Live data from Hacker News

Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

feross.org

111–120 of 133 posts

Re: Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

#114
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The latest version of Safari shows no warning on fullscreen, making users very vulnerable. The only indication is a short, half-second animation (it's much shorter than the usual OS X fullscreen animation). After that, there's no indication that you're in fullscreen mode.

Safari also completely disallows keyboard input in fullscreen mode, which majorly mitigates the vulnerability.

Does it also disable using any kind of keyboard event? Because if so, that cuts out a ton of legitimate use cases for full screen. If not, it just makes the vulnerability slightly more of a pain to exploit.

Re: Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

#115
post #99
post #11

The concept is clever, and very interesting. However, most users (even experienced users) don't look at the url when visiting information-sensitive websites and www.bankofamerica.fsh4.com would still not alarm them. They don't understand the SSL icon either.

There was an interesting research a few years ago regarding the SSL icon. Since in many users the idea is actually finely-ingrained that a padlock means security on a website they just made the favicon into a lock. A surprisingly large number of users was fooled by that. I guess the "padlock means secure" has been superceded a little by "address bar is green somewhere" by now, but the problem remains the same.

That's why Firefox no longer has the favicon in the URL bar.

Re: Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

#116
post #89
post #80

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is pissing me off. The link hover should be sacred, browsers shouldn't allow any trickery there.

I won't be surprised if both Google and MS restrict this in their browsers in the near future, but make exceptions for their own search engines.

I won't be holding my breath for major browsers to remove support for JS click events!

Re: Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

#117
post #80

The user can hover their mouse over the link and their status bar will show https://www.bankofamerica.com, as expected. Google search results use a similar technique to show you the "right" link when you hover. (It's only when you click the link does it muck around with the DOM to insert the google.com/... redirect link.)

This is pissing me off. The link hover should be sacred, browsers shouldn't allow any trickery there.

For Google Search use this userscript http://userscripts.org/scripts/show/121923 Work in FF & Google Chrome.

Re: Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

#118

The user can hover their mouse over the link and their status bar will show https://www.bankofamerica.com, as expected. Google search results use a similar technique to show you the "right" link when you hover. (It's only when you click the link does it muck around with the DOM to insert the google.com/... redirect link.)

This was really annoying for me because somehow the google redirect link took a lot longer to load than the ultimate destination would, or even regular google pages.

For Google Search use this userscript http://userscripts.org/scripts/show/121923 Works in FF & Google Chrome.

Re: Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

#119
post #51

That's clever. It was pretty obvious to me, since I run Chrome in presentation mode (no UI elements visible) and Chrome popped up a dialog box telling me about the switch to full-screen mode. Still, I can see how a lot of people could be tricked by this. I can't think of a better solution than extant phishing site blacklists. Full-screen mode can be useful, but it and other HTML5 features can be used for phishing or…

NoScript already inherently blocks this, and even if you allow the domain that provides the script that tries to go full-screen, and allow the full-screen transition, the web page pretending to be a desktop doesn't cover the NoScript toolbar that's still prompting for permissions on the other domains. I suspect the anti-clickjacking measures would kick in if the phishing site tried to incorporate the real site as a b…

It's increasingly difficult to browse websites with NoScript and Request Policy add-ons. There are websites that download JS from more than a dozen different domains. Moreover, it seems that a lot of web developers (including some here) simply dismiss NoScript users "not our target audience". Emerging "HTML" standards don't make this situation any better, since they are pretty much aimed at developing websites in JavaScript, not HTML.

Re: Using the HTML5 Fullscreen API for Phishing Attacks

#120
post #22

When the standard was being ratified, this came up on the mailing list (I can't find the link right now, I am on my cell). The solution was that to recommend vendors print warning labels across the top or add a layer of permissions around the feature - which Chrome and Safari have done. for eg. when I open it I get a message saying 'Chrome is currently in fullscreen mode'. They will likely both also add permission bo…

>The first post rightly points out that Flash had the feature implemented in a non-secure manner for a long time.

Flash disabled all "printing" keys in full-screen mode, and disabled a warning label when entered into the mode. FS could only be entered from user action. So Flash's full-screen mode was limited but fairly secure.

Post reply on HN