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Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

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171–180 of 697 posts

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#171
> Few engineers could reliably build the software locally; debugger usage was rare (I ended up writing the team's first how-to guide in 2024); and automated test coverage sat below 40%.

A key clue and explains why so much of what Microsoft puts out is garbage. Wow.

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#172

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> risks to national security Microsoft is the go to solution for every government agency, FEDRAMP / CMMC environments, etc. > People come in all the time crying that everything is broken and needs to be scrapped and rewritten but it's hardly ever true. This I'm more sympathetic to. I really don't think his approach of "here's what a rewrite would look like" was ever going to work and it makes me think that there's an…

> Microsoft is the go to solution for every government agency, FEDRAMP / CMMC environments, etc. I've been involved with FEDRAMP initiatives in the past. That doesn't mean as much as you'd think. Some really atrocious systems have been FEDRAMP certified. Maybe when you go all the way to FEDRAMP High there could be some better guardrails; I doubt it. Microsoft has just been entrenched in the government, that's all. Th…

Thanks. That was exactly the plan. Full rewrites are extremely risky (see the 2nd System syndrome) as people wrongly assume they will redo everything and also add everything everyone always wanted, and fix all dept, and do it in a fraction of the time, which is delusional and almost always fail. Stepwise modernization is a proven technique.

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#173

The post is so dramatized and clearly written by someone with a grudge such that it really detracts from any point that is trying to be made, if there is any. From another former Az eng now elsewhere still working on big systems, the post gets way way more boring when you realize that things like "Principle Group Manager" is just an M2 and Principal in general is L6 (maybe even L5) Google equivalent. Similarly Sev2 i…

I believe the author was referring to this https://www.propublica.org/article/microsoft-digital-escorts... . Microsoft hired Chinese engineers to manage US Department of Defense Azure VMs.

Thanks. That reference is correct. The point is why those sessions were necessary because there is no reason, a-priori, to do manual touches on production systems, DoD or not.

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#174
post #147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The only good thing Microsoft azure ever did for me was provide a very easy way to exploit their free trial program in the early 2010s to crypto mine for free. It couldn’t do much, but it was straight up free real estate for CPU mining. $200 or 2 weeks per credit/debit card.

I used it for MMO goldfarming - circa 2012/2013

Damn that’s impressive. Wasn’t it all command line at the time?

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#175
post #146

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If anything it's astonishing that a program whereby China-based Microsoft engineers telling U.S.-based Microsoft engineers specific commands to type in ever made it off the proposal page inside Microsoft, accelerated time-to-market or not. > It defeats the entire purpose of many of the NIST security controls that demand things like U.S.-cleared personnel for government networks, and Microsoft knew those were a thin…

https://www.propublica.org/article/microsoft-digital-escorts...

Holy fuck. Ok, this will change things considerably for some companies I'm working with that had moved their stuff to Azure. Thanks. More than I can express on here.

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#176
post #119
post #5

> The direct corollary is that any successful compromise of the host can give an attacker access to the complete memory of every VM running on that node. Keeping the host secure is therefore critical. > In that context, hosting a web service that is directly reachable from any guest VM and running it on the secure host side created a significantly larger attack surface than I expected. That is quite scary

This is well documented: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-machines/ins... Why would an Azure customer need to query this service at all? I was not aware this service even exists- because I never needed anything like it. AFAI can tell, this service tells services running on the VM what SKU the VM is. But how is this useful to the service? Any Azure users could tell how they use IMDS? Thanks!

[deleted]

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#177
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Last thing, the final part 6 comes off as really childish, risks to national security and sending letters to the board, really? That struck me too. Maybe i've never worked high enough in an org (im unclear how highly ranked the author of the piece is) but i've never been in an org where going over your boss's boss's boss's boss's head and writing a letter to the board was likely to go well. That said, i could easil…

[flagged]

Lol, no.

It is true that writing to the board will get you noticed, and that you might not like the consequences. If you value having the job then don’t write to the board. Even if you are right, being noticed like that isn’t going to endear you to your boss.

But if you care more about doing the right thing then writing to the board is the right thing to do. And after a few years of working at Microsoft you might not value your job very much either and you too might decide to go out in style.

Go watch the last episode of Chernobyl again.

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#178
post #22

What are we reading here? These are extraordinary statements. Also with apparent credibility. They sound reasonable. Is this a whistleblower or an ex employee with a grudge? The appearance is the first. Is it? They’ve put their name to some clear and worrying statements. > On January 7, 2025… I sent a more concise executive summary to the CEO. … When those communications produced no acknowledgment, I took the customa…

He is, I think, Swiss, perhaps a cultural difference?

We like things well done, but also integrity and accountability.

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#179
post #46

What are we reading here? These are extraordinary statements. Also with apparent credibility. They sound reasonable. Is this a whistleblower or an ex employee with a grudge? The appearance is the first. Is it? They’ve put their name to some clear and worrying statements. > On January 7, 2025… I sent a more concise executive summary to the CEO. … When those communications produced no acknowledgment, I took the customa…

Yeah I thought that was extreme. An engineer going to the board of any corporation let alone Microsoft is not normal or customary IME. That could explain why they got no response.

Not on day one. Imagine it took two years to get there.

Re: Decisions that eroded trust in Azure – by a former Azure Core engineer

#180
post #60

from part 2: > Worse, early prototypes already pulled in nearly a thousand third-party Rust crates, many of which were transitive dependencies and largely unvetted, posing potential supply-chain risks. Rust really going for the node ecosystem's crown in package number bloat

Rust is nowhere close to Node in terms of package number bloat. Most Rust libraries are actually useful and nontrivial and the supply chain risk is not necessarily as high for the simple reason that many crates are split up into sub-crates. For example, instead of having one library like "hashlib" that handles all different kinds of hashing algorithms, the most "official" Rust libraries are broken up into one for sha…

While i agree the exact line “rust libraries are useful and non-trivial” i have heard from all over the place as if the value of a library is how complex it is. The rust community has an elitist bent to it or a minority is very vocal.

Supply chain attacks are real for all package registries. The js ones had more todo with registry accounts getting hacked than the compromised libraries being bad or useless.

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