The fact that SVG files can contain scripts was a bit of a mistake. On one hand, the animations and entire interactive demos and even games in a single SVG are cool. But on the other hand, it opens up a serious can of worms of security vulnerabilities. As a result, SVG files are often banned from various image upload tools, they do not unfurl previews, and so on. If you upload an SVG to discord, it just shows the raw…
All SVGs should be properly sanitized going into a backend and out of it and when rendered on a page. Do you allow SVGs to be uploaded anywhere on your site? This is a PSA that you're probably at risk unless you can find the few hundred lines of code doing the sanitization. Note to Ruby on Rails developers, your active storage uploaded SVGs are not sanitized by default.
We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
161–170 of 453 posts
Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#162Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#163Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#164The fact that SVG files can contain scripts was a bit of a mistake. On one hand, the animations and entire interactive demos and even games in a single SVG are cool. But on the other hand, it opens up a serious can of worms of security vulnerabilities. As a result, SVG files are often banned from various image upload tools, they do not unfurl previews, and so on. If you upload an SVG to discord, it just shows the raw…
There is: PDF. You may not like it or adobe, but its there and widely supported.
Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#165This feels so emblematic of our current era. VC funded vibe coded AI documentation startup somehow gets big name customers who don't properly vet the security of the platform, ship a massive vulnerability that could pwn millions of users and the person who reports the vulnerability gets...$5k. If I recall last week Mintlify wrote a blog post showcasing their impressive(ly complicated) caching architecture. Pretending…
I don't think anybody in SFBA-style software development, both pre- and post-LLM, is really resilient against these kinds of attacks. The problem isn't vibe coding so much as it is multiparty DLL-hell dependency stacks, which is something I attribute more to Javascript culture than to any recent advance in technology.
Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#166Earlier quoted context omitted.
All SVGs should be properly sanitized going into a backend and out of it and when rendered on a page. Do you allow SVGs to be uploaded anywhere on your site? This is a PSA that you're probably at risk unless you can find the few hundred lines of code doing the sanitization. Note to Ruby on Rails developers, your active storage uploaded SVGs are not sanitized by default.
Sanitisation is a tricky process, it can be real easy for something to slip through the cracks.
Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#167Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nice! So the Cookie is accessible by JavaScript on all of those sites? That would be pretty surprising given the prevalence of HttpOnly, so that doesn't seem clear to me at all. And they're all using Cookie-based auth, you think? You're a bug bounty hunter so I'll defer to your wisdom, but doesn't it seem more likely that an account takeover would be possible via a state-changing request from the user's existing sess…
the impact varied by customer. in Discord's case, the auth token is stored in local storage and their docs is hosted on the primary domain; they were susceptible to a full account takeover. X's docs are on a different subdomain but we found a CSRF attack that could facilitate a full account takeover. most companies were significantly affected in one way or another.
You mention one method being a cookie sent to an attacker-controlled domain, but that in itself is a vulnerability given it being incorrectly scoped (missing HTTPOnly & SameSite atleast).
> the auth token is stored in local storage
Has anyone reported this (rhetorical question)? What in the world could be the justification for this?
In my opinion, any full account takeovers due to XSS is a vulnerability, even ignoring XSS. Changing email/password/phone should require verification back to one of those methods. Or at least input of the previous password.
Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#168Earlier quoted context omitted.
No it would not have been.
It would have been. Ten times the amount at least.
To elaborate, to exploit this you have to convince your target to open a specially crafted link which would look very suspect. The most realistic way to exploit would be to send a shortened link and hope they click on it, that they are logged into discord.com when they do (most people use the app), that there are no other security measures (httponly cookies) etc
No real way to use this to compromise a large amount of users without more complex means
Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#169Earlier quoted context omitted.
Supply and demand I guess. Pathetic for a senior SE but pretty awesome for a 16 year old up and coming hacker.
You are right, but that could (probably not) make them go for the bad route because they would get way more money that way. 4k for a bug that could take control of your customer account sounds disrespectful to me.
Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack
#170Move fast and break things? I have this feeling with almost all web tools I am required to use nowadays. No trust.