11–20 of 387 posts
Who do they expect to fall for the claims that a Facebook owned messenger couldn't read your "encrypted" messages? It's truly funny. Any large scale provider with headquarters in the USA will be subject to backdoors and information sharing with the government when they want to read or know what you are doing.
I want whatsapp to decrypt the messages in a secure enclave and render the message content to the screen with a secure rendering pipeline, as is done with DRM'ed video. Compromise of the client side application or OS shouldn't break the security model. This should be possible with current API's, since each message could if needed simply be a single frame DRM'ed video if no better approach exists (or until a better ap…
I don't really see how it's possible to mitigate client compromise. You can decrypt stuff on a secure enclave but at some point the client has to pull it out and render it.
I want whatsapp to decrypt the messages in a secure enclave and render the message content to the screen with a secure rendering pipeline, as is done with DRM'ed video. Compromise of the client side application or OS shouldn't break the security model. This should be possible with current API's, since each message could if needed simply be a single frame DRM'ed video if no better approach exists (or until a better ap…
Nowadays all of the messaging pipeline on my phone is closed source and proprietary, and thus unverifiable at all.
The iPhone operating system is closed, the runtime is closed, the whatsapp client is closed, the protocol is closed… hard to believe any claim.
And i know that somebody’s gonna bring up the alleged e2e encryption… a client in control of somebody else might just leak the encryption keys from one end of the chat.
Closed systems that do not support third party clients that connect through open protocols should ALWAYS be assumed to be insecure.
I wonder how these investigations go? Are they just asking them if it is true? Are they working with IT specialist to technically analyze the apps? Are they requesting the source code that can be demonstrated to be the same one that runs on the user devices and then analyze that code?
But you never know.
I want whatsapp to decrypt the messages in a secure enclave and render the message content to the screen with a secure rendering pipeline, as is done with DRM'ed video. Compromise of the client side application or OS shouldn't break the security model. This should be possible with current API's, since each message could if needed simply be a single frame DRM'ed video if no better approach exists (or until a better ap…
Signal uses the DRM APIs to mitigate threats like Microsoft Recall, but it doesn't stop the app itself from reading its own data. I don't really see how it's possible to mitigate client compromise. You can decrypt stuff on a secure enclave but at some point the client has to pull it out and render it.
Who do they expect to fall for the claims that a Facebook owned messenger couldn't read your "encrypted" messages? It's truly funny. Any large scale provider with headquarters in the USA will be subject to backdoors and information sharing with the government when they want to read or know what you are doing.
Personally, I would never trust anyone big enough that it(in this case Meta) need and want to be deeply entangled in politics.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Signal uses the DRM APIs to mitigate threats like Microsoft Recall, but it doesn't stop the app itself from reading its own data. I don't really see how it's possible to mitigate client compromise. You can decrypt stuff on a secure enclave but at some point the client has to pull it out and render it.
By avoiding untrustworthy clients. All Windows devices should be considered compromised after last year.
You don't build defense-in-depth by assuming something can't be compromised.
I want whatsapp to decrypt the messages in a secure enclave and render the message content to the screen with a secure rendering pipeline, as is done with DRM'ed video. Compromise of the client side application or OS shouldn't break the security model. This should be possible with current API's, since each message could if needed simply be a single frame DRM'ed video if no better approach exists (or until a better ap…
This is what a layman would assume happens from Meta’s WhatsApp advertising. They show the e2e process, and have the message entirely unreadable by anyone but the phone owner.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Signal uses the DRM APIs to mitigate threats like Microsoft Recall, but it doesn't stop the app itself from reading its own data. I don't really see how it's possible to mitigate client compromise. You can decrypt stuff on a secure enclave but at some point the client has to pull it out and render it.
By avoiding untrustworthy clients. All Windows devices should be considered compromised after last year.