One thing that is not addressed: say this quantum attack happens tomorrow and everyone agrees it was an attack, what would prevent the community (miners, node operators, and users) to hard fork the chain at a snapshot before the attack, patch the protocol, and call that Bitcoin? There would be loss of value of course, but it is not unrecoverable. It’s worth remembering that Ethereum forked for much less (not even a b…
Bitcoin and quantum computing
31–40 of 147 posts
Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
A hard fork implies a difference in consensus rules, and what do you propose that difference be? Existing wallets need to actively commit to some PQ signature mechanism, prior to Q-day.
Even if Q-day means there is a way to deterministically retrieve any private key from a public key (is that what it means? or is the blast radius of q-day contained? This is a bit above my level of cryptography), I’m sure we could come up with something to minimize the damage. In the worst case, it might involve a claim process with an authority or consensus mechanism to prove who the rightful owner of the funds is a…
That's exactly what it means. (Note also that under ECDSA you can retrieve a public key from a valid signature).
How do you prove anything, after the key material is compromised?
Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#33One thing that is not addressed: say this quantum attack happens tomorrow and everyone agrees it was an attack, what would prevent the community (miners, node operators, and users) to hard fork the chain at a snapshot before the attack, patch the protocol, and call that Bitcoin? There would be loss of value of course, but it is not unrecoverable. It’s worth remembering that Ethereum forked for much less (not even a b…
In theory nothing prevents that but it would be so contentious that the backlash (e.g. 90% drawdown) may be even worse than just letting the hacks stand.
Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#34One thing that is not addressed: say this quantum attack happens tomorrow and everyone agrees it was an attack, what would prevent the community (miners, node operators, and users) to hard fork the chain at a snapshot before the attack, patch the protocol, and call that Bitcoin? There would be loss of value of course, but it is not unrecoverable. It’s worth remembering that Ethereum forked for much less (not even a b…
In theory nothing prevents that but it would be so contentious that the backlash (e.g. 90% drawdown) may be even worse than just letting the hacks stand.
Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#35Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
A hard fork implies a difference in consensus rules, and what do you propose that difference be? Existing wallets need to actively commit to some PQ signature mechanism, prior to Q-day.
Even if Q-day means there is a way to deterministically retrieve any private key from a public key (is that what it means? or is the blast radius of q-day contained? This is a bit above my level of cryptography), I’m sure we could come up with something to minimize the damage. In the worst case, it might involve a claim process with an authority or consensus mechanism to prove who the rightful owner of the funds is a…
It’s a blockchain, so the simplest would be chain of custody until the chain points undeniably at you. This is not a pure cryptographic device, some social intervention might be needed here.
Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#37Somewhat ironic question, but as ETFs holdings of BTC continue to grow, is there a possibility that the custodians of those ETFs start to have a backup plan for ETF holders or create an alliance to push a fork forward? The management fee those companies generate is non-trivial, so they're incentivized to stay ahead of this. Now, of course, the irony here would be traditional finance infrastructure winning out over de…
Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#38Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#39As was alluded to in the comments, my colleagues at Blockstream Research are doing some work on this with mechanisms called SHRINCS and SHRIMPS. Of course, inventing and demonstrating a quantum-resistant signature mechanism isn't the same thing as deploying it in consensus or upgrading everyone's UTXOs to it, and it's fair to say that there are many steps in between!
Re: Bitcoin and quantum computing
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
In theory nothing prevents that but it would be so contentious that the backlash (e.g. 90% drawdown) may be even worse than just letting the hacks stand.
Letting the hack stand means the chain comes to a halt and all value is destroyed? Even if you’re a staunch bitcoin purist, I don’t think that’s the path you want to go on.