Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah, but lets keeping downplaying use-after-free as something not worth eliminating in 21st century systems languages.
I love rust but honestly I am more scared about supply chain attacks through cargo than memory corruption bugs. The reason being that supply chain attacks are probably way cheaper to pull off than finding these bugs
Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
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Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#22"Use after free in CSS" is a funny description to see.
Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#23The fact that these still show up is pretty wild to me. Don't we have a bunch of tools that should create memory-safish binaries by applying the same validation checks that memory-safe languages get for free purely from their design? I get that css has changed a lot over the years with variables, scopes and adopting things from less/sass/coffee, but people use no-script for the reason because javascript is risky, but…
No, we don't. All of the ones we have are heavily leveraged in Chromium or were outright developed at Google for similar projects. 10s of billions are spent to try to get Chromium to not have these vulnerabilities, using those tools. And here we are.
I'll elaborate a bit. Things like sanitizers largely rely on test coverage. Google spends a lot of money on things like fuzzing, but coverage is still a critical requirement. For a massive codebase, gettign proper coverage is obviously really tricky. We'll have to learn more about this vulnerability but you can see how even just that limitation alone is sufficient to explain gaps.
Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
I love rust but honestly I am more scared about supply chain attacks through cargo than memory corruption bugs. The reason being that supply chain attacks are probably way cheaper to pull off than finding these bugs
Google already uses `cargo-vet` for rust dependencies.
Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah, but lets keeping downplaying use-after-free as something not worth eliminating in 21st century systems languages.
I love rust but honestly I am more scared about supply chain attacks through cargo than memory corruption bugs. The reason being that supply chain attacks are probably way cheaper to pull off than finding these bugs
Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#26Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
Google already uses `cargo-vet` for rust dependencies.
thats good, but it wont eliminate the risk
If anything, what are you doing about supply chain for the existing code base? How is cargo worse here when cargo-vet exists and is actively maintained by Google, Mozilla, and others?
Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#28"Use after free in CSS" is a funny description to see.
Why ?
Saying "Markdown has a CVE" would sound equally off. I'm aware that its not actually CSS having the vulnerability but when simplified that's what it sounds like.
Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#29"Google Chromium CSS contains a use-after-free vulnerability that could allow a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. This vulnerability could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera." That's pretty bad! I wonder what kind of bounty went to the researcher.
> That's pretty bad! I wonder what kind of bounty went to the researcher. I'd be surprised if it's above 20K$. Bug bounties rewards are usually criminally low; doubly so when you consider the efforts usually involved in not only finding serious vulns, but demonstrating a reliable way to exploit them.
Re: Zero-day CSS: CVE-2026-2441 exists in the wild
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
I love rust but honestly I am more scared about supply chain attacks through cargo than memory corruption bugs. The reason being that supply chain attacks are probably way cheaper to pull off than finding these bugs
But this is irrelevant. If you're afraid of third-party code, you can just... choose not to use third-party code? Meanwhile, if I'm afraid of memory corruption in C, I cannot just choose not to have memory corruption; I must instead simply choose not to use C. Meanwhile, Chromium uses tons of third-party Rust code, and has thereby judged the risk differently.