141–150 of 346 posts
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Maybe three letter agencies prevented them from giving that option.
Surely that's not legal is it? Can the government force companies to include spyware?
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The alternative is just not having FDE on by default, it really isn't "require utterly clueless non-technical users to go through complicated opt-in procedure for backups to avoid losing all their data when they forget their password". And AFAICT, they do ask, even if the flow is clearly designed to get the user to back up their keys online.
No, encryption keys should never be uploaded to someone else's computer unencrypted. The OOBE should give users a choice between no FDE or FDE with a warning that they should not forget their password or FDE and Microsoft has their key and will be able to recover their disk and would be compelled to share the key with law enforcement. By giving the user the three options with consequences you empower the user to addr…
>By giving the user the three options with consequences you empower the user to address their threat model how they see fit.
Making it too easy for uneducated users to make poor choices is terrible software design.
This is blurring of fact drives click bait.
The origin of this is a Forbes article[0] where the quote is: "Microsoft confirmed to Forbes that it does provide BitLocker recovery keys if it receives a valid legal order."
[0] https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/01/22/micro...
The headline is misleading. It says that Microsoft will provide the key if asked , but the linked statement to Forbes says Microsoft will provide the key if it receives a valid legal order . These have different meanings. Microsoft is legally entitled to refuse a request from law enforcement, and subject to criminal penalties if it refuses a valid legal order. It does illustrate a significant vulnerability in that Mi…
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Encrypt the BL key with the user's password? I mean there are a lot of technical solutions besides "we're gonna keep the BL keys in the clear and readily available for anyone".
For something as widely adopted as Windows, the only sensible alternative is to not encrypt the disk by default. The default behavior will never ever be to "encrypt the disk by a key and encrypt the key with the user's password." It just doesn't work in real life. You'll have thousands of users who lost access to their disks every week.
Inform, and Empower with real choices. Make it easy for end users to select an alternate key backup method. Some potential alternatives: Allow their bank to offer such a service. Allow friends and family to self host such a service. Etc.
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Any American company will hand over data stored on their server (that they have access to) in response to a warrant. Apple provides an optional encryption level (ADP) where they don't have a copy of your encryption key. When Apple doesn't have the encryption key, they can't decrypt your data, so they can't provide a copy of the decrypted data in response to a warrant. They explain the trade off during device setup: I…
Any company in any country will hand over data in response to a warrant. There is no country with a higher standard of protection than a warrant.
That's a Microsoft thing.
Is how bitlocker works not well known perhaps? I don't think it's a secret. The whole schtick is that you get to manage windows computers in a corporate fleet remotely, that includes being able to lock-out or unlock volumes. The only other way to do that would be for the person using the device to store the keys somewhere locally, but the whole point is you don't trust the people using the computers, they're employees. If they get fired, or if they lose the laptop, them being the only people who can unlock the bitlocker volume is a very bad situation. Even that aside, the logistics of people switching laptops, help desk getting a laptop and needing to access the volume and similar scenarios have to be addressed. Nothing about this and how bitlocker works is new.
Even in the safer political climates of pre-2025, you're still looking at prosecution if you resist a lawful order. You can fight gag-orders, or the legality of a request, but without a court order to countermand the feds request, you have to comply.
Microsoft would do the same in China, Europe, middle east,etc.. the FBI isn't special.
The headline is misleading. It says that Microsoft will provide the key if asked , but the linked statement to Forbes says Microsoft will provide the key if it receives a valid legal order . These have different meanings. Microsoft is legally entitled to refuse a request from law enforcement, and subject to criminal penalties if it refuses a valid legal order. It does illustrate a significant vulnerability in that Mi…
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That's a crypto architecture design choice, MS opted for the user-friendly key escrow option instead of the more secure strong local key - that requires a competent user setting a strong password and saving recovery codes, understanding the disastrous implication of a key loss etc. Given the abilities of the median MS client, the better choice is not obvious at all, while "protecting from a nation-state adversary" wa…
While you're right, they also went out of their way to prevent competent users from using local accounts and/or not upload their BitLocker keys. I could understand if the default is an online account + automatic key upload, but only if you add an opt-out option to it. It might not even be visible by default, like, idk, hide it somewhere so that you can be sure that the median MS user won't see it and won't think abou…
I really think that enabling BitLocker with an escrowed key during OOBE is the right choice, the protection to risk balance for a “normal” user is good. Power users who are worried about government compulsion can still set up their system to be more hardened.