Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust

OneCLI is an open-source gateway that sits between your AI agents and the services they call. You store your real credentials once in OneCLI's encrypted vault, and give your agents placeholder keys. When an agent makes an HTTP call through the proxy, OneCLI matches the request by host/path, verifies the agent should have access, swaps the placeholder for the real credential, and forwards the request. The agent never touches the actual secret. It just uses CLI or MCP tools as normal.

Try it in one line: docker run --pull always -p 10254:10254 -p 10255:10255 -v onecli-data:/app/data ghcr.io/onecli/onecli

The proxy is written in Rust, the dashboard is Next.js, and secrets are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest. Everything runs in a single Docker container with an embedded Postgres (PGlite), no external dependencies. Works with any agent framework (OpenClaw, NanoClaw, IronClaw, or anything that can set an HTTPS_PROXY).

We started with what felt most urgent: agents shouldn't be holding raw credentials. The next layer is access policies and audit, defining what each agent can call, logging everything, and requiring human approval before sensitive actions go through.

It's Apache-2.0 licensed. We'd love feedback on the approach, and we're especially curious how people are handling agent auth today.

GitHub: https://github.com/onecli/onecli Site: https://onecli.sh

Show HN: OneCLI – Vault for AI Agents in Rust
github.com

I have few questions:

- How can a proxy inject stuff if it's TLS encrypted? (same for IronClaw and others)

- Any adapters for existing secret stores? like maybe my fake credential can be a 1Password entry path (like 1Password:vault-name/entry/field and it would pull from 1P instead of having to have yet another place for me to store secrets?

1) Not all systems respect HTTP_PROXY. Node in particular is very uncooperative in this regard.

2) AWS access keys can’t be handled by simple credential swap; the requests need to be resigned with the real keys. Replicating the SigV4 and SigV4A exactly was bit of a pain.

3) To be secure, this system needs to run outside of the execution sandbox so that the agent can’t just read the keys from the proxy process.

For Airut I settled on a transparent (mitm)proxy, running in a separate container, and injecting proxy cert to the cert store in the container where the agent runs. This solved 1 and 3.