some talk on Xitter (so grain of salt) about people replicating their result with…

> Wasn't the scaffolding for the Mythos run basically a line of bash that loops through every file of the codebase and prompts the model to find vulnerabilities in it? That sounds pretty close to "any gold there?" to me, only automated. But the entire value is that it can be automated. If you try to automate a small model to look for vulnerabilities over 10,000 files, it's going to say there are 9,500 vulns. Or none.…

3 years ago the best model was DaVinci. It cost 3 cents per 1k tokens (in and out the same price). Today, GPT-5.4 Nano is much better than DaVinci was and it costs 0.02 cents in and .125 cents out per 1k tokens.

In other words, a significantly better model is also 1-2 orders of magnitude cheaper. You can cut it in half by doing batch. You could cut it another order of magnitude by running something like Gemma 4 on cloud hardware, or even more on local hardware.

If this trend continues another 3 years, what costs 20k today might cost $100.

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