New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

Post by squibonpig » Wed, Dec 24, 2025, 11:19 PM UTC

A_D_E_P_T wrote: post #83

squibonpig wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think any of these need to lead to qualia for any obvious reason. It could be a p-zombie why not.

The zombie intuition comes from treating qualia as an "add-on" rather than as the internal presentation of a self-model. "P-zombie" is not a coherent leftover possibility once you fix the full physical structure. If a system has the full self-model (temporal-spatial sense) / world-model / memory binding / counterfactual evaluator / control loop, then that structure is what having experience amounts to (no extra ingre…

> The zombie intuition comes from treating qualia as an "add-on" rather than as the internal presentation of a self-model.

Haven't you sort of smuggled a divide back into the discussion? You say "internal presentation" as though an internal or external can be constructed in the first place without the presumption of a divided off world, the external world of material and the internal one of qualia. I agree with the concept of making the quale and the material event the same thing, (isn't that kinda like Nietzsche's wills to power?), but I'm not sure that's what you're trying to say because you're adding a lot of stuff on top.

Post by A_D_E_P_T » Thu, Dec 25, 2025, 1:50 AM UTC

missingrib wrote: post #110

A_D_E_P_T wrote: post #108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're offering a dichotomy: 1. Qualia exist as something separate from functional structure (so p-zombies are conceivable) 2. Qualia don't exist at all (Dennett-style eliminativism) But I say that there is a third position: Qualia exist, but they are the internal presentation of a sufficiently complex self-model/world-model structure. They're not an additional ingredient that could be present or absent while the fun…

You have first-person knowledge of qualia. I'm not really sure how you could deny that without claiming that qualia doesn't exist. You're claiming some middle ground here that I think almost all philosophers and neuroscientists would reject (on both sides). > "couldn't something be H2O without being water?," "what if the universe was created last Thursday with false memories?," or "what if only I'm real?" These are d…

> You have first-person knowledge of qualia. I’m not sure how you could deny that...

I don't deny that. I explicitly rely on it. You must have misunderstood... My claim is not:

1) "There are no qualia"

2) "Qualia are an illusion / do not exist"

My claim is: First-person acquaintance does not license treating qualia as ontologically detachable from the physical/functional. I reject the idea that experience is a free-floating metaphysical remainder that can be subtracted while everything else stays fixed. At root it's simply a necessary form of internally presented, salience-weighted feedback.

> This middle ground would be rejected by almost all philosophers and neuroscientists

I admit that it would be rejected by dualists and epiphenomenalists, but that's hardly "almost all."

As for Mary and her room: As you know, the thought experiment is about epistemology. At most it shows that knowing all third-person facts doesn’t give you first-person acquaintance. It is of little relevance, and as a "refutation" of physicalism it's very poor.

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis