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IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

johnmaguire.me

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Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#71
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The whole point of NAT firewalls is that the devices behind it don't have routable addresses. "Statefulness" improves the situation, but the translation itself provides a material control.

I suppose we fundamentally disagree that it's meaningful or material whether NAT can provide something the stateful firewalling has handled more completely since the first shipping implementation and that this defines what the purpose and introduction of NAT to the market was supposed to be.

There's no uncertainty at all about what NAT was meant to do; you can just read Cisco's introduction to the PIX, or it's statement about the acquisition of NTI, which are online.

Network administrators (less so security engineers) don't want NAT to be a security feature, so they've retconned a principle of security engineering that doesn't exist. If people were honest about it and just said they'd prefer to work on networks where less distortive middlebox features provide the same security controls, I'd have nothing to argue about.

But this article makes the claim that "NAT isn’t actually a security feature". That's simply false. People need to stop rebroadcasting this canard.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#72
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, it is the case. In the real world, there are malfunctioning ALGs, permissive defaults, and connectionless protocols that are poorly tracked by these sloppy, underpowered "SPI" devices.

It's not, because in the real world NAT only affects your outbound connections. That means that turning it off only changes the behavior of outbound connections, not inbound ones. Any inbound connection that would have worked before you turned it off will still work afterwards, and any that wouldn't have worked before will still not work afterwards.

Think about what 99% of SOHO users have: PAT (Nat Overload). This NAT impacts the way a connection is established in BOTH directions. Inbound connection attempts from the Internet to the NAT public IP address of the SOHO router can go no further than the router. We are talking what 99% of users have installed.

Maybe this is the reason for some of the disagreement. I am focusing on what is installed at 99% of user installations (PAT). I would agree with the comments that a 1-to-1 NAT offers no EXTRA security.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#73
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I suppose we fundamentally disagree that it's meaningful or material whether NAT can provide something the stateful firewalling has handled more completely since the first shipping implementation and that this defines what the purpose and introduction of NAT to the market was supposed to be.

There's no uncertainty at all about what NAT was meant to do; you can just read Cisco's introduction to the PIX, or it's statement about the acquisition of NTI, which are online. Network administrators (less so security engineers) don't want NAT to be a security feature, so they've retconned a principle of security engineering that doesn't exist. If people were honest about it and just said they'd prefer to work on n…

One could see the inlined, sourced, and dated references I placed above about the PIX rather than searching online from scratch or making assumptions of others reasons or intentions.

What some people do or don't want in the 2020s has no relevance to the reasoning in the 1990s, nor does it redefine the purpose or use of NAT the same. The above is clearly and directly stated from the sourced material of the era itself: NAT was introduced in the mid 90s due to concerns about address space depletion and the need to move to IPv6. The security features of said introductory appliance never came from or were supposed to come from implementing NAT, but from implementing stateful firewalling and blocking inbound connections. There is no personal opinion or retconning in any of this, they aren't even the postings of anyone from this century.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#74

The tension here is the difference between theory and reality. In reality, IPv4 NAT is the only thing protecting most users in their homes. If you force IPv6 on this same population, you have to give them an equivalent posture by default. This is kind of like writing an argument that motorcycles are not unsafe because they lack 4 wheels. This is true, but if you put my grandmother on one and ask her to drive across t…

France with >85% IPv6 adoption mostly made of grandmothers driving a motorcycles across the town manually delivering packets like in their youth.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.04792?

"Collectively, our results show that NAT has indeed acted as the de facto firewall of the Internet, and the v4-to-v6 transition of residential networks is opening up new devices to attack."

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#75
I have yet to see a "NAT is not security" rebuttal that does not make either one or both of these points:

- NAT is not a security feature because it wasn't designed as one (this post), and/or

- NAT is not a security feature because it does not, without a firewall, protect against an attacker on the WAN subnet, or another difficult-to-exploit scenario.

And yet making LAN devices unroutable from the Internet does on its own makes exploitation much more difficult. It's admittedly not a perfect measure, but it's one that IPv6 deployments with routable addresses for LAN devices lack. I would wager this does make a difference in the proliferation of botnets, especially given the lackluster standards of consumer network equipment security.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#76
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's no uncertainty at all about what NAT was meant to do; you can just read Cisco's introduction to the PIX, or it's statement about the acquisition of NTI, which are online. Network administrators (less so security engineers) don't want NAT to be a security feature, so they've retconned a principle of security engineering that doesn't exist. If people were honest about it and just said they'd prefer to work on n…

One could see the inlined, sourced, and dated references I placed above about the PIX rather than searching online from scratch or making assumptions of others reasons or intentions. What some people do or don't want in the 2020s has no relevance to the reasoning in the 1990s, nor does it redefine the purpose or use of NAT the same. The above is clearly and directly stated from the sourced material of the era itself:…

Your own sources confirm what I'm saying.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#77
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not, because in the real world NAT only affects your outbound connections. That means that turning it off only changes the behavior of outbound connections, not inbound ones. Any inbound connection that would have worked before you turned it off will still work afterwards, and any that wouldn't have worked before will still not work afterwards.

Think about what 99% of SOHO users have: PAT (Nat Overload). This NAT impacts the way a connection is established in BOTH directions. Inbound connection attempts from the Internet to the NAT public IP address of the SOHO router can go no further than the router. We are talking what 99% of users have installed. Maybe this is the reason for some of the disagreement. I am focusing on what is installed at 99% of user ins…

That's the type of NAT I've been talking about the entire time. It doesn't do anything to inbound connections unless you explicitly tell it to.

Connections to the router's IP address go to the router, but you need to consider what happens to connections that go to IP addresses on the network behind the router too.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#78

The tension here is the difference between theory and reality. In reality, IPv4 NAT is the only thing protecting most users in their homes. If you force IPv6 on this same population, you have to give them an equivalent posture by default. This is kind of like writing an argument that motorcycles are not unsafe because they lack 4 wheels. This is true, but if you put my grandmother on one and ask her to drive across t…

NAT isn't protecting them. Not being on the public internet at all is protecting them.

NAT is then unprotecting them a little by letting them punch out again. It's super easy for routers to implement this behaviour by default if your LAN is publicly addressable, and removes a whole class of exploits caused by applications making NAT hacks.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#79
post #75

I have yet to see a "NAT is not security" rebuttal that does not make either one or both of these points: - NAT is not a security feature because it wasn't designed as one (this post), and/or - NAT is not a security feature because it does not, without a firewall, protect against an attacker on the WAN subnet, or another difficult-to-exploit scenario. And yet making LAN devices unroutable from the Internet does on it…

You should read my other comments on this post. I've attempted, multiple times (but apparently without much success) to make the point that NAT is not a security feature because it does not, without a firewall, protect against an attacker.

You don't need a qualifier like "on the WAN subnet". It just doesn't do anything to protect you from inbound connections at all.

Re: IPv6 is not insecure because it lacks a NAT

#80
post #29

This is going to depend on the router and on IP distribution. My ISP does not give me an IPv6 address, only a single IPv6 which all my network devices have to NAT through. NAT is not intended to be a security feature, for sure, but it creates security as a side effect . If I start up a web server on one of my devices, I know that it is unreachable from the Internet unless I go out of my way to set a port forward on m…

So, what side effect of NAT is making your server unreachable here? It sounds like you could turn the NAT off and it would be exactly as unreachable as it was when the NAT was on. (Just to double-check... have you tried DHCPv6-PD? ISPs will normally only give your router a single IP on its WAN interface, or sometimes no IP on the WAN. Getting the routed prefix for the LAN-side networks involves doing a PD request, wh…

With NAT your device does not have a publicly routable address. Attackers have no way of contacting you at all. Without NAT you have a publicly routable address and attackers can try reaching out to your device. You rely entirely on your device's and your router's firewall.

So it's not really about NAT although it ends up being a consequence—it's about having a truly private network "air gapped" from the public internet.

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