Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not really. It is literally something that binds the internet together (i.e. one of the common definitions of the word glue).
Now we can get into what "bind" means.
Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about How the Internet Works
91–100 of 158 posts
Re: Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about How the Internet Works
#92Re: Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about How the Internet Works
#93Earlier quoted context omitted.
As I read it that was 18:24 yesterday in PST, or 02:24 today in UTC. The use of "today" may just be sloppy dating-- or it may reflect that it was today for most of those affected.
My guess was that he wrote the article yesterday, but didn't publish it until today. It's not a big deal, was just curious.
Re: Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about How the Internet Works
#94Earlier quoted context omitted.
Much more common that malicious outages is malicious creation of ghost networks. Basically a person could say over BGP "W.X.Y.Z is at my office" where that address isn't used by anyone anywhere else on the internet. Then they do their bad deeds from that made up address. Lastly they remove their route via BGP and it is as if their addresses never existed.
That might work for some unused /24's for a large organization's /8 block, but unused IPv4 addresses are so last year! I suppose the attack will still work for IPv6 for a long time.
Re: Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit about How the Internet Works
#95Earlier quoted context omitted.
The moment people realize that the rogue network was being malicious, they'd stop trusting it - ignoring all announcements it might make. It might take a few hours for order to be restored, though.
Would it be possible to claim to own Google's IP, then on receiving the packets intended for Google forward them on to the real IP (without accidentally forwarding them back to yourself)? That way someone could hijack & interrogate these packets without being spotted (at least without causing service outage / only adding slight delay). Alternatively could they route these requests to a clone as an advanced phishing s…
It might work for somebody like China, where they have two network interfaces, so can make all Chinese networks think they are Google on one interface, then forward things on to the real Google on the other. There might be a good reason for them to do it, too, because they are also likely a trusted CA, so could forge SSL certs, too.