>Effectively, eight CPUs run the flight software in parallel. The engineering philosophy hinges on a >“fail-silent” design. The self-checking pairs ensure that if a CPU performs an erroneous calculation >due to a radiation event, the error is detected immediately and the system responds. >“A faulty computer will fail silent, rather than transmit the ‘wrong answer,’” Uitenbroek explained. >This approach simplifies the…
How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
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Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#62>Effectively, eight CPUs run the flight software in parallel. The engineering philosophy hinges on a >“fail-silent” design. The self-checking pairs ensure that if a CPU performs an erroneous calculation >due to a radiation event, the error is detected immediately and the system responds. >“A faulty computer will fail silent, rather than transmit the ‘wrong answer,’” Uitenbroek explained. >This approach simplifies the…
Put another way, the FIT (Failure in Time) value for the condition in which both CPUs in a lockstep pair perform the same erroneous calculation and still produce matching results is extremely small. That is why we selected and accepted this lockstep CPU design
Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#63I sure wish they would talk about the hardware. I spent a few years developing a radiation hardened fault tolerant computer back in the day. Adding redundancy at multiple levels was the usual solution. But there is another clever check on transient errors during process execution that we implemented that didn't involve any redundancy. Doesn't seem like they did anything like that. But can't tell since they don't ment…
Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#64Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#65NASA didn't build this, Lockheed Martin and their subcontractors did. Articles and headlines like this make people think that NASA does a lot more than they actually do. This is like a CEO claiming credit for everything a company does.
Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#66The quote from the CMU guy about modern Agile and DevOps approaches challenging architectural discipline is a nice way of saying most of us have completely forgotten how to build deterministic systems. Time-triggered Ethernet with strict frame scheduling feels like it's from a parallel universe compared to how we ship software now.
Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#67Typo in the first sentence of the second paragraph is sad though. C'mon, proofread a little.
Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agile is not meant to make solid, robust products. It’s so you can make product fragments/iterations quickly, with okay quality and out to the customer asap to maximize profits.
“Agile” doesn’t mean that you release the first iteration, it’s just a methodology that emphasizes short iteration loops. You can definitely develop reliable real-time systems with Agile.
Someone needs to inform the management of the last three companies I worked for about this.
Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#69Typo in the first sentence of the first paragraph is oddly comforting since AI wouldn't make such a typo, heh. Typo in the first sentence of the second paragraph is sad though. C'mon, proofread a little.
Re: How NASA built Artemis II’s fault-tolerant computer
#70The quote from the CMU guy about modern Agile and DevOps approaches challenging architectural discipline is a nice way of saying most of us have completely forgotten how to build deterministic systems. Time-triggered Ethernet with strict frame scheduling feels like it's from a parallel universe compared to how we ship software now.
Tesla’s Cybertruck uses that in its ethernet as well!