Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
jai.scs.stanford.edu
Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
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Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#2What would it take for people to stop recklessly running unconstrained AI agents on machines they actually care about? A Stanford researcher thinks the answer is a new lightweight Linux container system that you don't have to configure or think about.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#3Excellent project, unfortunate title. I almost didn't click on it.
I like the tradeoff offered: full access to the current directory, read-only access to the rest, copy-on-write for the home directory. With stricter modes to (presumably) protect against data exfiltration too. It really feels like it should be the default for agent systems.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#4[flagged]
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#5[flagged]
So?
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#6What would it take for people to stop recklessly running unconstrained AI agents on machines they actually care about? A Stanford researcher thinks the answer is a new lightweight Linux container system that you don't have to configure or think about.
Yes. It is like walking arounf your house with a flamethrower, but you added fire retardant. Just take the flamethower to a shed you don't mind losing. Which is some kind of cloud workspace most likely. Maybe an old laptop.
Still if you yolo online access and give it cred or access to tools that are authenticated there can still be dragons.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#7What would Jonathan Blow think about this.
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#8How is this different than say bubblewrap and others?
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#9Excellent project, unfortunate title. I almost didn't click on it. I like the tradeoff offered: full access to the current directory, read-only access to the rest, copy-on-write for the home directory. With stricter modes to (presumably) protect against data exfiltration too. It really feels like it should be the default for agent systems.
Since the site itself doesn't really have a title, I probably would've went with something like "jai - filesystem containment for AI agents"
Re: Go hard on agents, not on your filesystem
#10How is this different than say bubblewrap and others?
https://jai.scs.stanford.edu/comparison.html#jai-vs-bubblewr...
> bubblewrap is more flexible and works without root. jai is more opinionated and requires far less ceremony for the common case. The 15-flag bwrap invocation that turns into a wrapper script is exactly the friction jai is designed to remove.
Plus some other comparisons, check the page