The only thing reassuring is the Apache and Linux foundation setups. Lets hope this is not just an appeasing mention but more fundamental. If there are really models too dangerous to release to the public, companies like oracle, amazon and microsoft would absolutely use this exclusive power to not just fix their holes but to damage their competitors.
Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
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Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#92Pricing for Mythos Preview is $25/$125, so cheaper than GPT 4.5 ($75/$150) and GPT 5.4 Pro ($30/$180)
For comparison, 5x the cost of Opus 4.6, and 1.67x for Opus 4.1
I think this would be very heavily used if they released it, completely unlike GPT 4.5
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#93So, $100B+ valuation companies get essentially free access to the frontier tools with disabled guardrails to safely red team their commercial offerings, while we get "i won't do that for you, even against your own infrastructure with full authorization" for $200/month. Uh-huh.
Yes, and that's normal. Coordinated disclosure is standard practice when the risk of public disclosure is unacceptable.
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#94Earlier quoted context omitted.
From the article: > Anthropic’s commitment of $100M in model usage credits to Project Glasswing and additional participants will cover substantial usage throughout this research preview. Afterward, Claude Mythos Preview will be available to participants at $25/$125 per million input/output tokens (participants can access the model on the Claude API, Amazon Bedrock, Google Cloud’s Vertex AI, and Microsoft Foundry).
Key point: available to participants .
permanent underclass has arrived :(
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#95Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I would like to reach out and talk to biologists - do you find these models to be useful and capable? Can it save you time the way a highly capable colleague would? Well, I would say they have done precisely that in evaluating the model, no? For example section 2.2.5.1: >Uplift and feasibility results >The median expert assessed the model as a force-multiplier that saves meaningful time (uplift level 2 of 4), with…
This is the exact logic people that was used to claim that GPT4 was a PhD level intelligence.
You said: "I would like to reach out and talk to biologists - do you find these models to be useful and capable? Can it save you time the way a highly capable colleague would?" and they said, paraphrasing, "We reached out and talked to biologists and asked them to rank the model between 0 and 4 where 4 is a world expert, and the median people said it was a 2, which was that it helped them save time in the way a capable colleague would" specifically "Specific, actionable info; saves expert meaningful time; fills gaps in adjacent domains"
so I'm just telling you they did the thing you said you wanted.
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#96Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just reading this, the inevitable scaremongering about biological weapons comes up. Since most of us here are devs, we understand that software engineering capabilities can be used for good or bad - mostly good, in practice. I think this should not be different for biology. I would like to reach out and talk to biologists - do you find these models to be useful and capable? Can it save you time the way a highly capab…
> Just reading this, the inevitable scaremongering about biological weapons comes up. It's very easy to learn more about this if it's seriously a question you have. I don't quite follow why you think that you are so much more thoughtful than Anthropic/OpenAI/Google such that you agree that LLMs can't autonomously create very bad things but—in this area that is not your domain of expertise—you disagree and insist that…
>It's very easy to learn more about this if it's seriously a question you have.
No, it's not. It took years of polishing by software engineers, who understand this exact profession to get models where they are now.
Despite that, most engineers were of the opinion, that these models were kinda mid at coding, up until recently, despite these models far outperforming humans in stuff like competitive programming.
Yet despite that, we've seen claims going back to GPT4 of a DANGEROUS SUPERINTELLIGENCE.
I would apply this framework to biology - this time, expert effort, and millions of GPU hours and a giant corpus that is open source clearly has not been involved in biology.
My guess is that this model is kinda o1-ish level maybe when it comes to biology? If biology is analogous to CS, it has a LONG way to go before the median researcher finds it particularly useful, let alone dangerous.
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#97Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#98Another Anthropic PR release based on Anthropic’s own research, uncorroborated by any outside source, where the underlying, unquestioned fact is that their model can do something incredible. > AI models have reached a level of coding capability where they can surpass all but the most skilled humans at finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities I like Anthropic, but these are becoming increasingly transparent att…
I would've basically agreed with you until I'd seen this talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sd26pWhfmg
Maybe a bad example since Nicholas works at Anthropic, but they're very accomplished and I doubt they're being misleading or even overly grandiose here
See the slide 13 minutes in, which makes it look to be quite a sudden change
Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#99One of the things I'm always looking at with new models released is long context performance, and based on the system card it seems like they've cracked it: GraphWalks BFS 256K-1M Mythos Opus GPT5.4 80.0% 38.7% 21.4%
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Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era
#100Earlier quoted context omitted.
Software security heavily favors the defenders (ex. it's much easier to encrypt a file than break the encryption). Thus with better tools and ample time to reach steady-state, we would expect software to become more secure.
This came across as so confident that I had a moment of doubt. It is most definitely an attackers world: most of us are safe, not because of the strength of our defenses but the disinterest of our attackers.
There are plenty of interested attackers who would love to control every device. One is in the white house, for example.