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New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

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Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#101

Post by khana »

vbard wrote: post #92
vasco wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you explain further? Maybe I'm too out of this scope but if you want to simulate Universe X plus the computer Y that simulates X then you'd need at least 1 extra bit of memory (likely way more) to encompass the simulation plus the computation running the simulation (X+Y). The computer running the simulation by definition is not part of the simulation, so how can it be that it can truly simulate itself?

In Men in Black II (2002), Will Smith learned that a miniature civilization existed in a locker. Later, Will Smith’s character learned that our civilization was in a locker of a larger civilization. By thinking of memory usage, you’re restricting yourself to our perceived physical limits withine our perceived reality. But, what if the things running the simulation did not have those limits? E.g. maybe data could be s…

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Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#103

Post by dgfl »

A_D_E_P_T wrote: post #83
squibonpig wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think any of these need to lead to qualia for any obvious reason. It could be a p-zombie why not.

The zombie intuition comes from treating qualia as an "add-on" rather than as the internal presentation of a self-model. "P-zombie" is not a coherent leftover possibility once you fix the full physical structure. If a system has the full self-model (temporal-spatial sense) / world-model / memory binding / counterfactual evaluator / control loop, then that structure is what having experience amounts to (no extra ingre…

I have more or less the same views, although I can’t formulate them half as well as you do. I would have to think more in depth about those conditions that you highlighted in the GP; I’d read a book elaborating on it.

I’ve heard a similar thought experiment to your bitterness one from Keith Frankish: You have the choice between two anesthetics. The first one suppresses your pain quale, meaning that you won’t _feel_ any pain at all. But it won’t suppress your external response: you will scream, kick, shout, and do whatever you would have done without any anesthetic. The second one is the opposite: it suppresses all the external symptoms of pain. You won’t budge, you’ll be sitting quiet and still as some hypothetical highly painful surgical procedure is performed on you. But you will feel the pain quale completely, it will all still be there.

I like it because it highlights the tension in the supposed platonic essence of qualia. We can’t possibly imagine how either of these two drugs could be manufactured, or what it would feel like.

Would you classify your view as some version of materialism? Is it reductionist? I’m still trying to grasp all the terminology, sometimes it feels there’s more labels than actual perspectives.

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#104

Post by Borg3 »

vasco wrote: post #42
Borg3 wrote: post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hehe yeah.. For me, its just inverted search for the God. There must be somethink behind it, if its not God, then it must be simulation! Kinda sad, I would expect more from scientist. The big riddle of Universe is, how all that matter loves to organize itself, from basic particles to Atoms, basic molecues, structured molecues, things and finally live.. Probably unsolvable, but that doesnt mean we shouldnt research an…

> The big riddle of Universe is, how A lot of people are more interested in the Why of the Universe than the How, though. How is an implementation detail, Why is "profound". At least that's how I think most people look at it.

Yeah I guess... But such question is not really intereseting.. Answer is simple, there is nothing behind it.. and people arent confortable with that answer. Hence "How" is more interesting and scientific..

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#105

Post by BobbyTables2 »

lioeters wrote: post #23
raverbashing wrote: post #17

We can't even run docker inside docker without making things slower, the simulator hypotheses is frankly ridiculous

That's what a simulated universe running inside Docker would say.

Nah, it runs on podman…

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#106

Post by missingrib »

A_D_E_P_T wrote: post #83
squibonpig wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think any of these need to lead to qualia for any obvious reason. It could be a p-zombie why not.

The zombie intuition comes from treating qualia as an "add-on" rather than as the internal presentation of a self-model. "P-zombie" is not a coherent leftover possibility once you fix the full physical structure. If a system has the full self-model (temporal-spatial sense) / world-model / memory binding / counterfactual evaluator / control loop, then that structure is what having experience amounts to (no extra ingre…

That is not what a p-zombie is. The p-zombie does not have any qualia at all. If you want to deny the existence of qualia, that's one way a few philosophers have gone (Dennett), but that seems pretty ridiculous to most people.

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#107

Post by shtzvhdx »

analog31 wrote: post #55
shtzvhdx wrote: post #46

This all assumes there's no computation beyond a Turing machine, right? Therefore, this assumes reality is a simulation on a finite set of rationals? So, as long as one believes in continuum, this is just toying around?

We've yet to propose an experiment that demonstrates the inadequacy of IEEE floats if used carefully. The simulation only needs to be good enough.

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Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#108

Post by A_D_E_P_T »

missingrib wrote: post #106
A_D_E_P_T wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The zombie intuition comes from treating qualia as an "add-on" rather than as the internal presentation of a self-model. "P-zombie" is not a coherent leftover possibility once you fix the full physical structure. If a system has the full self-model (temporal-spatial sense) / world-model / memory binding / counterfactual evaluator / control loop, then that structure is what having experience amounts to (no extra ingre…

That is not what a p-zombie is. The p-zombie does not have any qualia at all. If you want to deny the existence of qualia, that's one way a few philosophers have gone (Dennett), but that seems pretty ridiculous to most people.

You're offering a dichotomy:

1. Qualia exist as something separate from functional structure (so p-zombies are conceivable)

2. Qualia don't exist at all (Dennett-style eliminativism)

But I say that there is a third position: Qualia exist, but they are the internal presentation of a sufficiently complex self-model/world-model structure. They're not an additional ingredient that could be present or absent while the functional organization stays fixed.

To return to the posthuman thought experiment, I'm not saying the posthuman has no qualia, I'm saying the red "TOXIC" warning is qualia. It has phenomenal character. The point is that any system that satisfies certain criteria and registers information must do so as some phenomenal presentation or other. The structure doesn't generate qualia as a separate byproduct; the structure operating is the experience.

A p-zombie is only conceivable if qualia are ontologically detachable, but they're not. You can't have a physicalism which stands on its own two feet and have p-zombies at the same time.

Also, it's a fundamentally silly and childish notion. "What if everything behaves exactly as if conscious -- and is functionally analogous to a conscious agent -- but secretly isn't?" is hardly different from "couldn't something be H2O without being water?," "what if the universe was created last Thursday with false memories?," or "what if only I'm real?" These are dead-end questions. Like 14-year-old-stoner philosophy: "what if your red is ackshuallly my blue?!" The so-called "hard problem" either evaporates in the light of a rigorous structural physicalism, or it's just another silly dead-end.

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#109

Post by qayxc »

gcost wrote: post #81
qayxc wrote: post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would consider this if someone was able to demonstrate a way to distinguish these phenomena from altered states of mind (i.e. hallucinations). We know and can demonstrate that the human psyche can easily be manipulated in various ways (psychological manipulation, drugs, magnetic fields, sleep depravation, stress, etc.) to cause such experiences. Some actual evidence for for "past life regressions" and "astral proje…

PLR is real, read the works of Michael newton and others. Over 8000 PRL from people of all kind of age and background describe the same things happening once we pass on the other side. Definitely not hallucinations. Actually scary how people still think that instead of exploring for themselves.

Newton was a hypnotherapist. I'm sorry to say this, but hypnosis is precisely the kind of altering a person's state of mind to make it highly susceptible to both deliberate and unintentional suggestion. This has been well documented and researched for decades at this point.

The fact that to this day not a single so called "PRL" has uncovered hitherto unknown, yet verifiable information (e.g. archaeological sites like sunken cities or translations of ancient scripts) points to suggestion (even if unintentional) rather than paranormal phenomena.

Re: New mathematical framework reshapes debate over simulation hypothesis

#110

Post by missingrib »

A_D_E_P_T wrote: post #108
missingrib wrote: post #106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That is not what a p-zombie is. The p-zombie does not have any qualia at all. If you want to deny the existence of qualia, that's one way a few philosophers have gone (Dennett), but that seems pretty ridiculous to most people.

You're offering a dichotomy: 1. Qualia exist as something separate from functional structure (so p-zombies are conceivable) 2. Qualia don't exist at all (Dennett-style eliminativism) But I say that there is a third position: Qualia exist, but they are the internal presentation of a sufficiently complex self-model/world-model structure. They're not an additional ingredient that could be present or absent while the fun…

You have first-person knowledge of qualia. I'm not really sure how you could deny that without claiming that qualia doesn't exist. You're claiming some middle ground here that I think almost all philosophers and neuroscientists would reject (on both sides).

> "couldn't something be H2O without being water?," "what if the universe was created last Thursday with false memories?," or "what if only I'm real?" These are dead-end questions. Like 14-year-old-stoner philosophy: "what if your red is ackshuallly my blue?!"

These are all legitimate philosophical problems, Kripke definitively solved the first one in the 1970s in Naming and Necessity. You should try to be more humble about subjects which you clearly haven't read enough about. Read the Mary's room argument.

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