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We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

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81–90 of 453 posts

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#81

Slightly related, as someone who doesn’t engage in this type of work, I’m curious about the potential risks associated with discovering, testing, and searching for security bugs. While it’s undoubtedly positive that this individual ultimately became a responsible person and disclosed the information, what if they hadn’t? Furthermore, on Discord’s side, what if they were unaware of this person and encountered someone…

There are laws governing these scenarios. It's different everywhere. Portugal just updated theirs in favor of security researchers: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/portugal-upda...

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#83

How these companies don't hire kids like Daniel for pennies on the dollar and have him attack their stacks on a loop baffles me. Pay the kid $50k/yr (part time, he still needs to go to school) to constantly probe your crappy stacks. Within a year or two you'll have the most goddamn secure company on the internet - and no public vulns to embarrass you.

While I would love that for the kid I dont think these companies care about security at all.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#84

Slightly related, as someone who doesn’t engage in this type of work, I’m curious about the potential risks associated with discovering, testing, and searching for security bugs. While it’s undoubtedly positive that this individual ultimately became a responsible person and disclosed the information, what if they hadn’t? Furthermore, on Discord’s side, what if they were unaware of this person and encountered someone…

If you engage in “white hat security research” on organisations who haven’t agreed to it (such as by offering roles of engagement on a site like hacker one) there is indeed a risk.

For example they might send the police to your door, who’ll tell you you’ve violated some 1980s computer security law.

I know 99.99% of cybercrime goes unpunished, but that’s because the attackers are hard to identify, and in distant foreign lands. As a white hat you’re identifiable and maybe in the same country, meaning it’s much easier to prosecute you.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#85
post #79

The linked site https://heartbreak.ing/ explains that Mintlify disabled CORS, so that 3rd party sites can run code in your Mintlify-using environment (X, Vercel, etc). The OP site says that .svg files can only run scripts if they are directly opened, not via tags. So how does the attack work?

My understanding, the SVGs were imported directly and embedded as code, not as a `src` for an img tag. This is very common, it's a subjectively better (albeit with good security practices) way to render SVGs as it provides the ability to adjust and style them via CSS as they are now just another element in the HTML DOM. It should only be done with "trusted" SVGs however!

As for CORS, they were uploading the SVGs to an account of their own, but then using the vulnerabilities to pivot to other accounts.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#86
post #72

One of these days I'm gonna have to learn why cross-site scripting even matters, especially with modern browsers restricting a script's access to anything local

You log in to goodsite.com

goodsite.com loads a script from user-generated-content-size.com/evil.js

evil.js reads and writes all your goodsite.com account data.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#87

How these companies don't hire kids like Daniel for pennies on the dollar and have him attack their stacks on a loop baffles me. Pay the kid $50k/yr (part time, he still needs to go to school) to constantly probe your crappy stacks. Within a year or two you'll have the most goddamn secure company on the internet - and no public vulns to embarrass you.

It's not quite that simple. I don't think most bug bounty participants want a full-time job. But even more-so in my experience they are not security generalists. You can hire one person who is good at finding obscure XSS vulns, another that's good at exploiting cloud privilege escalation in IAM role definitions, another that's good at shell or archive exploits. If you look at profiles on H1 you'll see most good hackers specialize in specific types of findings.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#88
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This comes up on every story about bug bounties. There is in general no market at all for XSS vulnerabilities. That might be different for Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, because of the possibility of monetizing a single strike across a whole huge social network, and there's maybe a bank-shot argument for Discord, but you really have to do a lot of work to generate the monetization story for any of those. T…

If a $500 drone is coming for your $100M factory, the price limit for defense considerations isn't $500. In the end, you are trying to encourage people not to fuck with your shit, instead of playing economic games. Especially with a bunch of teenagers who wouldn't even be fully criminally liable for doing something funny. $4K isn't much today, even for a teenager. Thanks to stupid AI shit like Mintlify, that's like w…

That's not how any of this works. A price for a vulnerability tracking the worst-case outcome of that vulnerability isn't a bounty or a market-clearing price; it's a shakedown fee. Meanwhile: the actual market-clearing price of an XSS vulnerability is very low (in most cases, it doesn't exist at all) because there aren't existing business processes those vulnerabilities drop seamlessly into; they're all situational and time-sensitive.

Re: We pwned X, Vercel, Cursor, and Discord through a supply-chain attack

#90
post #49
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

External entities in XML[1] were a similar issue back when everyone was using XML for everything, and parsers processed external-entities by default. 1: https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/XML_External...

At least with external entities you could deny the parser an internet connection and force it to only load external documents from a cache you prepopulated and vetted. Turing completeness is a bullshit idea in document formats.

With SVGs you can serve them from a different domain. IIUC the issue from TFA was that the SVGs were served from the primary domain; had they been on a different domain, they would have not been allowed to do as much.
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