Just a note - you can very much limit cpu usage on the docker containers by setting --cpus="0.5" (or cpus:0.5 in docker compose) if you expect it to be a very lightweight container, this isolation can help prevent one roudy container from hitting the rest of the system regardless of whether it's crypto-mining malware, a ddos attempt or a misbehaving service/software.
The other thing to note is that docker is for the most part, stateless. So if you're running something that has to deal with questionable user input (images and video or more importantly PDFs), is to stick it on its own VM and then cycle the docker container every hour and the VM every 12, and then still be worried about it getting hacked and leaking secrets.
I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
221–230 of 422 posts
Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#222Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#223> I also enabled UFW (which I should have done ages ago) I disrecommend UFW. firewalld is a much better pick in current year and will not grow unmaintainable the way UFW rules can. firewall-cmd --persistent --set-default-zone=block firewall-cmd --persistent --zone=block --add-service=ssh firewall-cmd --persistent --zone=block --add-service=https firewall-cmd --persistent --zone=block --add-port=80/tcp firewall-cmd --…
The problem with firewalld is that it has the worst UX of any program I know. Completely unintuitive options, the program itself doesn’t provide any useful help or hint if you get anything wrong and the documentation is so awful you have to consult the Red Hat manuals that have thankfully been written for those companies that pay thousands per month in support. It’s not like iptables was any better, but it was more i…
I’d love a Linux firewall configured with a sane config file and I think BSD really nailed it. It’s easy to configure and still human readable, even for more advanced firewall gateway setups with many interfaces/zones.
A have no doubt that Linux can do all the same stuff feature-wise, but oh god the UX :/
Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#224So this is part of the "React2Shell" CVE-2025-55182 issue? I find it interesting that this seems to get so little publicity. Almost like the issue is normal or expected. And it looks like the affected versions go back a little over a year. So if you've deployed anything with Next.js over the last 12 months your web app is now probably part of a million node bot net. And everyone's advice is just "use docker" or "inst…
Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#225So this is part of the "React2Shell" CVE-2025-55182 issue? I find it interesting that this seems to get so little publicity. Almost like the issue is normal or expected. And it looks like the affected versions go back a little over a year. So if you've deployed anything with Next.js over the last 12 months your web app is now probably part of a million node bot net. And everyone's advice is just "use docker" or "inst…
I'm hearing about it like crazy because I deployed around 100 Next frontends in that time period. I didn't use server components though so I'm not affected.
Unless you're running a static html export - eg: not running the nextjs server, but serving through nginx or similar
Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#226> The Reddit post I’d seen earlier? That guy got completely owned because his container was running as root. The malware could: [...] Is that the case, though? My understanding was, that even if I run a docker container as root and the container is 100% compromised, there still would need to be a vulnerability in docker for it to “attack” the host, or am I missing something?
While this is true, the general security stance on this is: Docker is not a security boundary. You should not treat it like one. It will only give you _process level_ isolation. If you want something with better security guarantees, you can use a full VM (KVM/QEMU), something like gVisor[1] to limit the attack surface of a containerized process, or something like Firecracker[2] which is designed for multi-tenancy. Th…
Of course if you have a kernel exploit you'd be able to break out (this is what gvisor mitigates to some extent), nothing seems to really protect against rowhammer/memory timing style attacks (but they don't seem to be commonly used). Beyond this, the main misconfigurations seem to be too wide volume bindings (e.g. something that allows access to the docker control socket from inside the container, or an obviously stupid mount like mounting your root inside the container).
Am I missing something?
Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#227Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#228Recently, those Monero miners were installing themselves everywhere that had a vulnerable React 19. I had exactly the same problem.
If you have decent network or process level monitoring, you're likely to find it, while you might not realize the vulnerable software itself or some stealthier, more dangerous malware that might exploit it.
Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#229> I also enabled UFW (which I should have done ages ago) I disrecommend UFW. firewalld is a much better pick in current year and will not grow unmaintainable the way UFW rules can. firewall-cmd --persistent --set-default-zone=block firewall-cmd --persistent --zone=block --add-service=ssh firewall-cmd --persistent --zone=block --add-service=https firewall-cmd --persistent --zone=block --add-port=80/tcp firewall-cmd --…
Re: I got hacked: My Hetzner server started mining Monero
#230Earlier quoted context omitted.
A firewall blocking outgoing connections (except those whitelisted through the proxy) would’ve likely prevented the download of the malware (as it’s usually done by using the RCE to call a curl/wget command rather than uploading the binary through the RCE) and/or its connection to the mining server.
In practice, this is basically impossible to implement. As a user behind a firewall you normally expect to be able to open connections with any remote host.
In this model, hosts don’t need any direct internet connectivity or access to public DNS. All outbound traffic is forced through the proxy, giving you full control over where each host is allowed to connect.
It’s not painless: you must maintain a whitelist of allowed URLs and HTTP methods, distribute a trusted CA certificate, and ensure all software is configured to use the proxy.