CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
11–20 of 118 posts
Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#12Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#13some comments purportedly (i did not verify) from one of the maintainers: > Dear All, I'm Sam and in I'm working with Franck on CPU-Z (I'm doing the validator). Franck is unfortunately OOO for a couple weeks. I'm just out of bed after worked on Memtest86+ for most the night, so I'm doing my best to check everything. As very first checks, the file on our server looks fine ( https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6c8faba4…
Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#14which you can install with:
winget install --exact --id CPUID.CPU-Z
(there is a --version flag where you can specify "2.19", which the signature there is a month old, so it should be safe to install that way)Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#15> (because i am often working with programms which triggering the defender i just ignored that)
This again shows the unfortunate corrosive effect of false-positives. Probably impossible to solve while aggressively detecting viruses though.
Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#16Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#17Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#18This is bad. I like to install software with winget. Are the versions there also compromised? v1.63 updated 6 days ago https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs/tree/master/manifes... via https://winstall.app/apps/CPUID.HWMonitor v2.19 updated 15 days ago https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs/tree/master/manifes... via https://winstall.app/apps/CPUID.CPU-Z
Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#19Re: CPU-Z and HWMonitor compromised
#20I've wondered about this while using CachyOS and their package installer. I don't know what repos do what, I don't really understand the security model of the AUR, and I wonder, if I download a package, how can I know it's legitimate or otherwise by some trusted user of the community vs. some random person?
- CachyOS packages should be coming from known, trusted CachyOS and Arch Linux maintainers. There is still potential for them or their original packages to get compromised (See XZ backdoor) however they are pulling source code from trusted sources so you can generally trust these as much as your trust the OS itself.
- AUR packages are a complete wild west. AUR packages are defined by PKGBUILD files and I highly recommend learning how to read PKGBUILDs and always reading them before installation and re-reading them when they are updated. PKGBUILDs for AUR packages can be treated as untrusted shell scripts and to a certain extent an arbitrary actor can make and upload any PKGBUILD to the AUR. Feel free to use them, but make sure A) they are downloading from trusted sources like the original git repo and B) they are running commands that are expected.
EDIT: Improved accuracy.