Earlier quoted context omitted.
If everyone avoids using packages released within the last 7 days, malicious code is more likely to remain dormant for 7 days.
that's why people are telling others to use 7 days but using 8 days themselves :)
Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
191–200 of 894 posts
Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#192Project: https://point-wild.github.io/who-touched-my-packages/
Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#193Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#194Not to beat a dead horse but I see this again and again with dependencies. Each time I get more worried that the same will happen with rust. I understand the fat std library approach won’t work but I really still want a good solution where I can trust packages to be safe and high quality.
Hosting curated dependencies is a commercially valuable service. Eventually an economy arises where people pay vendors to vet packages.
Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#195Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#196Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#197Package managers are a failed experiment. We have libraries like SQLite, which is a single .c file that you drag into your project and it immediately does a ton of incredibly useful, non-trivial work for you, while barely increasing your executable's size. The issue is not dependencies themselves, it's transitive ones. Nobody installs left-pad or is-even-number directly, and "libraries" like these are the vast majori…
If no one checks their dependencies, the solution is to centralize this responsibility at the package repository. Something like left-pad should simply not be admitted to npm. Enforce a set of stricter rules which only allow non-trivial packages maintained by someone who is clearly accountable.
Another change one could make is develop bigger standard libraries with all the utilities which are useful. For example in Rust there are a few de facto standard packages one needs very often, which then also force you to pull in a bunch of transitive dependencies. Those could also be part of the standard library.
This all amounts to increasing the minimal scope of useful functionality a package has to have to be admitted and increasing accountability of the people maintaining them. This obviously comes with more effort on the maintainers part, but hey maybe we could even pay them for their labor.
Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#198I recommend everyone to use bwrap if you're on linux and alias all package managers / anything that has post build logic with it. I have bwrap configured to override: npm, pip, cargo, mvn, gradle, everything you can think of and I only give it the access it needs, strip anything that is useless to it anyway, deny dbus, sockets, everything. SSH is forwarded via socket (ssh-add). This limits the blast radius to your CW…
Re: Axios compromised on NPM – Malicious versions drop remote access trojan
#199Package managers are a failed experiment. We have libraries like SQLite, which is a single .c file that you drag into your project and it immediately does a ton of incredibly useful, non-trivial work for you, while barely increasing your executable's size. The issue is not dependencies themselves, it's transitive ones. Nobody installs left-pad or is-even-number directly, and "libraries" like these are the vast majori…
For some reason, NPM is the only ecosystem with substantial issues with supply-chain attacks.