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Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

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Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#31

Given that all the stolen credentials were made public, I was hoping that someone would build a haveibeenpwned style site. We know we were compromised on at least a few tokens, but it would be nice to be able to search using a compromised token to find out what else leaked. We’ve rotated everything we could think of but not knowing if we’ve missed something sucks.

Doesn't it publish the repos to your Github account? Just clone and look at what was stolen.

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#32
post #21

NPM post-install scripts considered harmful. There has to be a tool that allows you (or an AI) to easily review post-install scripts before you install the package.

As mentioned in the article, good NPM package managers just do this now.

pnpm does it by default, yarn can be configured. Not sure about npm itself.

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#33
post #27
post #24

> stored in our database which was not compromised Personally I don't really agree with "was not compromised" You say yourself that the guy had access to your secrets and AWS, I'd definitely consider that compromised even if the guy (to your knowledge) didn't read anything from the database. Assume breach if access was possible.

There are logs for accessing aws resources and if you don't see the access before you revoke it then the data is safe

Unless the attacker used any one of hundreds of other avenues to access the AWS resource.

Are you sure they didn’t get a service account token from some other service then use that to access customer data?

I’ve never seen anyone claim in writing all permutations are exhaustively checked in the audit logs.

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#34
post #3

I have been thinking about this. How do I make my git setup on my laptop secure? Currently, I have my ssh key on the laptop, so if I want to push, I just use git push. And I have admin credentials for the org. How do I make it more secure?

One approach I started using a could of years ago was storing SSH private keys in the TPM, and using it via PKCS11 in SSH agent.

One benefit of Microsoft requiring them for Windows 11 support is that nearly every recent computer has a TPM, either hardware or emulated by the CPU firmware.

It guarantees that the private key can never be exfiltrated or copied. But it doesn't stop malicious software on your machine from doing bad things from your machine.

So I'm not certain how much protection it really offers on this scenario.

Linux example: https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Trusted_Platform_Module/SSH

macOS example (I haven't tested personally): https://gist.github.com/arianvp/5f59f1783e3eaf1a2d4cd8e952bb...

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#35
post #21

NPM post-install scripts considered harmful. There has to be a tool that allows you (or an AI) to easily review post-install scripts before you install the package.

As mentioned in the article, good NPM package managers just do this now. pnpm does it by default, yarn can be configured. Not sure about npm itself.

Got any pointers on how to configure this for yarn? I'm not turning anything up in the yarn documentation or in my random google searches.

npm still seems to be debating whether they even want to do it. One of many reasons I ditched npm for yarn years ago (though the initial impetus was npm's confused and constantly changing behaviors around peer dependencies)

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#36
The Torvalds commits were a common post infection signature, common in the random repos that published secrets (Microsoft documented https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/12/09/sha...)

It was a really noisy worm though, and it looked like a few actors also jumped on the exposed credentials making private repos public and modifying readmes promoting a startup/discord.

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#37
post #31

Given that all the stolen credentials were made public, I was hoping that someone would build a haveibeenpwned style site. We know we were compromised on at least a few tokens, but it would be nice to be able to search using a compromised token to find out what else leaked. We’ve rotated everything we could think of but not knowing if we’ve missed something sucks.

Doesn't it publish the repos to your Github account? Just clone and look at what was stolen.

On the follow up Wiz blog they suggested that the exfiltration was cross-victim https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-2-0-aftermath-ongoing-sup...

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#38
post #33
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are logs for accessing aws resources and if you don't see the access before you revoke it then the data is safe

Unless the attacker used any one of hundreds of other avenues to access the AWS resource. Are you sure they didn’t get a service account token from some other service then use that to access customer data? I’ve never seen anyone claim in writing all permutations are exhaustively checked in the audit logs.

It depends on what kind of access we're talking about. If we're talking about AWS resource mutations, one can trust CloudTrail to accurately log those actions. CloudTrail can also log data plane events, though you have to turn it on, and it costs extra. Similarly, RDS access logging is pretty trustworthy, though functionality varies by engine.

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#39
post #3

I have been thinking about this. How do I make my git setup on my laptop secure? Currently, I have my ssh key on the laptop, so if I want to push, I just use git push. And I have admin credentials for the org. How do I make it more secure?

Your SSH private key must be encrypted using a passphrase. Never store your private key in the clear!

Re: Shai-Hulud compromised a dev machine and raided GitHub org access: a post-mortem

#40
post #3

I have been thinking about this. How do I make my git setup on my laptop secure? Currently, I have my ssh key on the laptop, so if I want to push, I just use git push. And I have admin credentials for the org. How do I make it more secure?

Your SSH private key must be encrypted using a passphrase. Never store your private key in the clear!

And what do you do with the passphrase, store it encrypted with a passphrase?
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