Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
blog.railway.com
Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
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Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#2There are dozens of contradictions, like first they say:
“this may have resulted in potentially authenticated data being served to unauthenticated users”
and then just a few sentences later say
“potentially unauthenticated data is served to authenticated users”
which is the opposite. Which one is it?
Am I missing something, or is this article poorly reviewed?
Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#3I think that's already best practice in most API designs anyway?
Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#4This write up doesn’t make sense. Authenticated users are the ones without a Set-Cookie? Surely the ones with the cookie set are the authenticated ones? There are dozens of contradictions, like first they say: “this may have resulted in potentially authenticated data being served to unauthenticated users” and then just a few sentences later say “potentially unauthenticated data is served to authenticated users” which…
Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#5Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#6I think this is their first major security incident. Good that they are transparent about it.
If possible (@justjake) it would be helpful to understand if there was a QA/test process before the release was pushed. I presume there was, so the question is why this was not caught. Was this just an untested part of the codebase?
Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#7"0.05% of domains" is a vanity metric -- what matters is how many requests were mis-served cross-user. "Cache-Control was respected where provided" is technically true but misleading when most apps don't set it because CDN was off. The status page is more honest here too: they confirmed content without cache-control was cached.
They call it a "trust boundary violation" in the last line but the rest of the post reads like a press release. No accounting of what data was actually exposed.
Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#8This write up doesn’t make sense. Authenticated users are the ones without a Set-Cookie? Surely the ones with the cookie set are the authenticated ones? There are dozens of contradictions, like first they say: “this may have resulted in potentially authenticated data being served to unauthenticated users” and then just a few sentences later say “potentially unauthenticated data is served to authenticated users” which…
Fixed the typo in that second paragraph and aligned the section on the Set-Cookie stuff. Anything else that can be made more clear?
Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#9Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fixed the typo in that second paragraph and aligned the section on the Set-Cookie stuff. Anything else that can be made more clear?
The problem is that these visible errors make us wonder what other errors in the post are less visible. Fixing them doesn’t fix the process that led to them.
https://x.com/JustJake/status/2007730898192744751
I wouldn't be surprised if most of Railway's infra is running on Claude at this point.
Re: Incident March 30th, 2026 – Accidental CDN Caching
#10This write up doesn’t make sense. Authenticated users are the ones without a Set-Cookie? Surely the ones with the cookie set are the authenticated ones? There are dozens of contradictions, like first they say: “this may have resulted in potentially authenticated data being served to unauthenticated users” and then just a few sentences later say “potentially unauthenticated data is served to authenticated users” which…
Fixed the typo in that second paragraph and aligned the section on the Set-Cookie stuff. Anything else that can be made more clear?
Be more direct. Be concise. This blog post sounds like a cagey customer service CYA response. It defeats the purpose of publishing a blog post showing that you’re mature, aware, accountable, and transparent.