Earlier quoted context omitted.
Drive encryption is only really securing your data at rest, not while the system is running. Ideally image based systems also use the kernels runtime integrity checking (e.g. dm-verity) to ensure that things are as they are expected to be.
“ensure that things are as they are expected to be” according to who, and for who's benefit? Certainly not the person sitting in front of the computer.
Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
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Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#122Earlier quoted context omitted.
"Just don't use X" doesn't solve any problems in any space, unfortunately. Plus, it's an avoidant and reductionist take. Note: I have nothing against BSDs, but again, this is not the answer.
It works for me and for millions of others. Stop trying to make everyone act like you act.
Yeah! Telling people what to do is rude!
> Anyone still using Linux on the desktop in 2026 should switch
Oh.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#123Remote attestation is another technology that is not inherently restrictive of software freedom. But here are some examples of technologies that have already restricted freedom due to oligopoly combined with network effects: * smartphone device integrity checks (SafetyNet / Play Integrity / Apple DeviceCheck) * HDMI/HDCP * streaming DRM (Widevine / FairPlay) * Secure Boot (vendor-keyed deployments) * printers w/ sign…
I personally don't think this product matters all that much for now. These types of tech is not oppressive by itself, only when it is being demanded by an adversary. The ability of the adversary to demand it is a function of how widespread the capability is, and there aren't going to be enough Linux clients for this to start infringing on the rights of the general public just yet.
A bigger concern is all the efforts aimed at imposing integrity checks on platforms like the Web. That will eventually force users to make a choice between being denied essential services and accepting these demands.
I also think AI would substantially curtail the effect of many of these anti-user efforts. For example a bot can be programmed to automate using a secure phone and controlled from a user-controlled device, cheat in games, etc.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#124Remote attestation is another technology that is not inherently restrictive of software freedom. But here are some examples of technologies that have already restricted freedom due to oligopoly combined with network effects: * smartphone device integrity checks (SafetyNet / Play Integrity / Apple DeviceCheck) * HDMI/HDCP * streaming DRM (Widevine / FairPlay) * Secure Boot (vendor-keyed deployments) * printers w/ sign…
> * Secure Boot (vendor-keyed deployments) I wish this myth would die at this point. Secure Boot allows you to enroll your own keys. This is part of the spec, and there are no shipped firmwares that prevents you from going through this process.
UEFI secure boot on PCs, yes for the most part. A lot of mobile platforms just never supported this. It's not a myth.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#125[flagged]
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#126Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#127Earlier quoted context omitted.
Drive encryption is only really securing your data at rest, not while the system is running. Ideally image based systems also use the kernels runtime integrity checking (e.g. dm-verity) to ensure that things are as they are expected to be.
“ensure that things are as they are expected to be” according to who, and for who's benefit? Certainly not the person sitting in front of the computer.
In my case I am talking about myself. I prefer to actually know what is running on my systems and ensure that they are as I expect them to be and not that they may have been modified unbeknownst to me.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#128Earlier quoted context omitted.
The events includes a conference title "Remote Attestation of Imutable Operating Systems built on systemd", which is a bit of a clue.
I'm sure this company is more focused on the enterprise angle, but I wonder if the buildout of support for remote attestation could eventually resolve the Linux gaming vs. anti-cheat stalemate. At least for those willing to use a "blessed" kernel provided by Valve or whoever.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#129Exciting! It sounds like you want to achieve system transparency, but I don't see any clear mention of reproducible builds or transparency logs anywhere. I have followed systemd's efforts into Secure Boot and TPM use with great interest. It has become increasingly clear that you are heading in a very similar direction to these projects: - Hal Finney's transparent server - Keylime - System Transparency - Project Oak -…
I'm super far from an expert on this, but it NEEDS reproducible builds, right? You need to start from a known good, trusted state - otherwise you cannot trust any new system states. You also need it for updates.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#130My only experience with Linux secure boot so far.... I wasn't even aware that it was secure booted. And I needed to run something (I think it was the Displaylink driver) that needs to jam itself into the kernel. And the convoluted process to do it failed (it's packaged for Ubuntu but I was installing it on a slightly outdated Fedora system). What, this part is only needed for secure boot? I'm not sec... oh. So go bac…
Secure Boot only extends the chain of trust from your firmware down the first UEFI binary it loads. Currently SB is effectively useless because it will at best authenticate your kernel but the initrd and subsequent userspace (including programs that run as root) are unverified and can be replaced by malicious alternatives. Secure Boot as it stands right now in the Linux world is effectively an annoyance that’s only t…
Code signature verification is an interesting idea, but I'm not sure how it could be achieved. Have distro maintainers sign the code?