You’re still dodging the point by arguing founders’ personal depravity instead of the political theory they articulated: rights don’t come from government, authority is delegated, and it has limits. The fact that many founders violated their own principles doesn’t erase the principles, it proves why limiting doctrines and later amendments were necessary.
And the “they wouldn’t care” claim is overstated even on its own terms. The founders were divided and inconsistent, but several explicitly condemned slavery and/or refused to participate in it:
Jefferson (who was deeply compromised personally) still wrote this about slavery’s corruption and consequences:
> “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever…” (Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XVIII (1784), as transcribed by Encyclopedia Virginia)
Jefferson also documented that Congress removed an anti–slave trade passage from his draft for political reasons (i.e., to get unanimity):
> “The clause too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa, was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves…” (Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography (1821), as reproduced by Monticello / Avalon Project)
John Adams:
> “my opinion against it has always been known… and never in my Life did I own a Slave.” (John Adams to George Churchman and Jacob Lindley, Jan. 24, 1801; Gilder Lehrman Institute primary source)
So no, it’s not accurate to collapse “the founders” into “they endorsed whatever abuses you can point to.” Some did; some didn’t; many were hypocrites; but the rights-and-limits framework is real, and it’s the framework the country later used to correct (some of) those failures.
On Hamilton: yes, courts are an intermediate body. But it does not follow that “if the Court doesn’t stop it (especially on an emergency posture), it’s therefore within authority.” Courts can be wrong, courts can be procedural, and emergency orders are not merits adjudications. “Not enjoined today” is not the same thing as “constitutional.” If that were the rule, coordinated abuse across branches would become self-legitimating (exactly what checks and balances are meant to prevent).
Washington and the Whiskey Rebellion is a non sequitur. Nobody is arguing the government can’t enforce laws or respond to violence. The question is whether current enforcement is staying inside constitutional rails.
And on your legal citations: sure, INA authority exists. But statutory authority doesn’t dissolve the Fourth Amendment. Your own lead case, Brignoni‑Ponce, is precisely about limits: reasonable suspicion has to be based on specific articulable facts, and it can’t collapse into ethnicity/race-by-proxy plus “totality of circumstances” handwaving.
So let’s keep it concrete: what specific factors are officers using in practice to form reasonable suspicion, and what safeguards prevent that from becoming a dragnet? “The INA authorizes questioning” is not an answer to whether particular stops/detentions are constitutional.
Finally: “I defer to the Supreme Court” is fine as a personal posture, but it’s not an argument that the Constitution has no redlines unless five Justices say so on a given day (especially not on the shadow docket).
> “to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions: a very dangerous doctrine indeed and one which would place us under the despotism of an Oligarchy.” (Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820)