101–110 of 113 posts
How will they deal with mastodon? If I have an instance in my home server at home, do I need to check people reading my posts are over 16 or is the onus on the servers where they are logged in?
For the record, I'm totally in favour of banning social media for kids and, contrary to other people here, I think it can be done without deanonymising anyone. I just don't think it is possible. Ban facebook, x, and bluesky and tomorrow all the cool kids will be using facemagazine, y, and greensky.
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You need ID to buy cigarettes and alcohol, prescription drugs or to get sim card... you will need it to register for social network account... do not seem as big of a deal to me. Even less when considering all the positives.
American here. it's a very big deal.
"How X's new location feature exposed big US politics accounts" https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj38m11218xo
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/nov/23/rightwing-in...
https://weaponizedspaces.substack.com/p/x-just-accidentally-...
or maybe VPN using Canadian secessionist from Thailand?
https://www.cp24.com/news/canada/2025/12/04/rage-or-real-exp...
For Europeans ID is not as big of a deal as losing democracy thru foreign influence manipulating public opinion on a massive scale.
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False dichotomy. Plenty of governments have a digitalised id/login service to log into the tax office, government portals, whatever. This is usually also offered as a "single sign-on". After signing on, the website can request any piece of information, the list of those pieces is presented to the user, who clicks Accept or Go Back. Pretty standard stuff. Meaning: these websites simply need to request 2 pieces of data…
> Where does the mass deanonymisation enter into this? How is it not deanonymisation when your tax ID is inextricably linked to your social media profile?
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False dichotomy. Plenty of governments have a digitalised id/login service to log into the tax office, government portals, whatever. This is usually also offered as a "single sign-on". After signing on, the website can request any piece of information, the list of those pieces is presented to the user, who clicks Accept or Go Back. Pretty standard stuff. Meaning: these websites simply need to request 2 pieces of data…
> Where does the mass deanonymisation enter into this? Via the UUID. Also via the fact that the authentication service sees what you're logging into, regardless of whether the social media site does or not. This isn't complicated. It's obvious if you're not desperately trying not to think about it.
The "authentication service" is the national id. The tax man already knows your name, address, date of birth, financial possessions, income, family members, etc etc. There is no further information, apart from which website you logged on and when. This quite literally the standard of Signal [1]. And this is of course assuming the worst from the national id implementation; any sensible law would require the id provider to delete all information as soon as the login is complete.
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Age verification is possible without revealing personally identifiable information (beyond old enough yes/no, which is not in any way personally identifiable info) and from my perspective should be a strict requirement with any such laws. In fact, if these laws make the requisite infrastructure (ID cards that offer that functionality) a hard requirement then creating an anonymous web that nevertheless has age checks…
It is not preemptive cynicism. My issue isn't with private corporations having access to my data, it's with my government having access to my social media profile.
Please stop spreading FUD when the actual implementations behind the government initiative are actually open source and have been designed to allow anonymous verification.
[0]: https://ageverification.dev/ [1]: https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet
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Given the track record of both the country and other EU attempts (despite the existence of a zero trust verification framework) I am quite sure this will be used to de-anonymize users online, see UK.
Please, enlighten us on the track record of Spain. Because I really can't recall anything outrageous, and surely nothing on the level of surveilance existing in the UK.
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Please, enlighten us on the track record of Spain. Because I really can't recall anything outrageous, and surely nothing on the level of surveilance existing in the UK.
Hacienda is the most extractive Tax Agency in the world. They have lobbied for ever more intrusion into private lifes of citizens in order to extract more money. Thus they have included a "lifestyle auditing" that has access to many cross-databases, utilities, insurance, etc.... If you set up a system of ID identification linked to your real ID and IP, Hacienda (and the police, and eventually private companies) will…
That’s bold and inaccurate. What you shouldn’t trust is El Corte Inglés, who would code another shitty platform for the Spanish institutions.
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> Where does the mass deanonymisation enter into this? Via the UUID. Also via the fact that the authentication service sees what you're logging into, regardless of whether the social media site does or not. This isn't complicated. It's obvious if you're not desperately trying not to think about it.
The UUID is unique per service. All it tells you is that two people are not the same person. The "authentication service" is the national id. The tax man already knows your name, address, date of birth, financial possessions, income, family members, etc etc. There is no further information, apart from which website you logged on and when. This quite literally the standard of Signal [1]. And this is of course assuming…
Which is the whole damned problem, obviously.
> This quite literally the standard of Signal [1].
Yes, Signal is weak in a similar way. Although there is a difference between having to set up a bunch of wiretapping to do traffic analysis, and having the information handed to you on a plate.
> And this is of course assuming the worst from the national id implementation; any sensible law would require the id provider to delete all information as soon as the login is complete.
Assumptions that laws will be followed are out of order. Yes, you have the laws. Yes, you punish violations. But you still deal with the fact that violations will happen.