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Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

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31–40 of 242 posts

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#31
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's pretty bad! I wonder what kind of bounty went to the researcher. I'd be surprised if it's above 20K$. Bug bounties rewards are usually criminally low; doubly so when you consider the efforts usually involved in not only finding serious vulns, but demonstrating a reliable way to exploit them.

I think a big part of "criminally low" is that you'll make much more money selling it on the black market than getting the bounty.

I am far from the halls of corporate decision making, but I really don't understand why bug bounties at trillion dollar companies are so low.

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#32
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's pretty bad! I wonder what kind of bounty went to the researcher. I'd be surprised if it's above 20K$. Bug bounties rewards are usually criminally low; doubly so when you consider the efforts usually involved in not only finding serious vulns, but demonstrating a reliable way to exploit them.

I think a big part of "criminally low" is that you'll make much more money selling it on the black market than getting the bounty.

I read this often, and I guess it could be true, but those kinds of transaction would presumably go through DNM / forums like BF and the like. Which means crypto, and full anonymity. So either the buyer trusts the seller to deliver, or the seller trusts the buyer to pay. And once you reveal the particulars of a flaw, nothing prevents the buyer from running away (this actually also occurs regularly on legal, genuine bug bounty programs - they'll patch the problem discreetly after reading the report but never follow up, never mind paying; with little recourse for the researcher).

Even revealing enough details, but not everything, about the flaw to convince a potential buyer would be detrimental to the seller, as the level of details required to convince would likely massively simplify the work of the buyer should they decide to try and find the flaw themselves instead of buying. And I imagine much of those potential buyers would be state actors or organized criminal groups, both of which do have researchers in house.

The way this trust issue is (mostly) solved in drugs DNM is through the platform itself acting as a escrow agent; but I suspect such a thing would not work as well with selling vulnerabilities, because the volume is much lower, for one thing (preventing a high enough volume for reputation building); the financial amounts generally higher, for another.

The real money to be made as a criminal alternative, I think, would be to exploit the flaw yourself on real life targets. For example to drop ransomware payloads; these days ransomware groups even offer franchises - they'll take, say, 15% of the ransom cut and provide assistance with laundering/exploiting the target/etc; and claim your infection in the name of their group.

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#34
post #19
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah, but lets keeping downplaying use-after-free as something not worth eliminating in 21st century systems languages.

I love rust but honestly I am more scared about supply chain attacks through cargo than memory corruption bugs. The reason being that supply chain attacks are probably way cheaper to pull off than finding these bugs

If you can bring in 3rd party libraries, you can be hit with a supply chain attack. C and C++ aren't immune, it's just harder to pull off due to dependency management being more complex (meaning you'll work with less dependencies naturally).

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#35
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I quoted directly from NIST, there's many other browsers and non-browsers that use chromium

It was intended as a joke reference to the 2004 Kerry / Bush debate. It's not a coincidence that Google would leave off an ad-blocking variant of Chrome.

they listed the top 3 most popular chromium browsers, covering 90%+ of chromium users

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#36
post #7

I wonder if this was found with LLM assistance, if yes, with which one and is it a one-off or does it mark a start of a new era (I assume it does).

Absolutely nothing in the announcement or other publicly available source implies that, to my knowledge. Might as well speculate if a random passer-by on the street is secretly a martian.

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#38
post #29
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's pretty bad! I wonder what kind of bounty went to the researcher. I'd be surprised if it's above 20K$. Bug bounties rewards are usually criminally low; doubly so when you consider the efforts usually involved in not only finding serious vulns, but demonstrating a reliable way to exploit them.

The bounty could be very high. Last year one bug’s reporter was rewarded $250k. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44861106

Maybe google is an exception (but then again, maybe that payout was part marketing to draw more researchers).

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#39
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So basically Firefox is not affected ?

It's pretty hard to have an accidental a use after free in the FireFox CSS engine because it is mostly safe Rust. It's possible, but very unlikely.

That came to my mind as well. CSS was one of the earliest major applications of Rust in FireFox. I believe that work was when the "Fearless Concurrency" slogan was popularized.

Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild

#40
post #15
post #14

Isn't this a wrongly editorialized title - "Reported by Shaheen Fazim on 2026-02-11" so more like 7-day.

It refers to your many days software is available for, with zero implying it is not yet out so you couldn't have installed a new version and that's what makes it a risky bug The term has long watered-down to mean any vulnerability (since it was always a zero-day at some point before the patch release, I guess is those people's logic? idk). Fear inflation and shoehorning seems to happen to any type of scary/scarier/sc…

It's original meaning was days since software release, without any security connotation attached. It came from the warez scene, where groups competed to crack software and make it available to the scene earlier and earlier. A week after general release, three days, same-day. The ultimate was 0-day software, software which was not yet available to the general public.

In a security context, it has come to mean days since a mitigation was released. Prior to disclosure or mitigation, all vulnerabilities are "0-day", which may be for weeks, months, or years.

It's not really an inflation of the term, just a shifting of context. "Days since software was released" -> "Days since a mitigation for a given vulnerability was released".

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