Having worked in IB / PE my whole career (both buying & selling businesses and distressed debt, primarily in the middle market) it is always fun when my area of domain hits the front page and I can read the confident opinions folks have on my industry.
I think most people in this thread are missing the boat.
First, it’s important to realize that “default” does not imply wipeout. Default just means that you’ve violated a credit agreement, and that can be solved many different ways. Sometimes it’s solved by the sponsor restructuring the debt (injecting equity, asking for covenant/interest relief); sometimes it’s a true Ch 11 bankruptcy; in very rare cases, it can be a true Ch 7 liquidation. But even in those destruction-of-value scenarios, first-lien recoveries run 50-70% of “par value” borrowed. Lenders are smart, their job is to underwrite these deals, and they’re compensated for this with healthy interest rates - typically S+500-650 plus fees, which comes out to 10–12% unlevered returns. So they are basically pricing junk bonds, and in exchange get senior secured risk with real covenants around what the business can / can’t do.
Second, the myth that PE firms can just saddle a company with debt at the lender’s expense with no skin in the game and walk away with a profit while the company files for bankruptcy is hilarious, in part because it obviously doesn’t hold up to the slightest bit of scrutiny. The typical PE firm is buying a middle market business for 10-12x EBITDA on average. In today’s world, lenders will usually let you put 4.5-5.5x EBITDA on the business as leverage (in the ZIRP era, you could push things up closer to 7x, sometimes above that if it’s a stellar business). So on a typical 10x deal with 5x debt, 50% of the capital structure is PE firm equity which gets wiped out first before the lender loses a dollar. If that happens, the PE fund’s investor returns crater, which means no more Fund II/III/IV, which means no more fees for them to generate.
(As an aside, the typical “fees” paid by portfolio companies to the PE firm are, at least in modern limited partner agreements, largely offset against management fees and recaptured by the fund’s investors. The PE firm is not getting rich off these fees, at least not anymore.)
Third, private credit is not your local commercial bank. Many of the largest private credit firms are actually PE firms themselves - e.g., Apollo, Ares, and Blackstone, who are all known as “private equity” have actually become more valuable to the public investor community due to their private credit business. These are not sadsack regional banks and credit unions getting hoodwinked by New York finance elites. In many cases, they are the same firms, with the same resources (in-house restructuring / “workout” teams, portfolio ops, etc.).
It’s important to realize that private credit funds raise capital from institutions and HNW individuals with locked-up commitments - it is the exact same investor base as PE, and fundamentally a very similar business, they just invest at a different part of the capital stack. Because of this, risk of contagion is very low. Bank exposure to private credit is something like 1.5% of their portfolio - it is tiny. The extent of the blowback will be that a pension fund investing in alternatives has a poor return in one asset class across a dozen - it’s not systemic risk.
Finally, what IS true is that pre-ZIRP portfolios and software-heavy credits (something like 15-20% of leveraged loans outstanding) are in a tough spot. These businesses are either failing or they have too much debt that has “re-rated” to higher interest rates as interest rate hedges fell off. What happens from here is that the companies with structural issues in their business model will cease to exist (e.g., certain SaaS businesses). This happens all the time - it’s capitalism. But the good businesses are not going to disappear because of a bad cap structure - they will just get recapitalized.